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PREFACE
This field manual provides guidance to commanders and staffs of military intelligence (MI)
and other units responsible for technical intelligence (TECHINT) or having an association with
TECHINT.  It provides general guidance and identifies the tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) used in the collection, exploitation, and dissemination of TECHINT in satisfying the
warfighter's requirements.
TECHINT is an integral part of the overall battlefield operating system (BOS) and supports
Army operations through the analysis and exploitation of foreign equipment, weapons, and other
war materiel.
This field manual describes the TECHINT process at all echelons and identifies
responsibilities.  It further describes the MI TECHINT organizations, other services, and the
strategic  level intelligence agencies supporting the process.
  
On today's battlefield, Army forces will likely deploy as part of a joint or combined military
operation.  For that reason, while this manual supports Army operations, it does so in the context
of Army operations as part of a joint or combined task force.
This field manual applies to all Army personnel, to include Active Component (AC) and
Reserve Components (RC) commanders and their staffs, US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) Centers and Schools, and MI elements.
The proponent of this publication is US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
(USAIC&FH).  Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended
Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center
and School, ATTN:  ATZS-TDL-D, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.
The doctrine in this publication conforms with and supports the principles in FM 34-1 and
FM 100-5.  This manual does not implement any international standardization agreements but 
complies with the following Standardization Agreements:
STANAG 1059 - National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces (Edition 6).
STANAG 2014 - Operations Plans, Warning Orders, and Administrative/Logistics Orders    
         (Edition 7).
STANAG 2044 - Procedures for Dealing With Prisoners of War (Edition 5).
STANAG 2084 - Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents    
                                     (Edition 5).
STANAG 2097 - Nomenclature and Classification of Equipment (Edition 6).
STANAG 2143 - Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance/Explosive Ordnance Disposal
    (Edition 4).
STANAG 2389 - Minimum Standards of Proficiency for Trained Explosive Ordnance            
            Disposal Personnel (Edition 1).
STANAG 2834 - The Operation of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical       
 Information Center (EODTIC) (Edition 2).   
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not referFM 34-54
vi
exclusively to men.  The use or mention of any commercial or private organization's name or
trademark and the organization's services and/or funds by the US Army does not express or imply
an endorsement of the sponsor or its products and services by the US Army.FM 34-54 FM 34-54
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Chapter 1
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND SUPPORT
GENERAL
This chapter describes the TECHINT mission, how it supports the
warfighter, and presents TECHINT in a historical perspective.  TECHINT
results from the collection, evaluation, and analysis of foreign warfighting
equipment and associated materiel.  At the strategic level, the exploitation
and interpretation of foreign weapons systems, materiel, and technologies
is referred to as scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI).  This S&TI
covers—
Foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied
engineering techniques.
Scientific and technical (S&T) characteristics, capabilities, and
limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems,
and material.
Research and development (R&D) related to these systems and the
production methods employed for their manufacture.
MISSION
The TECHINT mission ensures that the warfighter has a clear
understanding of the full technological capabilities residing in his
opponent’s equipment.  With this knowledge, the warfighter adopts
  countermeasures, operations, and tactics, as necessary, to be successful
in any assigned mission.
TECHINT SUPPORT TO THE WARFIGHTER
STRATEGIC LEVEL:
The US has relied on its military strength as a strategic deterrent to war. 
The strength of the US military lies, in part, to the diversity and extent of its
technology base.  While the US aspires to be the leader in integrating
technology, the actual products are available to any buyer.  An adversary
can achieve temporary technological parity or advantage by acquiring
modern systems or capabilities.  The world arms market is willing to provide
these advanced systems to countries or individuals with the resources toFM 34-54
1-2
pay for them.  A concerted TECHINT program is vital to providing precise
direction and purpose within the US R&D process to ensure that this parity
or advantage is neutralized quickly and efficiently.
  
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL: 
 
For the Army, technology is changing how we organize, how we train and
develop leaders, and how we conduct operations.  Advances in electronics,
communications, automation, reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S),
contamination avoidance, precision-guided munitions, and the exploitation
of space-based capabilities have increased the lethality, range, accuracy,
and reliability of our weaponry.
   Operational and tactical commanders rely on this technological advantage
to successfully synchronize and execute complex modern Army operations. 
The introduction of a surprise technological capability by an adversary
causes confusion and delay mission accomplishment until the capability is
understood and countered.  TECHINT is the key to the early identification of
an adversary’s technical capabilities and the development of
countermeasures for the operational and tactical commander.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the 1920's, Germany was developing the weapons and systems it would
use against the Allies in the 1940's.   Because Allied nations did not
integrate TECHINT into peacetime collection efforts, German S&T
advances went largely unnoticed.  When information did come to light,
Washington and London ignored or ridiculed it.  Later, when
the Germans fielded their advanced weapons and systems in war, the
resulting technological surprise on the battlefield was devastating.
WORLD WAR II:
During the air battle for Europe, the British used TECHINT to counter the
German antiaircraft and night-fighter defenses.  This was accomplished by
exploiting captured aircraft radios and a captured radar station.  (See below
a discussion of the Bruneval Raid.)
The Allies captured many German and Italian weapons in North Africa. 
This collection led to the publishing of new technical material, such as—
Technical manual E9 series handbooks on enemy weapons.
Special series publications on German weapons.
Training aids.FM 34-54
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Updates to handbooks on the German and Italian armies.
TECHINT exploitation of captured German Tiger and Panther tanks led to
several important battlefield countermeasures.  One of these was the
adoption of new armor tactics while another was the development of more
powerful antitank rockets.
The United States started a successful TECHINT program in the fall of
1943 called the ALSOS mission.  This unit was made up of
Counterintelligence (CI) Corps agents, scientists, and interpreters.  Their
mission was to capture and exploit personnel and material of S&T value.
The successes of this unit included:
Exploitation of Italian and German nuclear scientists.
Removal of significant quantities of uranium ore from the Albert Canal.
Recovery of the international radium standards from what was to be
the Soviet occupied sector of Germany.
Throughout the remainder of the 1940's a Foreign Materiel Intelligence
Branch at the Ordnance Center, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD,
continued to conduct exploitation work on captured German and Japanese
equipment.
THE RAID ON BRUNEVAL—AN OFFENSIVE TECHINT OPERATION:
At 2100Z on 27 February 1942, 119 British soldiers of Company C, 2nd
Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, parachuted into a drop zone near the
small village of Bruneval, in Occupied France.  The company's mission was
to raid a suspected German radar site on a cliff a few hundred yards from
an accessible beach to bring back an item of extreme TECHINT
interest—the WUERZBURG radar.
The WUERZBURG radar was believed to be a mobile, short-range, high-
precision radar responsible for the sudden and serious increase in Allied
heavy bomber losses.  Routine Allied photographic reconnaissance
originally discovered the installation in January 1942.  French resistance
forces were sent to investigate.  They confirmed the site as well as a
garrison troop strength of nearly 200 enemy signal, support, and security
troops.  They also reported that the nearby beach was not mined.
It was the intelligence and urgent need to protect Allied planes that resulted
in the commando raid that night.  Once on the ground, the commandos
moved quickly and split into three equal groups.  The first group securedFM 34-54
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the beach.  The second group spread out and took up positions to act as a
reserve or blocking force.  The last group, the collection team and a special
radar technical expert, moved forward to take the target.
The collection team slipped through enemy defender positions, entered the
installation, and found the radar.  They used hacksaws, crowbars, and
precision hand tools to dismantle the main components.  As each part of
the radar was exposed, it was sketched and photographed.  The team also
captured a German signalman—the radar operator.
When they finished, the team destroyed what they couldn't take with them
and began their move to the beach under progressively heavy fire.  The
surviving commandos were picked up by Allied landing craft and escaped
across the Channel to England.
Exactly three and one-half hours after the mission began it was over. 
Although two men were killed, six wounded, and six more listed as missing
in action, the raid was deemed a great success.  Not only was it the first
raid on the continent following the disaster at Dunkirk but also it resulted in
the successful capture of a valuable piece of enemy material—material that
later proved to be of vital TECHINT interest.
  
Allied TECHINT experts examined the material as soon as they got it.  The
exploitation of this radar, along with the sketches and the photographs,
quickly began to provide valuable TECHINT.  For example, just from the
recovered metal manufacturer's plates, analysts accurately determined
how many Wuerzburg radars had been produced and their current rate of
production.  When the German signalman was interrogated, he provided
valuable information about the level of operator skills and operator training. 
Most important, though, TECHINT scientists
used the captured material to build an operational Wuerzburg radar
mockup.
When the mockup was completed, they had a multifrequency radar that
seemed, at first, to be almost impossible to jam.  Scientists went to work to
develop countermeasures to neutralize the radar's capabilities.  Their
efforts resulted in thin metallic strips cut to different lengths that could be
dropped from airplanes.  These strips reflected radar signals and effectively
jammed the new radars.  They dubbed these strips chaff.  CHAFF turned
out to be one of the most successful countermeasures developed during
World War II—being particularly useful during the Normandy Invasion.
THE KOREAN WAR:
It wasn't until the beginning of the Korean War, when North Korean troops
in Soviet-designed and Chinese-built armor rolled south, that the United
States discovered it had little confirmed data on enemy weapons systems. FM 34-54
1-5
We realized that to be able to develop effective countermeasures,
TECHINT had to be an ongoing process.  As a result, we once again began
a concerted TECHINT effort, with the Foreign Material Intelligence Branch
at Aberdeen Proving Grounds training and fielding TECHINT teams to
Korea.
In the Korean War, the warfighters found that their 2.36-inch bazooka
rockets could not penetrate the T-34/85 tanks' frontal armor.  With this
combat deficit identified, commanders began to support the TECHINT
process by evacuating captured T-34/85 tanks and other material to
TECHINT elements for exploitation.  TECHINT both in the theater and back
in the United States at the Chrysler Corporation analyzed the captured
material.  The US Army responded by giving combat commanders new
tactics, a redesigned M-48 tank, and a 3.5-inch bazooka.
 
The TECHINT effort also supported the political effort to prove Soviet
involvement on behalf of the North Korean aggressor.  Captured modern
Soviet weapons were regularly paraded before the UN Security Council as
evidence of Soviet support.
THE VIETNAM WAR:
Following the Korean War, the United States did not disband its TECHINT
capability completely, as had been done at the conclusion of all previous
hostilities.  But neither did we maintain it at its wartime level.  Three small
TECHINT detachments remained in place at the Army's research and
development centers.  By 1962 two of the detachments merged to form the
Army's Foreign Science and Technology Center.  The third detachment
established the Missile Intelligence Agency at Redstone
Arsenal.  The Surgeon General also operated a Medical Intelligence
Center at Fort Detrick, MD.
An agency called the Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) came
into being in 1966.  Its wartime mission was to manage, coordinate, and
analyze captured enemy equipment (CEE), and technical captured enemy
documents (CEDs).  The CMEC did this on a tactical level by dispatching
teams of experts and analysts into the tactical zone of each corps.  These
teams analyzed captured materiel in the field and recommended
countermeasures to tactical commanders.  American personnel working in
the CMEC were assigned to Delta Company, 519th MI Battalion.
The North Vietnamese employed Soviet designed man-portable systems
with considerable success.  The Soviet AT-3 Sagger antitank guided
missile (ATGM) was used against South Vietnamese armored vehicles,
communications bunkers, and even small outposts.  In addition, the SA-7
heat-seeking surface-to-air missile (SAM) was employed and became an
even more serious threat because it could disrupt allied control of the airFM 34-54
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space over the battlefield.  Lastly, the 122-mm rocket was employed as the
North Vietnamese Army's (NVA) primary artillery weapon in a variety of
configurations.  While samples of these weapons undoubtedly fell into the
hands of the South Vietnamese, nothing was done with them because of
the September 1969 inactivation of American TECHINT units in Vietnam.  
And, by October 1971, the 55th Military Intelligence Detachment, a corps
support unit with a TECHINT capability, had also been inactivated.
GRENADA  (OPERATION URGENT FURY):
Following the commitment of US forces to Grenada on 25 October 1983,
large quantities of foreign military equipment were discovered thus
requiring TECHINT support.
Two elements of the 203d MI Battalion, 513th MI Group, were deployed to
Grenada.  Five soldiers participated as members of a Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) Team formed at the request of the Commander in Chief,
Atlantic (CINCLANT) operational commander for URGENT FURY.  The first
element arrived in Grenada on 31 October 1983 and was tasked to identify, 
sort, and provide approximate inventories of foreign material and to
establish priorities for shipment to the United States.  Nineteen other
soldiers established the 203d MI Battalion (Forward) and operated a
modified CMEC.  Together the 203d soldiers type-classified and developed
inventories; assisted combat units in searches for materiel; operated a
collection point for CEE and captured enemy materiel (CEM); and shipped
appropriate items to the continental United States (CONUS).
In 1985 the 203d MI Battalion was redesignated the Foreign Materiel
Intelligence Group.  In 1989 it was again redesignated as the Foreign
Materiel Intelligence Battalion (FMIB).
THE GULF WAR (OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM):
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were the largest battlefield
TECHINT operations since the Vietnam War, and the largest joint and
combined TECHINT operations since World War II.  The Joint Captured
Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC) was formed with the Army's FMIB to
serve as the nucleus and headquarters.  Augmentation to the FMIB
included TECHINT personnel from every element of the Department of
Defense (DOD), the national S&TI community, Great Britain, Canada, and
Australia.
During Sadaam Hussein's attack on the Saudi Arabian city of Khafji in
February 1991, a previously unseen and highly modified tank was
captured.  This tank, a modified T-55, had vastly improved external armor
and possibly new fire control, weapons, and optical systems.  A team from
the JCMEC was dispatched forward to conduct a hasty exploitation and toFM 34-54
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find out if this tank required a tactical capabilities reassessment.  In
layman's terms, could this new tank, with its improved armor, defeat a
broader array of friendly weaponry?  Within 2 days, the TECHINT collection
team soldiers, analysts at the JCMEC, and national S&TI agencies in the
United States were able to report their findings to the theater commander
and his staff.
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM produced the largest amount of
CEM in the shortest amount of time since World War II.  As a result of
lessons learned from prior deployments, TECHINT provided
unprecedented timely and accurate information to the warfighter and the
national S&TI community.
   
SOMALIA (OPERATION RESTORE HOPE):
On 4 December 1992, the FMIB alerted a TECHINT liaison element (LNE)
for deployment in support of the US Marine Corps (USMC) II Expeditionary
Force, the core headquarters for Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia.
The TECHINT LNE deployed to Somalia on 16 December and established
operations at the US Embassy compound in southwest Mogadishu on 18
December.  The TECHINT LNE made several significant contributions to
the operations and intelligence efforts in Somalia.
  
On 21 December, the LNE accompanied a delegation from the JTF
Somalia headquarters on a tour of compounds controlled by rival warlords
in Mogadishu.  During the 5 to 10 minutes the LNE was inside of each of
the five compounds, the TECHINT LNE personnel compiled lists of the
foreign and US weapons, equipment, and ordnance controlled by the
warlords.  This order of battle (OB) intelligence was key in planning the
eventual US forces attack against one of those compounds.
After determining there was no theater-wide plan for the collection and
processing of CEM, the TECHINT LNE established the Centralized
Weapons Collection Center (CWCC).  In conjunction with explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel, the CWCC processed, screened for
intelligence value, and disposed of thousands of captured weapons and
hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition.
On 6 January, several SA-7 man-portable SAMs were captured in the
Mogadishu area.  In conjunction with EOD personnel, and with input from
the US Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), the TECHINT LNE
reported that the missiles were functional.  This intelligence prompted a
change in the air defense artillery (ADA) threat status and flight operations
in Somalia.
On 14 January, several French MILAN antitank missiles were captured inFM 34-54
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the Mogadishu area.  The TECHINT LNE conducted testing and evaluation
of captured missiles with personnel from the French contingent
of  Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) Somalia.  The missiles were
functional and capable of defeating all but the heaviest armor in the Somali
theater of operations.
HAITI (OPERATIONS RESTORE DEMOCRACY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY) :
In September 1994 FMIB deployed a 14-soldier TECHINT contingency
support detachment (CSD) and a 2-soldier LNE  in support of  US
Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY.   TECHINT LNE personnel, in
conjunction with JTF 180 and JTF 190 planners,  developed handling and
processing procedures for CEM, including weapons received as part of the
"Cash for Guns" program. 
 
The CSD established the JCMEC (Forward) in Port-au-Prince.  The CSD
screened, processed, and inventoried over 10,000 weapons and thousands
of rounds of ammunition by hand without the benefit of materiel-handling
equipment.  The resulting database provided OB analysts a tool for
assessing the threat to US forces as well as the success of the "Cash for
Guns" program.  Additionally, the "by serial number" inventory was
forwarded to national law enforcement agencies via CI liaison channels to
aid in arms smuggling investigations.
At the time of redeployment,  CSD personnel had accomplished all
assigned  national TECHINT collection requirements, and through
intelligence discipline integration, played key roles in various signals
intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations.
  
LESSONS LEARNED
The historical experience of the nation in times of peace and war clearly
demonstrates the need for a fully operational Army TECHINT capability.  A
robust TECHINT collection and analysis capability, with dynamic links to
S&TI centers in the United States is especially vital in the future's
technologically sophisticated battlefield.  This capability is required to
correctly portray the battlespace for warfighting commanders.  Furthermore,
TECHINT enhances force protection.  To neglect TECHINT during the
planning and execution of Army operations invites the possibility of
technological surprise.FM 34-54
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Chapter 2
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
     INTRODUCTION
TECHINT is the end product of a complex process.  It is the result of
collecting, analyzing, and processing information on foreign technological
developments.  It is also the result of studying the performance of foreign
materiel and its operational capabilities.  
TECHINT has two goals:
To ensure the US armed forces maintain technological advantage
against any adversary.
To provide tailored, timely, and accurate TECHINT support to the
warfighter throughout the entire range of military operations. 
This support includes providing US forces information and training on
foreign weapons systems to an extent that allows use of the CEE.  The
TECHINT system accomplishes both missions.
  
THE S&TI COMMUNITY
The S&TI community satisfies the nation's overall TECHINT objectives
during peacetime, and the strategic TECHINT requirements in wartime.
The S&TI community starts at the DOD level.  Figure 2-1 shows this
organizational structure.
S&TI is designed to track and analyze foreign technological developments. 
It is used to analyze the performance and operational capabilities of foreign
materiel that may have military application.
Although the primary function of the S&TI community is to satisfy strategic
TECHINT objectives, it also makes significant contributions toward fulfilling
operational and tactical TECHINT requirements.  Strategic communications
between battlefield TECHINT units and S&TI centers allow the use of their
comprehensive databases and expertise to rapidly satisfy the TECHINT
requirements of the warfighter.FM 34-54
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STRUCTURE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:
 
DIA manages and reviews overall TECHINT activities throughout DOD
during peacetime and war.  The S&TI directorate within DIA is the action
element for TECHINT.  This directorate coordinates with external
TECHINT agencies on nonpolicy matters concerning the production of
S&TI. 
 
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC).  AFMIC, based at
Fort Detrick, MD, is a DOD intelligence production center under control of
DIA.  AFMIC is responsible for exploiting foreign medical materiel.  The
director supports the Army Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program (FMEP)
and Army medical R&D requirements.  The director coordinates with the
Deputy Chief of Staff,  Intelligence (DCSINT) in planning, programming,
and budgeting.  AFMIC—
Studies and reports foreign medical S&TI and general medical
intelligence to DOD and other Federal agencies.
Studies and reports foreign biological warfare S&TI capabilities.
Administers the DOD Foreign Medical Materiel Exploitation Program
(FMMEP).
Provides "quick response" foreign medical intelligence support to DOD
and other Federal agencies.
Maintains a mutually beneficial S&TI exchange with the US Army
Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) to complement Army
capabilities.
Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC).  MSIC, based at Redstone
Arsenal, AL, is a DOD intelligence production center under control of DIA
and supports the FMEP.  The MSIC acquires, produces, maintains, and
disseminates S&TI pertaining to missile and space weapons systems,
subsystems, components, and activities.  The S&TI produced at MSIC also
covers foreign state-of-the-art  technology and research applicable to
missiles.  MSIC analyzes—
Directed energy weapons.
Antisatellite technology.
Tactical air defense.FM 34-54
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Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).
Antitank guided missiles (ATGMs).
Defense HUMINT Service (DHS).  DHS conducts worldwide HUMINT
operations in support of foreign materiel acquisition and exploitation.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA):
NSA is the SIGINT organization of the US Government.  It  is responsible
for exploiting cryptologic and electronic warfare (EW) materiel.
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA):
DARPA is the central R&D organization for DOD.  It manages and directs
selected basic and applied R&D projects for DOD and pursues research
and technology where risk and payoff are both very high and where
success may provide dramatic advances for traditional military roles and
missions.  DARPA sponsors R&D in all aspects of TECHINT, including
imagery intelligence (IMINT), SIGINT, HUMINT, and measurement and
signature intelligence (MASINT).  For the latest description of DARPA
projects, visit the DARPA World Wide Web site on the Internet: 
http://www.arpa.mil/.
AIR FORCE:
National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC).  NAIC is the primary DOD
agency producing foreign aerospace S&TI.  It satisfies DIA requirements
and supports the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(AFACSI).  NAIC acquires, analyzes, produces, and disseminates S&TI
related to current and future enemy aerospace capabilities.
NAVY:
Naval EOD Technical Division and Fire Support and Armament
Command EOD.  These are the primary training centers of all Joint EOD
personnel.  Augmented by Army EOD specialists from Picatinny Arsenal,
they act as primary centers establishing identification, render safe
procedures (RSPs) and demolition procedures for foreign ordnance.
Office of Naval Intelligence.  The Navy proponent for TECHINT in the
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is designated ONI-23.  ONI-23 providesFM 34-54
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  S&TI on technical characteristics and capabilities of foreign naval forces
and merchant systems.  It provides S&TI support to the Commander of
the ONI and the Chief of Naval Operations.
ARMY:
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ODCSINT).  Although
ODCSINT does not produce intelligence, it does have general staff
responsibility for all Army TECHINT activities.  The ODCSINT—  
Formulates policies and procedures for S&TI activities.
Supervises and carries out the Army S&TI program.
Coordinates Department of the Army (DA) staff and major subordinate
command requirements for TECHINT.
Is responsible for the Army Foreign Materiel Program  (FMP).
US Army Materiel Command (AMC).  AMC is a major Army command
(MACOM) with a significant support role in TECHINT.  Among AMC
elements are a series of research, development, and engineering centers
(RDECs), the Army Research Laboratory System, and the US Army Test
and Evaluation Command (TECOM).  Each plays a role in wartime in
conducting highly technical evaluations of foreign equipment.  In
peacetime, the AMC conducts foreign materiel exploitation (FME) on
equipment purchased by each laboratory and RDEC for the intelligence
community and for DOD as part of the International Materiel Evaluation
Program (IMEP).
        AMC's Foreign Ordnance exploitation team is at the Fire Support 
      Armaments Center (FSAC) EOD (Picatinny Arsenal).  They exploit foreign
ground ordnance and develop RSP for foreign ordnance.  They also
prepare detailed intelligence reports to support EOD, Intelligence, and US
munitions developer communities.
Additionally, AMC operates the Scientific Intelligence Center Europe
(STICEUR ) and Scientific Intelligence Center Far East (STICFE) with the
purpose of overtly collecting information on foreign technical developments
by attending arms shows and technology exhibitions.
AMC's Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) is the
headquarters for the US Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU).  This unit has
the mission to collect and escort nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
samples from the battlefield to CONUS for testing and evaluation.FM 34-54
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US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).  Under the
direction of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), INSCOM is
responsible for peacetime TECHINT operations.  Headquarters, INSCOM,
fulfills its responsibilities through its TECHINT oversight function and
manages the Army's Foreign Materiel for Training (FMT) Program and
FMEP.  It does this by— 
Providing the interface with strategic S&TI agencies in support of
foreign materiel exploitation.
Organizing, training, and equipping echelons above corps (EAC)
TECHINT organizations during peacetime. 
Headquarters, INSCOM, controls two organizations that facilitate
TECHINT:  National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) and the 203d MI
Battalion.
National Ground Intelligence Center:
Headquarters, INSCOM, exercises direct operational control over the
NGIC.  NGIC produces and maintains intelligence on foreign scientific
developments, ground force weapons systems, and associated
technologies.  NGIC analysis includes, but is not  limited to, military
communications-electronics (C-E) systems which include—
Types of aircraft used by foreign ground forces (usually rotary wing).
NBC systems.
Basic research in civilian technologies with possible military
applications.
203d Military Intelligence Battalion:
The 203d MI Battalion, headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, is
the only AC TECHINT battalion.  The 203d MI Battalion is subordinate to
the Force Projection Brigade (FPB) supporting national level S&TI.  It—
Conducts TECHINT and MASINT collection and reporting in support of
validated S&TI objectives and MASINT data requirements (MDRs).
Acts as the HQDA executive agent for foreign materiel used for training
purposes.
Conducts formalized TECHINT and MASINT training for DOD analystsFM 34-54
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and RC TECHINT personnel.
Supports INSCOM's foreign materiel acquisition (FMA) operations and
FME operations as directed.
Supports the Technical Reconnaissance and Surveillance (TECRAS)
Program through its MASINT detachment.  See Appendix A for MASINT
support to TECHINT operations.
All TECHINT assets that reside in the RC are Wartraced to the 203d MI
Battalion.  Their primary peacetime mission focuses on training.   However,
certain RC TECHINT units and individuals are tasked to augment real
world S&TI missions.FM 34-54
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Chapter 3
BATTLEFIELD TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes battlefield TECHINT operations, functions, and
procedures.  Battlefield TECHINT operations consist of collection, hasty
exploitation, initial TECHINT reporting, analysis, evacuation (as necessary),
detailed exploitation and analysis, and production and dissemination of final
TECHINT products.  The term "battlefield" includes any area of operation
that US forces occupy while conducting the full range of military operations. 
Battlefield TECHINT can start with one conscientious soldier identifying
something new in the area of operations and taking the proper steps to
report it.  The information or item is initially exploited to ascertain if it
represents an advantage for the enemy.  If it does, the information or item
then undergoes increasing levels of analysis until a countermeasure is
developed and the technological advantage is neutralized.  While a single
weapon or technology seldom means the difference between final victory or
defeat, it can give one side a battlefield advantage.
A mutually dependent relationship exists between the support the
warfighter gets from the TECHINT process and the support TECHINT gets
from the warfighter.  Operational and tactical commanders identify, capture,
protect, and evacuate CEM that undergoes analysis for TECHINT value. 
TECHINT analysts receive CEM, conduct detailed exploitation, and
recommend countermeasures to overcome an enemy's technological
advantage.  
Another result of this analysis is the development of a new US technology
or an enhancement to an existing technology.  In any case the end result is
the neutralization of the adversary’s technological advantage.
Commanders further ensure the success of the process by demanding
TECHINT support to accomplish their assigned missions.FM 34-54
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203D MI BATTALION (TECHINT):
The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) mission during conflict and war is to
provide near-real-time (NRT) intelligence derived from the exploitation of
weapons, equipment, and other materiel found, captured, or acquired within
the theater area of operations.  This includes all items of an S&T nature. 
This battalion is the centerpiece of the theater TECHINT mission; task-
organizing personnel and equipment to support several echelons.  Figure
3-2 shows the 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) organization.  The HHC and
the TECHINT Exploitation Company form the CMEC.  This union is
discussed below.FM 34-54
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HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (HHC): 
HHC conducts normal service support operations.  In addition, its 
personnel may be tasked to perform duties as LNEs at various echelons.   The S4
section, besides its normal maintenance and logistics staff 
responsibilities, also plays a significant role in the TECHINT concept of 
operations.  The S4—
Conducts warehouse operations for all CEE maintained at the CMEC.
Monitors CEE at the Corps level collection points.
Monitors captured ammunition and ordnance at Corps ammunition
points.
Assists in the transportation and tracking of equipment from theater to
CONUS.  
TECHINT EXPLOITATION COMPANY:
The TECHINT Exploitation Company consists of TECHINT collection
managers and senior technical analysts in weapons and armaments,
mobility systems, EW and communications systems, and chemical,
medical, and logistics systems.  
During joint and/or combined operations the CMEC may receive joint
and/or combined augmentees.  In this case, the CMEC is redesignated as
the JCMEC or Combined Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center
(CJCMEC).  In all three configurations, the CMEC is  commanded by the
Commander, 203d MI Battalion.  See Appendix B for JCMEC operations
and responsibilities.
TECHINT COLLECTION COMPANY:
   The TECHINT Collection Company consists of three TECHINT collection
teams that normally are attached one per Corps MI brigade. The teams'
mission is to conduct the initial identification and exploitation of foreign
equipment in support of the Corps and, when directed, theater and national
requirements.  Additionally, the teams help monitor evacuation of the
equipment off the battlefield.
The MI Team (TECHINT) (Collection) serves as the intelligence collection
system for the battalion.  It consists of TECHINT-qualified soldiers trained in
the military occupational specialties (MOSs) shown in Figure 3-3.  These
teams, trained in TECHINT analysis, deploy forward of the JCMEC
into the Corps area and receive their taskings from the CMEC throughFM 34-54
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TECHINT LNEs at the Corps G2.  CEE is stored in the theater COSCOM.
NTC AND MASINT DETACHMENTS:
The Naval Technical Center (NTC) TECHINT Detachment, currently 
C Detachment, 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT), is similar to the TECHINT
Collection Company in its mission to conduct initial identification and
exploitation of foreign equipment in support of Corps, theater, and national 
requirements.  It is organized similar to the TECHINT collection teams
that are subordinate to the TECHINT Collection Company.  During  wartime
or contingency it would have the same command and control  relationships as a TECHINT
collection team.  It also has the additional  mission of supporting INSCOM's FMT Program at the
National Training  Center.
The MASINT Detachment attaches MASINT analysts to the TECHINT
collection teams and also provides senior analysts to the TECHINT
Collection Company.FM 34-54
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BATTLEFIELD TECHINT CHANNELS
The battlefield TECHINT channels are designed to support both operational
and tactical levels of war.  They support warfighting commanders at all
levels (see Figure 2-1). 
EAC TECHINT support consists of the Joint Technical Intelligence Branch
(JTIB) located at the Theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), the CMEC
formed around the 203d MI Battalion, and TECHINT LNEs located at
various EAC analysis and control elements (ACEs).  These EAC TECHINT
assets provide general support to the theater.
  
Echelons corps and below (ECB) TECHINT support  initially consists of 
TECHINT collection teams and TECHINT LNEs detached from the 203d MI
Battalion.  At a minimum, one TECHINT collection team is attached to each
Corps MI Brigade.  The team takes operational direction from the G2 via the
TECHINT liaison officer (LNO) in providing direct support to ECB units from
forward locations on the battlefield.  A TECHINT LNE is attached to each
Corps G2 or component equivalent.  Upon mobilization, RC TECHINT units
augment the 203d MI Battalion.
Regardless of the echelon, TECHINT elements are equipped to give the
supported commander timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive information
and recommended countermeasures based on CEM exploitation.  This
exploitation includes  identifying, analyzing, and coordinating the evacuation
of CEE, CED, and other CEM.  See 
Appendix C for procedures for handling and evacuating CEM.
JOINT TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 
The JTIB is formed during joint operations.  The JTIB is located at the
Theater JIC and is composed of military and civilian TECHINT subject
matter experts (SMEs).  The JTIB chief  is normally the DIA representative
and serves as the senior advisor on TECHINT matters to the Theater
Commander and the J2.
 
The JTIB conducts the following missions:
Coordinates all national, operational, and tactical TECHINT
requirements for the theater.
Develops the theater TECHINT collection plan.
Coordinates with the J2 and the JCMEC to execute all TECHINTFM 34-54
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requirements.
Provides liaison and coordination support for the JCMEC and the
TECHINT collection teams at the JTF level.
CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTER 
The main effort of the TECHINT mission is executed through a CMEC
formed from TECHINT personnel from the 203d MI Battalion.  The CMEC is
the first major processor of CEM of TECHINT value.  The CMEC—
Exploits CEM based on national, Theater, and supported commanders'
requirements.
Produces TECHINT reports (including countermeasures) for tactical
commanders.
In coordination with EOD, provides render safe procedures (RSPs) for
foreign munitions to combat units.
Coordinates the safe handling and evacuation of CEM.
Coordinates evacuation of special-interest CEM from ECB locations to
the CMEC.
Supervises evacuation of CEM from theater to CONUS.
Coordinates with the Theater or Joint Interrogation Facility for the
selection and technical interrogation of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs)
assessed to have TECHINT-related knowledge.  TECHINT analysts
may assist interrogators and strategic debriefers during interrogation of a
wide range of HUMINT sources of TECHINT interest by conducting
"quarterback" debriefing operations with the debriefers.
Provides accountability for CEE and CEDs within the theater TECHINT
structure.
Recommends CEM disposition to the Theater and Corps commands.
Maintains the theater TECHINT database.
Maintains the theater S&TI and battlefield TECHINT requirements.
The CMEC normally is located in the theater rear area near main supply
routes (MSRs) and air and sea ports to accommodate rapid evacuation ofFM 34-54
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equipment.  Every effort should be made to collocate the CMEC with the
Theater Interrogation Facility to enhance the integration of HUMINT and
TECHINT operations.  
Additionally, being collocated provides a single geographical area where
subordinate units bring captured personnel and CEM, as well as
consolidating many transportation and security requirements.  Regardless of
its location, it is fully equipped with sensitive and sophisticated test and
communication equipment.  Analyst teams use this equipment to perform
detailed in-theater exploitations.  
The CMEC can also organize a team from organic CMEC assets to meet
immediate requirements of echelons without TECHINT support.  These
teams can deploy forward or support rear area units as required. 
JCMEC AND CJCMEC
The JCMEC and CJCMEC are organized and conduct the same missions
as the CMEC.  The JCMEC and CJCMEC differ as follows.  They—
Allow a free flow of information, reports, and TECHINT exploitation
summaries between joint forces and/or allies; this is because the
intelligence support staff is joint and/or combined.
Coordinate scientific exploitation assistance from joint and/or allied
TECHINT analysts.
May provide direct support  US and allied TECHINT teams to joint and/or
allied ECB units as required.
TECHINT LIAISON ELEMENTS
The TECHINT LNEs are composed of TECHINT personnel from the 203d MI
Battalion.  The LNEs serve as advisors on all TECHINT-related matters. 
The TECHINT LNEs provide coordination and tasking support for the CMEC
and the theater TECHINT effort.  The TECHINT LNEs consist of one to three
TECHINT personnel.  Figure 3-4 shows the possible locations of TECHINT
LNEs if deployed as part of a JTF.FM 34-54
3-9
CORPS CMEC (FORWARD) 
An RC TECHINT section may staff a Corps level CMEC (Forward) normally
located at the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) area 
Class VII collection point.  Its primary mission is to inventory and identify
CEE located at the COSCOM Class VII collection point and screen it for
items of TECHINT value.
 
After identifying an item of TECHINT value, the CMEC (Forward)
coordinates with the Corps G4 through the supporting TECHINT LNE for the
transportation of the item back to the CMEC.  The  CMEC (Forward)
supports  the movement of  the CEE by packing or crating it when required.
The RC TECHINT section conducts preliminary exploitation and reporting
on the identified materiel and assists the Corps TECHINT teams as
required.
The RC TECHINT section normally consists of 15 personnel with organic
transportation.  The section's detailed analysis of CEE may be limited due to
number of personnel  and organic equipment.
BATTLEFIELD TECHINT COLLECTION TEAMS
The 203d MI Battalion provides direct support TECHINT collection teams to
ECB MI Brigades or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) intelligence
elements.  These teams are mobile and organized according to available 
resources and subordinate command requirements.FM 34-54
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TECHINT collection teams perform their mission as a tactical extension of
the CMEC.  They concentrate on the initial identification and exploitation of
CEM and provide TECHINT assistance to Corps and Division G2s.  Detailed
analysis by these teams is limited due to personnel  limitations and lack of
extensive diagnostic equipment. The TECHINT collection team normally will
have 14 TECHINT analysts and 2 MASINT analysts.
TECHINT collection teams are usually staffed with analysts capable of
exploiting threat equipment and documents in eight functional areas:  
C-E, automation systems, weapons, munitions, NBC, medical, mobility, and
signatures analysis.  The areas are described below:
C-E TECHINT is the analysis and exploitation of foreign and threat
communications, computers, radars, intercept and jamming equipment,
and like systems, including  electro-optic and directed-energy
technology.
Automation systems TECHINT is the analysis and exploitation of foreign
automation hardware and software.
Weapons TECHINT involves the analysis of threat weapons and
                                          weapon systems, including rocket, tube artillery, mortars, small arms,        
           ATGMs, other missiles, and associated fire control.
Munitions TECHINT involves the analysis of threat munitions including
missiles, NBC munitions, direct and indirect fire weapons ammunition,
explosives, and mines.
NBC TECHINT is based on the analysis of threat offensive and
defensive NBC material including NBC samples,  flame materials, and
obscurants. This analysis determines threat strengths and vulnerabilities
in relation to NBC operations.
 
Medical TECHINT focuses on the identification, evaluation, and
exploitation of medical materiel, general purpose systems modified for
medical support, and biological agents sampling. 
 
Mobility TECHINT exploits threat vehicles,  engineer equipment, 
materiel handling equipment,  and power generation.  Mobility TECHINT
determines the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the enemy to maneuver
and support its combat forces on the battlefield.
Signatures analysis involves collecting and analyzing the acoustic,
infrared, and hyperspectral and seismic signatures of foreign equipment.FM 34-54
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Historical Vignette
The XVIII Airborne Corps in support of a JTF is engaged in military operations in the country of
Zula.  During search operations, Company A of the 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry, discovers a
recently vacated facility that contains chemicals.
The commander notifies the 1st Battalion S2 and secures the facility until a permanent security
force arrives.  The Battalion S2 notifies the Brigade S2, who in turn requests that the battlefield
TECHINT collection team investigates the facility.
The battlefield TECHINT collection team arrives at the facility and does a cursory evaluation. 
Upon initial identification, several chemical samples are removed and transported to the Corps
CMEC (Forward).  The battlefield TECHINT collection team submits a report through channels to
the JTF J2 stating that certain suspect chemicals have been found; they've been  identified as
nerve gas; they will be moved to the Corps CMEC (Forward), and the team will confirm its initial
findings in a follow-up report within 4 hours.
Upon receipt, the Corps CMEC (Forward) coordinates with the Corps G4, through the supporting
TECHINT LNE, to transport the chemicals to the Corps CMEC.
If identification is made at the Corps CMEC, then the Corps G2 submits a report through the
Corps ACE to the JTF J2, for dissemination to the XVIII Airborne Corps G2, 1st Brigade S2, and
1st Battalion S2 for further dissemination to the Commander of Company A (the unit that found
the chemicals).  The Corps G2 also provides the report to other commanders and staffs within
the AO.  If identification or further analysis is required, the Corps CMEC coordinates the safe
handling and evacuation of chemicals to CONUS for identification and reporting.FM 34-54
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Chapter 4
INTELLIGENCE CYCLE APPLIED TO TECHNICAL 
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
The five-step process known as the intelligence cycle is applied to
TECHINT operations to ensure synchronization with the overall all-source
intelligence mission and collection plan.
  
PLAN AND DIRECT  
   Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB ) is the primary intelligence
task which helps the J2/G2 focus and direct this step of TECHINT and the
remaining steps of the intelligence cycle.  Figure 4-1 shows an example of
planning and directing.
The JTIB develops the commander's TECHINT priority intelligence
requirements (PIR), TECHINT information requirements (IR), and specific
information requests (SIR).  The JTIB helps develop TECHINT
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) and SIR of a
TECHINT nature.  The JTIB ensures requirements are closely coordinated
with combatant command J2, or theater Army G2 as well as major
subordinate commands; for example, corps G2.  The JTIB then integrates
and deconflicts these CCIR and SIR with other items of special interest to
the S&TI community and develops a prioritized TECHINT collection list.FM 34-54
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The TECHINT CCIR and SIR and the prioritized TECHINT collection list
normally are found in the TECHINT Appendix to the Intelligence Annex to
the operations order (OPORD) at all echelons maneuver brigade or group
and above.
  
Through all-source analysis, the JTIB and JCMEC template are where
items of TECHINT interest are most likely to be found on the battlefield. 
This is referred to as "TECHINT templating."  Appropriate units are notified,
through intelligence, that these items may be within their areas of
operations and are tasked for collection through collection management
channels.  The taskings must be translated into terms that combat, support,
and specific collectors can understand.
 
The taskings should include a TECHINT target folder (TTF).  Figure 4-2
shows an example of a TTF.  At a minimum, the TTF should include a
description of the item, with what major combat systems the item is
associated, as well as handling instructions, reporting instructions, and a
photograph or sketch if available.  The JCMEC and Corps level CMEC
(Forward) are responsible for producing TTFs.
 
1.  General information:
a.  Target folder inventory/index.
b.  Record of changes/updates.
c.  Validation/review sheet.
d.  Target identification data—
(1)  Name.
(2)  Description.
(3)  Photographs or sketches (imagery showing location on major end
       item if TECHINT item is subcomponent).
(4)  Country of origin.
(5)  Other equipment associated with materiel.
(6)  General description/significance (brief explanation of importance of
       materiel in terms of direct results should its use be denied partially
       or totally).
(7)  Type of unit materiel is associated with (unit designation if available).
(8)  Disposition instructions.
(9)  References.
Figure 4-2.  TECHINT target folder.
Additionally, the JCMEC must develop TECHINT-related indicators and
SOR for other intelligence disciplines to augment and complement the
single-source TECHINT effort.  One example would be the development of
TECHINT-related screening questions for EPWs as they are processed. 
Another might be to request that imagery analysts keep anFM 34-54
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eye out for a suspected external modification on a particular model of            
                     main battle tank during the normal course of their duty.
COLLECT
TECHINT collection is acquiring foreign materiel, associated technical
documents, or other information of TECHINT interest and providing these to
the processing and production elements.  It includes the maneuver and
positioning of intelligence assets to locations favorable to satisfying
TECHINT collection objectives.
All TECHINT collection is guided by CCIR, SIR, and the TECHINT
collection list.  Battlefield TECHINT collection includes capturing, reporting,
and evacuating CEM.  For that reason, tactical TECHINT and intelligence
planners must include a CEM appendix in the Logistics Annex to the
OPORD.  Logistics is critical in TECHINT collection operations.
Forward deployed units capture or collect items of known or possible
TECHINT interest.  Capturing units will normally safeguard CEM and report
it through intelligence channels to the first TECHINT element in the
reporting chain, normally the TECHINT LNE at Corps G2.  The Corps
TECHINT LNE then forwards the report simultaneously to the JCMEC and
JTIB and verifies if the type of materiel captured is required.  Further
disposition is determined, appropriate coordination is made by the Corps
TECHINT LNE with G2/G3 staff, and the capturing unit receives guidance
through operational (G3/S3) channels.  Figure 4-3 describes the flow of
CEM guidance and decisions.
A TECHINT collection team may be sent forward to confirm the
identification and conduct initial exploitation of the materiel at the site. 
Often the items of TECHINT value are subcomponents of major end items. 
In this case, the collection team removes and evacuates the items using
organic transportation, as shown in Figure 4-4.   
 
The capturing unit may be ordered to evacuate the materiel with its organic
equipment.  In this instance, they will receive detailed instructions from the
Corps LNE or direct support TECHINT collection team via G3/S3 channels. 
The Corps LNE or TECHINT collection team moves to the materiel's
location at the Corps CEM collection point when the materiel is not taken
directly to a Corps CMEC (Forward) or Theater JCMEC.
TECHINT collection can prove to be a significant force protection multiplier. 
One example is TECHINT team identification of NBC materiel prior to
transport, handling, or destruction of munitions or samples.FM 34-54
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PROCESS
Processing is the conversion of collected information into a suitable form
that can be readily used to produce intelligence.  Processing includes data
from conversion, photographic development, and transcription and
translation of foreign language materiel.  Effective processing management
ensures that critical information is extracted and processed ahead of
information of lesser immediate value.  Reports are generated and sent to
all appropriate theater and national assets during this process.
TECHINT processing starts with the capture of a piece of equipment of
TECHINT value.  This confirms that the enemy is indeed employing this
materiel.  A TECHINT collection team normally conducts a hasty
exploitation at the capture site.  After the hasty exploitation, a decision is
made at the JCMEC or JTIB as to whether the process continues.  If it
does, the items are sent to the Corps CMEC (Forward) or Theater JCMEC. 
If the item is deemed to yield no immediate tactical intelligence value, it may
still be evacuated to the S&TI centers in CONUS for further analysis if the
systems represent a change in the technological posture of an enemy.
PRODUCE
Producing involves the integration, evaluation, analysis, and synthesis of
information from single or multiple sources into intelligence.  At the tactical
level, time constraints and demands of the battle tend to make the
processing and producing steps indistinguishable.
TECHINT reports (along with interrogation reports from EPWs with
TECHINT knowledge) and digital imagery both funnel into the JCMEC
where they undergo the dynamics of production mentioned above.  They
are then sent to the JTIB and Theater ACE as a single-source TECHINT
product.
  
DISSEMINATE
Dissemination is the timely conveyance of intelligence to users in an easily
consumable form.  The diversity of forms and means requires
interoperability among command, control, communications, and intelligence
(C I) systems.  TECHINT reporting from JCMEC to the Theater ACE will be
3
conducted through existing communications links (See Appendix B for
communications architecture).
The JCMEC sends its completed products to the JTIB and to the Theater
ACE.  This report is based on the standard intelligence information reportFM 34-54
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(IIR) format.  TECHINT reports are then disseminated through two
channels.  The ACE fuses the TECHINT single-source product into its all-
source reports and disseminates them through normal J2/G2/S2 channels. 
While the TECHINT single-source product is being integrated into the ACE
all-source product, the JTIB disseminates the single-source TECHINT
product through TECHINT communications channels to the national S&TI
centers in CONUS.  This ensures both the rapid dissemination of TECHINT
and the fusion of TECHINT into all-source products.
The intelligence cycle is a continuous process in which steps are executed
concurrently, although not always sequentially.  For example, while new
information is being collected to satisfy one set of TECHINT requirements,
a new TECHINT item may be reported on the battlefield.  The JTIB plans
and redirects efforts while the intelligence produced from the previously
collected materiel or information is disseminated.  One or several iterations
of the intelligence cycle may be conducted depending on the time
constraints of the mission. 
BATTLEFIELD TECHINT REPORTING SEQUENCE
 THE CAPTURE:
A soldier either captures or observes an item of possible TECHINT interest
and does not tamper with it.  The soldier quickly reports the encounter via
the size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) spot report
format  through the chain of command to the Battalion S2.  The soldier then
either safeguards the items or continues the mission as directed (see
Figure 3-1).
  BATTALION S2: 
The battalion S2 coordinates security or continued observation of the item
with the S3 and ensures the item is not tampered with in any way.
WARNING
  Components, control knobs, and switches on       
 C-E equipment MUST NOT be touched until the  
equipment is photographed or positions               
recorded by TECHINT or other trained                 
personnel to avoid the possibility of immediate     
personal injury or damage to equipment.
The battalion S2 reports the items in the SALUTE format to the brigade S2,
and continues security or observation of the items until receiving further
instructions.  When possible, the capturing units identify associated items
requiring immediate screening for combat information by other supportingFM 34-54
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MI elements.  This could include C-E systems, code books, or technical
documents such as operator manuals.
TECHINT LNE:
The TECHINT LNE at Corps (or lowest level) receives the SALUTE report
through intelligence reporting channels.  He then compares report 
information with outstanding requirements to see if collection is necessary. 
Depending on the priority of the requirement and tactical situation, the
Corps LNE may—
       Coordinate with the G3 and MI Brigade Commander to dispatch the
Corps direct support TECHINT collection team to the capture site.
  
   Give further instructions for exploitation and/or evacuation procedures
to the capturing unit S2.  
If an intelligence requirement no longer exists for the captured equipment,
the LNE informs the capturing S2 who disposes of the materiel within
normal logistics channels. 
 
In any case, the Corps TECHINT LNE forwards an information copy of the
SALUTE report with details of initial actions taken to the JTIB, JCMEC, and
other TECHINT LNEs.
BATTLEFIELD TECHINT ANALYSIS
Once a TECHINT unit takes custody of a TECHINT item, battlefield
TECHINT exploitation begins.  TECHINT analysts and specialists use
checklists established by S&TI agencies and the JCMEC to exploit each 
type of threat equipment for which requirements exist.  S&TI and the
JCMEC develop battlefield exploitation procedures from four sources:
The US Army Test and Evaluation Command's international test
operation procedures.
Coordination with S&TI analysts.
Theater and Corps TECHINT requirements.
Their own experience.
Exploitation procedures are standardized yet constantly updated and
included in different exploitation plans based on the type of equipment or
documents being exploited.   These plans steer the analysis process.FM 34-54
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As the materiel moves through the TECHINT chain, each succeeding level
of the exploitation process is completed.  TECHINT units maintain
procedures and plans for sampling, exploiting, and handling materiel in the
following categories:
Missile guidance systems, warheads, fuses, and propellants.
Munitions, mines, explosives, and their effects.
Direct and indirect fire systems of all types and their effects.
Tracked and wheeled vehicles and transports.
Various types of armor, radios, and radar.
EW, intercept, and jamming equipment.
Communications, antenna, relay, and telephone equipment.
Teletypes.
Directed energy weapons.
Automated data processing (ADP) hardware and software.
NBC offensive and defensive equipment.
Tactical aviation.
Medical equipment capabilities and vulnerabilities.
Although exploitation plans are extremely useful, it is the analyst who
determines the actual steps to use in each procedure.  Analysis always
begins with what is, and what is not, known about the piece of equipment.  FM  34-54
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Chapter 5
RESPONSIBILITIES
INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines the various responsibilities of each staff element in
units on the battlefield when supporting the overall battlefield TECHINT
effort.  Battlefield TECHINT elements are resourced and responsible for
collecting and processing CEM.  Yet to work properly, the battlefield
TECHINT structure relies on many other units for mission support, such as
combat units which capture items, and the transportation units which
evacuate items of TECHINT interest.  Figure 5-1 shows staff
responsibilities.
STAFF SECTIONS
The duties of coordination staff sections and how they relate to TECHINT
direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination are
discussed below.   From the J1/G1 to the J5/G5, every staff section
contributes in some way to the successful production and use of TECHINT.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J1/G1, PERSONNEL
The J1/G1 is the principal staff element for the commander on all matters
concerning human resources.  The J1/G1's involvement in the battlefield
TECHINT effort is a result of their primary staff responsibilities for—
Planning and handling EPW evacuation and processing.  The prisoner
evacuation channel is one of the richest sources of CEM.  All J1/G1
annexes to OPORDs and operations plans (OPLANs) need to state that
all CEE will be inspected by TECHINT personnel, and/or be transported
to the Corps Captured Equipment Point by the transportation unit within
the Corps.
Directing the command surgeon in captured medical supply disposition
and medical intelligence responsibilities.
Coordinating with the J3/G3 to identify and assign special duty
personnel such as JCMEC translators and SMEs.FM 34-54
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ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J2/G2, INTELLIGENCE
The J2/G2 is the principal staff section for the commander on all
intelligence matters and, as such, has primary responsibility for the
command's battlefield TECHINT effort.  The J2/G2's primary battlefield
TECHINT responsibilities include, but are not limited to—
Providing staff supervision over captured and detained persons with
S&T expertise and exploiting CEM.
Supervising battlefield TECHINT planning, directing, processing,
producing, and disseminating.
Exercising staff supervision over the JCMEC or attached battlefield
TECHINT team operations.
Coordinating battlefield TECHINT collection tasking, with the J3/G3, MI,
EOD, NBC, and other combat and combat support units.
Coordinating with the JCMEC to provide instructions to units capturing
enemy materiel, captured medical materiel exploitation, evacuation, and
disposition with the command surgeon.
Coordinating CEM evacuation with the J4/G4.  This includes
coordinating transportation priorities, disposition, and opportunities to
screen CEM in logistic channels.FM  34-54
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Coordinating with the J5/G5 the TECHINT screening of materiel
obtained from local nationals, displaced persons, and civilian detainees.
Coordinating with the staff judge advocate (SJA) to ensure compliance
with the Geneva Conventions regarding exploitation of captured
personnel and materiel.  Ensure that the SJA includes instructions on
CEM in the legal annex to OPORDs and OPLANs regarding war
trophies and souvenirs.
Coordinating with the military historical officer to ensure all items of
possible historical value are initially screened for TECHINT value.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J3/G3, OPERATIONS
The J3/G3 is the principal staff section for the commander in matters
concerning operations, plans, organization, and training.  The J3/G3's
involvement in the battlefield TECHINT effort is a result of their primary 
staff responsibilities.  As they relate to battlefield TECHINT, these
responsibilities include—
Coordinating terrain management and clearance or movement issues
for TECHINT teams to move about the battlefield as missions dictate.
Exercising primary staff responsibility over the supporting aviation,
chemical, engineer, fire support coordination officers, and the provost
marshal (PM).
Preparing, coordinating, and publishing the command standing
operating procedures (SOPs), OPLANs, and OPORDs.  This includes
instructions for handling CEM, such as collection, reporting,
exploitation, evacuation, and disposition.
Reviewing subordinate command SOPs, OPLANs, and OPORDs to
ensure provisions for battlefield TECHINT are included.
Incorporating TECHINT into current and future operations and plans.
Assigning, attaching, and detaching battlefield TECHINT assets to
subordinate and adjacent commands.
Advising the commander on friendly use of CEM.  This includes to
whom the materiel should be allocated, such as irregular or other local
national forces.
Training US troops in the safe disposition and use of CEM.FM 34-54
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ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J4/G4, LOGISTICS
The J4/G4 is the principal staff section for the commander in matters
concerning supply, maintenance, transportation, and services.  As the
logistical planner, the J4/G4 conducts vital coordination for the TECHINT
system.  This includes—
Exercising primary staff responsibility over the EOD officer and the
transportation officer.
Coordinating with the Support Command Commander, who is
responsible for logistical support operations; and the J3/G3 for support
of battlefield TECHINT collection operations.
Coordinating and developing command policy for the evacuation and
disposition of CEM.  Give particular attention to "back-haul"
transportation plans for CEM.
Ensuring that the Service Support Annex to the OPORD has an
appendix that addresses CEM.
Recommending to the J3/G3 the MSR and the main evacuation route of
EPWs and CEM.
Supervising the establishment and the operation of CEM collection
points in the unit support area, normally near the Class VII collection
point.
Coordinating the setup and support of the JCMEC and CMEC
(Forward) at the Corps collection points.
Ensuring inventory and storage location records are properly
maintained and are reported through materiel management centers
(MMC) and TECHINT or JCMEC channels.
  Recommending policies and procedures for the use of captured
nonintelligence-value equipment and providing technical staff
assistance to the command's MI unit.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J5/G5, CIVIL AFFAIRS
The J5/G5 is the commander's principal staff officer in all mattersFM  34-54
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concerning civilians and their impact on military operations.  This includes
the political, economic, and social effects of military operations on civilian
personnel.  The J5/G5's involvement in the battlefield TECHINT effort is a
result of their primary coordinating staff responsibilities for civilian liaison
and Civil Affairs (CA).  These responsibilities include—
Supervising CA functions of the command regarding care and handling
of displaced persons, refugees, and any incidental foreign S&T materiel
CA personnel may secure.
Ensuring inclusion of TECHINT collection and notification procedures in
all CA SOPs, OPLANs, and OPORDs.
Coordinating with the command's battlefield TECHINT unit for the
screening, exploitation, and evacuation of any CA-secured CEM.
Coordinating with the J2/G2 and J4/G4 for the return of CEM to the
civilian populace.
SPECIAL STAFF OFFICERS
Because TECHINT covers such a broad spectrum of disciplines, activities,
and operations performed on the battlefield, the following special staff
officers also play an important role in battlefield TECHINT.
AVIATION OFFICER:
Coordinates with staff movement and transportation personnel for air
evacuations of CEM and chemical and biological (CB) samples.
CHEMICAL OFFICER:
Advises the commander on NBC intelligence matters. 
Recommends employment of chemical troops in support of battlefield
TECHINT teams, analysis, and collection operations. 
Plays a key role in the success of the CB sampling mission; ensures
that the mission is explained in the chemical Annex of the OPORD.
ENGINEER OFFICER:
Plans and constructs engineering requirements.
Incorporates battlefield TECHINT analyses and studies regardingFM 34-54
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mobility and survivability characteristics of enemy weapon systems into
these OPLANs and OPORDs. 
Provides construction support to JCMEC activities.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL OFFICER:
Establishes, operates, and supervises EOD-related TECHINT reporting
procedures; includes these reporting procedures in the EOD portion of
the OPLAN.
Coordinates with EOD TECHINT personnel at the JTIB, JCMEC, and
TECHINT collection teams for dissemination of  EOD TECHINT
information.
PROVOST MARSHAL:
Provides security for designated units, facilities, and convoys, including
CEM, along the evacuation route and for TECHINT facilities when
tasked by the J3/G3.
Coordinates with customs for the TECHINT screening of all CEM found
at US redeployment or staging sites.
   Establishes procedures to ensure military police confiscate, tag,  report,
and turn over to TECHINT personnel new or unidentified CEM
discovered incidental to EPW handling operations.
THEATER AND SUPPORTING COMMAND SURGEON:
Uses TECHINT when advising the commander on medical effects of
NBC weapons on personnel.
Coordinates with the theater chemical officer to implement CB sampling
procedures.
Includes CB sampling procedures in the medical portion of the OPLAN.
   Coordinates TECHINT support  to examine and process captured
medical supplies and equipment; this includes planning and
coordinating medical laboratories and personnel to assist in sample
analyses.
Recommends medically related TECHINT PIR and IR to the J2/G2.
Coordinates the analysis of biological warfare agent specimens
collected on the battlefield at the theater medical laboratory. FM  34-54
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Coordinates with the J2/G2 and J3/G3 and provides countermeasures,
quarantine recommendations, and other appropriate actions to
safeguard friendly forces.
AMMUNITION OFFICER:
Establishes policies for the safe storage and accountability of foreign
munitions; also is responsible for the safety certification of foreign
munitions designated for reissue to friendly troops. 
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE:
Coordinates the Theater war souvenir policy with the JCMEC
Commander, JTIB, and the J2.  This policy is determined by the
deploying commander, based upon recommendations from JAG, G4,
and TECHINT procedures.
 
Advises on legal matters concerning the movement of CEM out of the
Theater.
UNITS AND ORGANIZATIONS
This section describes the responsibilities and duties of specific
organizations and units on the battlefield that support TECHINT operations.
JOINT CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTER:
The JCMEC's primary function is processing CEM into combat information
and TECHINT.  The JCMEC is organized around the 203d MI Battalion. 
When it is further augmented by experts from other nations, it becomes a 
CJCMEC.  Regardless of the command or echelon it supports, it has the
same capabilities.  The JCMEC—
Exploits CEE, CED, and CEM.
Produces TECHINT reports, that include countermeasures, for tactical
commanders.
Provides studies, OPLANs, OPORDs, maps, and special reports to
disseminate the JCMEC findings.
Provides RSPs to combat units for found enemy weapons and enemy
munitions, with coordination through joint EOD.
Coordinates the safe handling and evacuation of CEM with EOD
elements.FM 34-54
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Coordinates evacuation of special-interest CEM from ECB locations to
JCMEC.
Supervises evacuation of CEM from theater to CONUS.
Coordinates with the joint interrogation facility the selection of EPWs for
TECHINT exploitation.  Supplies interrogators with TECHINT
requirements for EPW interrogation.
Provides accountability for CEM within the theater TECHINT structure.
Recommends CEM disposition to the Theater and Corps commands.
Maintains the theater TECHINT database.
Maintains S&TI and battlefield PIR, IR, and list of special interest items.
CAPTURING UNITS:
Combat units are usually the first to encounter new or modified threat
materiel.  However, other units such as engineers, military police, NBC
teams, and logistic units may also encounter or capture such materiel.  This
materiel often comes with operating instructions and other technical
documents.  The intelligence officer at each echelon coordinates with
J2/G2/S2 regarding TECHINT and captured or encountered threat materiel
and documents.  Together, they establish unit security, RSPs, reporting,
and dissemination procedures for CEM.
Capturing units must strive not to destroy TECHINT materiel known or
believed to answer PIR, IR, special interest lists, or unidentified or new
items before receiving disposition instructions.  CEM and logistics
complexes must be safeguarded and reported through intelligence
channels.  Captured items known or believed to answer TECHINT
requirements are reported via SALUTE format to higher command normally
to the Corps TECHINT LNE.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNITS:
The attachments of TECHINT teams less operational control (OPCON) to
MI units (for example, one TECHINT team per corps MI brigade) enhances
TECHINT operations, as well as improves coordination and synergy among
all MI disciplines.  MI units are normally best able to provide administrative
and logistical support to forward deployed TECHINT teams due to like
missions and collocation.
All MI units are responsible for establishing SOPs and having procedures
for handling, screening, and reporting TECHINT-related items orFM  34-54
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information encountered incidental to normal organizational activities.
The following items relate to enemy C-E systems:
Code books.
Frequency tables.
C-E operations instructions.
C-E standing instructions.
Cryptographic data.
Cryptographic items.
Encrypted items.
C-E hardware or software.
Examples of materiel, including CEE and CED, requiring immediate MI
screening.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES:
Special Operations Forces consist of special forces and ranger units,
special operations aviation units, psychological operations (PSYOP) teams,
and CA elements.
Special Forces and Ranger Units.  These forces usually operate deep in
enemy-controlled areas.  This means they are generally the first to
discover, identify, and provide information on a variety of TECHINT-related
CEE, CEDs, or facilities.  They can provide—
New or previously unacquired materiel.
Locations of enemy materiel.
Other technical data.
Capture of enemy S&T personnel.
Special Operations Aviation Units.  Special operations aviation units
provide aviation support to units conducting special operations missions
usually deep within enemy-controlled areas.  These units can provide
technical data on enemy radars, as well as on observed enemy equipment. 
Incidental to assigned air missions, special operations aviation units can
often "back-haul" limited amounts of priority CEM to rear areas.FM 34-54
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Psychological Operations Teams.  PSYOP personnel support theater,
corps, and division.  Historically, PSYOP has supported TECHINT
collection through creative PSYOP designed to secure TECHINT-related 
CEM, information, and/or personnel.
An example of a PSYOP success comes from the Korean War.  A North
Korean pilot was paid a $100,000 bounty for flying his Soviet MiG-15 to the
south, after the bounty was offered by leaflet and radio.  The benefits were
enormous.  The Communists grounded all MiG flights for eight days; and
getting the MiG turned out to be a TECHINT windfall.
PSYOP specifically designed to provide TECHINT occurred during the
Vietnam War.  A PSYOP campaign encouraged enemy soldiers to
surrender with their weapons and equipment intact; rewards were offered
and paid to Viet Cong and NVA troops who did this.  This type of campaign
not only reduced the number of weapons available to the enemy but also
provided a continuous source of materiel for the CMEC to exploit.
Civil Affairs Elements.  These elements provide support to tactical and
operational commanders by coordinating between military forces, civil
authorities, and area of operations personnel.  CA support to the battlefield
TECHINT process includes—
Providing SMEs to assist in the TECHINT analysis of food and
agriculture;  public communications, health, transportation, and supply;
public works and utilities; and centers of commerce and industry.
Securing TECHINT-related materiel and foreign experts having CA
wartime responsibility for civil administration and refugee handling.
ENGINEER TOPOGRAPHIC AND TERRAIN UNITS:
These units are responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating
topographic information and terrain intelligence.  They normally function at
theater, corps, and division levels.  TECHINT units use engineer
topographic and terrain products to support TECHINT collection planning. 
Engineers also support analysis and exploitation of CEM and facilities
when this materiel is within their field of expertise.
MILITARY POLICE:
The military police fulfill a wide range of duties on the battlefield, to include
providing route security for evacuating CEM and handling EPWs.  In
performance of these duties they often confiscate CEM from EPWs. 
Military police follow specific procedures for notifying MI personnel of
equipment or documents of intelligence interest discovered incidental to
EPW handling operations.FM  34-54
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If not done previously, military police mark or tag all CEM and personnel in
their custody.  Since EPWs and materiel may become separated, military
police use a three-part capture tag to clearly identify which prisoner the
CEM came from.  Accurate identification of the capture tag helps TECHINT
analysts and interrogators match materiel with associated EPWs.  It also
makes it easier to return certain property to the EPW.  (See Appendix C for
an example of an EPW capture tag.)
NBC RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS:
NBC reconnaissance teams locate, identify, and mark contaminated areas. 
They collect, identify, and evacuate suspected samples of nuclear
materials and CB warfare agents.   This function is an important
supplement to normal TECHINT collection capabilities.  Collecting,
handling, storing, and shipping these samples must be done using SOPs
developed in a coordinated effort between the command surgeon, the staff
NBC officer, and the staff S2.  All parties involved must ensure they
maintain a legal chain of custody of NBC samples for later possible war
crimes processing.
MEDICAL UNITS:
Combat zone and communications zone medical support units are capable
of giving specialized medical, laboratory, and medical intelligence
assistance to TECHINT and other MI disciplines.  The medical unit's S2
coordinates this assistance to MI units.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL:
One of the most critical and early sources of TECHINT on the battlefield is
explosive ordnance.  To safely exploit this source, EOD units provide
specially trained personnel to support TECHINT collection teams and units
in the area of operations.  EOD personnel examine existing
databases and prepare reports on new and unusual items of explosive
ordnance for TECHINT purposes.
TECHINT personnel should be familiar with EOD activities, capabilities, 
and responsibilities, as described in AR 75-15.  Foreign explosive
ordnance is extremely important to TECHINT analysts.  TECHINT
personnel coordinate closely with EOD personnel for proper disposal and
evacuation of explosive ordnance, particularly when conducting initial
inspections during hasty exploitations of CEM on the battlefield.FM 34-54
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DANGER
Exercise extreme care and awareness when
encountering possible booby-trapped CEM. 
Materiel may be booby trapped and cause
immediate death or permanent injury.
Only EOD personnel actually handle explosive ordnance.  Conversely,
EOD units must notify TECHINT personnel of the types and locations of
foreign equipment and munitions they encounter. FM 34-54
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Appendix A
MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
This appendix describes the MASINT mission, organization,
responsibilities, and their relevance to TECHINT.  Specific definitions are in
the glossary.  This appendix delineates MASINT’s dual mission of
supporting the S&TI community as well as providing unique time-critical
information to the supported tactical commander that contributes to
battlespace dominance.
MISSION
 
     PEACETIME: 
The mission of MASINT operations in peacetime includes fulfillment of
intelligence collection and transition to war requirements.  Army MASINT
efforts are focused at EAC MI force at the force projection brigades. 
Technical reconnaissance and surveillance (TECRAS) systems fielded at
EAC demonstrate the feasibility of MASINT support at that level. 
 
Successful demonstration is expected to lead to the development of tactical
intelligence and related activities (TIARA) systems and their progressive
fielding at appropriate EAC and ECB units.  EAC conducts operations to
fulfill collection requirements levied by the Army component command,
theater, DOD, or national levels.  The force projection brigade’s mission
includes the collection of S&TI to support baseline signature requirements
for reprogrammable munitions in support of Army, DOD, and national
requirements.
WARTIME:
In addition to its contributions to S&TI, MASINT also serves the warfighting
commander.  MASINT collection of threat battlefield equipment signatures
aids in the prevention of technological surprise and is critical to US ability to
produce effective countermeasures.  Continued signature collection by
MASINT sensors permits reprogramming of precision-guided, smart, or
brilliant munitions.  Specific MASINT missions are to—
Detect, identify, and locate targets with sufficient timeliness and
accuracy for operational planning, targeting, and combat action.FM 34-54
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Support IPB.
Support force protection via identification, friend or foe (IFF) systems.
Support terrain visualization and geographic intelligence.
Provide intelligence on threat signatures and equipment and
technological advances not discernible by other intelligence collection
means.
Support indications and warnings (I&W) intelligence in peacetime and
provide an indication of threat escalation from conventional to nuclear
war.
Provide intelligence to support the commanders' demands for situation
development, target development, battle damage assessment (BDA),
and intelligence operations in close, deep, and rear operations.
Provide information to detect or confirm enemy deception operations.
Provide information of threat strategic facilities, such as power plants,
design bureaus, production facilities, proving grounds, and test areas.
Provide commanders with information of friendly signature profiles. 
This information will be used for IFF to minimize fratricide and to alter
signatures for operations security (OPSEC) or friendly deception
operations.
ORGANIZATION
The Army’s MASINT organization is shown at Figure 2-1.
RESPONSIBILITIES
Figure A-1 shows the responsible agencies, along with their MASINT
functions.
AGENCY RESPONSIBILITYFM 34-54
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DIA, Central MASINT Office
HQDA, DCSINT
AMC, DCSINT
INSCOM, DCSOPS
NGIC, Signatures Division
Force Projection Brigades
Executive agent for MASINT.
Functional manager of TECRAS Program.
Materiel developer.
Manages and oversees operational MASINT
EAC collection operations.
Develops operational requirements
documents and mission needs statements.
Primary consumer of TECRAS data.
Ensure national MASINT sensors are tasked
to support commander's PIR.  Serve as focal
point for collection management and
dissemination for MASINT.
Collect baseline signatures in support of the
TECRAS Program.
Augment the Theater IPC upon request.
Act as the conduit for fielding selected RDTE
MASINT systems.
Figure A-1.  HQDA agencies and their MASINT responsibilities.
DEFINITIONS 
 
  The definitions for MASINT and electro-optical intelligence (ELECTRO-
OPTINT), as defined in JCS Publication 1-02, are shown in the terms and
definitions section of the glossary. 
 
ELECTRO-OPTINT:
ELECTRO-OPTINT may provide detailed information on the radiant
intensities, dynamic motion, spectral and spatial characteristics, and the
materials composition of the targeted objective.  Electro-optical data
collected has broad applications to a variety of tasks.  Data may be
collected by a variety of optically sensitive devices, such as radiometers,
spectrometers, non-literal imaging systems, lasers or laser radar—laser
detection and ranging (LIDAR).FM 34-54
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RADAR INTELLIGENCE (RADINT):
RADINT  is the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of radar
energy reflected (re-radiated) from a target or objective.  Instruments for
active target illuminations may include monostatic or bistatic, line-of-sight
(LOS) phased array, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and over-the-horizon
systems.  RADINT collection provides information on radar cross-sections,
tracking, precise spatial measurements of components, motion, and radar
reflectance and absorption characteristics for dynamic targets and
objectives.
RADIO FREQUENCY INTELLIGENCE:
This includes radio frequency/electromagnetic pulse intelligence
(RF/EMPINT) and unintentional radiation intelligence  (RINT).
  RF/EMPINT is the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of
radio frequency electromagnetic pulse emissions associated with
nuclear testing or other high energy events for the purpose of
determining power levels, operating characteristics, and signatures of
advanced technologic weapons, power, or propulsion systems.
RINT is the integration and specialized application of multiple MASINT
collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation techniques against
unintentional radiation sources that are incidental to the design and
operating characteristics of military and civil propulsion units, power
sources, weapons systems, electronic systems, machinery, equipment,
or instruments.  These techniques may be valuable in detecting,
tracking, and monitoring a variety of activities of interest.
GEOPHYSICAL INTELLIGENCE:
  This is the collection, processing, exploitation, and analysis of emitted or
reflected sounds, pressure waves, or vibration in the atmosphere
(acoustic), in the water (acoustical intelligence), or in the earth’s surface
(seismic).  Acoustic and seismic sensors may be valuable in target
detection and classification, measuring aircraft and ship performance
characteristics, detecting weapons testing and large military movements.
MATERIALS INTELLIGENCE:
This  is the physical collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of
atmospheric trace elements; gaseous, liquid, or solid particulate; effluents;
or debris.  Materials intelligence has specific applications to NBC warfare,
military and civil production, and economic and environmental problems.
NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE (NUCINT):FM 34-54
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NUCINT is intelligence information derived from the collection and analysis
of radiation and other effects resulting from radioactive sources, such as
nuclear weapons, processes, materials, devices, or facilities.  Nuclear
monitoring includes nuclear radiation detection, identification, and
characterization of sources and events.  Data exploitation results in nuclear
signature of weapons or materials. 
     
TECHNICAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE:  
TECRAS is DA's special program using a low density of instrumented
collection sensors which provide a quick-reaction capability for collection. 
ARMY REPROGRAMMING ANALYSIS TEAM (ARAT):
The ARAT is involved in altered signatures identification and associated
weapon systems impact.  The US Army target sensing systems (TSSs)
incorporate software algorithms used to make threat identification based on
embedded preprogrammed threat parameter data.
  
As the threat capabilities change, or as new threats become operational,
there is a risk that these systems will not correctly identify the threats.  To
the extent the threat is misidentified, incorrect countermeasures may be
implemented putting friendly forces at risk. 
 
Reprogramming the weapon systems provides the commander an
essential element in battle space dominance by allowing him to defeat
enemy countermeasures.  The production centers and the intermediate
processing centers (IPCs) validate suspected change signatures or
countermeasures.  The ARAT receives data upon which the threat change
is identified and system assessments made.  The ARAT determines impact
of validated threat changes on assigned Army equipment and weapon
systems and develops a suitable and achievable counter to the changes. 
The mission requirements center (MRC) within the systems manager’s
organization determines requirements for Army systems.  The software
support center (SSC) is responsible for developing the change program
and validating the change.
 
CONCLUSIONS
MASINT’s chief contribution to the Army to date has been support to force
modernization, a role which is likely to continue.  However, it is also an
evolving discipline which holds significant potential for warfighting
intelligence as adversaries develop means to deceive or evade imageryFM 34-54
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and signals sensors.
Much can be gained by integrating MASINT and TECHINT.  The disciplines
are not competing but complementary.  Many MASINT technologies and
subdisciplines lend themselves towards bringing traditional TECHINT into
the information age.  Sensors are used to derive
information in NRT, so that it can be fed to the supported commander in
time to effect  the decision cycle. FM 34-54
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Appendix B
JCMEC OPERATIONS
This appendix provides an overview of JCMEC operations and
responsibilities; it is used as an example for an annex to a  combatant
command's TTP document.  Each reference to the "supported Theater
Commander" may be replaced by the appropriate unified or joint combatant
command acronym (for example, ACOM, PACOM, CENTCOM).
INTRODUCTION
The JCMEC (in part or whole) normally will be established for any operation
where significant amounts or types of CEM will be available and/or require
field exploitation.  The supported Theater commander has the mission of
establishing and operating a JCMEC through the 203d MI Battalion
(TECHINT), FPB, and provides for the day-to-day operation of the JCMEC
to include administration, logistics, systems, communications, and
maintenance.
The supported Theater commander also has staff responsibility for—
Ensuring security of the materiel.
Arranging for the evacuation and movement of CEM.
Providing legal guidance concerning disposition of certain CEM,
structures, and facilities.
Coordinating for EOD.
Coordinating the issue of CEM to US forces.
The Theater J2 exercises operational control of the JCMEC through the
JTIB located at the JIC.  The JTIB consists of the senior TECHINT
representatives from DIA's Technical Directorate and Service TECHINT
organizations (National Ground, Air, and Maritime Intelligence Centers as
needed).  The JTIB  will be augmented with an LNE from the 203d MI
Battalion (TECHINT).  
The purpose of a JCMEC is to provide a central in-theater location for the
collection, safeguarding, identification, battlefield exploitation and
reporting, and destruction and/or evacuation of specified captured foreign
and US manufactured materiel.  The JTIB—FM 34-54
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Provides TECHINT advice and assistance to the Theater J2. 
 
Acts as the TECHINT collection manager for the Theater J2.
CONCEPT
The JCMEC will be sited by the supported Theater commander.  The site
should facilitate evacuating, storing, and shipping CEM.  The JCMEC also
will—
Locate to facilitate security.
Ensure safety for nearby forces and the local populace.
Provide easy access to communications, transportation, and other
support facilities.  
Locate near the Theater ordnance storage site.
JCMEC facilities have common site selection criteria and complementary
functions which provide efficient allocation of assets for evacuation,
movement, safeguarding, and exploitation of EPWs and CEM.
JCMEC will be staffed by the 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) and augmented
by selected service technical representatives and support personnel. 
Through the supported Theater commander, the JCMEC will have support
from military police or security forces, ground and aviation transportation
elements, EOD, and other activities as needed.
In accordance with DOD directives, service regulations, and other
established policies, all units will collect, identify, tag, secure, and evacuate
CEM to designated collection points.  
In coordination with the JCMEC, and through technical teams and liaisons,
Corps and equivalent units will transport or arrange for the transportation of
selected items to the JCMEC.  In cases of the reported capture of
designated CEM of high TECHINT priority and/or time sensitivity, a
TECHINT collection team will be deployed to the capture site to conduct
initial exploitation and then coordinate and prepare the materiel for hasty
evacuation directly to the JCMEC.
 
JCMEC will function as the Theater's central captured materiel exploitation
facility.  As such it will—
Establish procedures for the exploitation, destruction, or otherFM 34-54
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disposition of CEM in coordination with the J4.
Recommend the theater souvenir and war trophy policy, to include
demilitarization procedures.
Issue and provide training on the operation of CEM to US forces, allied,
and host nation forces based upon J3 requirements and priorities.
Return specified CEM to the sovereign nation at the end of the conflict
as directed.
ORGANIZATION
The JCMEC and its components can and will be tailored for each operation
depending on types and quantities of CEM.  Although operationally
responsible through the supported Theater commander for the JCMEC, the
commander and deputy are responsible to the J2 through the JTIB for
intelligence collection management and oversight of the JCMEC.  Figure B-
1 shows the JCMEC organization.  Following are specific functions of the
JCMEC components.
COMMANDER AND THE DEPUTY: 
The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) commander is dual hatted also as the
JCMEC commander and is assisted by a deputy, battalion S3, or Executive
Officer (XO).  The commander will tailor the CMECs to meet the worldwide
mission. 
LIAISON ELEMENTS:
FME LNEs will be attached to each component G2, Air Force and Navy
Intelligence, and Corps, or the equivalent subordinate command.  These
LNEs will advise the supported command on CEM handling, control, and
evacuation procedures and coordinate these efforts with the JCMEC.FM 34-54
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OPERATIONS CENTER (OPCEN):  
The OPCEN director works directly for the JCMEC commander.  The
OPCEN is responsible for planning and coordinating all current and
projected JCMEC operations, to include deploying TECHINT
collection teams and maintaining the current intelligence situation.
 
SUPPORT CENTER (SUPCEN):  
The SUPCEN director works directly for the JCMEC commander.  The
SUPCEN provides administrative and logistics support to all JCMEC
elements. 
The warehouse section chief works directly for the SUPCEN director.  This
section maintains all records on CEM, structures, and facilities that are
processed through or by the JCMEC.  Specifically, the Warehouse
Section—FM 34-54
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Serves as the point of contact (POC) for the various units or
organizations delivering and/or transferring materiel.
Ensures that documents, manuals, inventory records, and other related
items are cataloged and properly exploited.
Ensures exploitation elements are informed of materiel and documents
received at the JCMEC.
Coordinates and monitors the shipping of materiel to CONUS and/or
issuance to US forces, allies, or host nation as directed.
EXPLOITATION CENTER (EXCEN):
The EXCEN director works directly for the JCMEC commander.  The
EXCEN director prioritizes, coordinates, and deconflicts the efforts of his
subordinate elements based on the JCMEC commander's guidance. 
Elements subordinate to the EXCEN director and their functions are as
follows:
Ground Exploitation Element.  This element  processes validated
requirements; exploits captured ground materiel (to include helicopters
and ground-based missile systems); produces tactical TECHINT
reports; ensures that reports are forwarded to the CM&D section
expeditiously; and participates in technical interrogations in
coordination with the joint interrogation facility.
Air and Missile Exploitation Element.  The structure and functions are
the same as for the Ground Exploitation Element except that the focus
is on aviation (aircraft, air delivered weapons systems, and associated
radar and tracking systems) and missile-related materiel.
Maritime Exploitation Element.  The structure and function are the same
as the Ground Exploitation Element except that the focus is on naval
and marine materiel (to include naval mines, vessels, naval aviation,
and naval-related missile systems).
Medical and NBC Exploitation Element.  This element's function, in
addition to exploitation and reporting on NBC weapons and materiel, is
to be responsible for removal and shipment of samples from the area of
operation.  This element will ship suspected samples to the Theater
Army Medical Laboratory (TAML), if available, or to CONUS- based
laboratories for analysis.
C-E and  IEW Exploitation Element.  This element focuses onFM 34-54
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communications, computers, intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW),
and related systems. 
 
CM&D Element.  The collection management and dissemination
(CM&D) element provides a single POC to ensure that effective
coordination is maintained between the JCMEC and the numerous
component, theater, national, allied, and host government
units.  This element will ensure the receipt and satisfaction of all
requirements.  Specific functions are as follows:
— Operate joint and Army automated file servers and associated work
stations that are used for receiving requirements and disseminating
technical reports.  Figure B-2 shows the TECHINT communications
architecture.
— Coordinate directly with the J2 TECHINT collection manager for
receipt of validated requirements (collection and production). 
Ensure that exploitation elements receive these requirements;
monitor the status of the requirements; and close them when           
appropriate.
— Take reports from the elements and ensure that they are
disseminated expeditiously to units and organizations that need the
information.  Dissemination can be by any or all means; for        
example, secure voice, facsimile, message, Joint Deployable
Intelligence Support System (JDISS).  Information should be given
the widest dissemination possible.
SIGNAL CENTER (SIGCEN):
 
The SIGCEN director works directly for the JCMEC commander.  The
SIGCEN provides communications, systems, and related maintenance
support to all of the JCMEC elements.  It acts as the focal point for all
communications in and out of the JCMEC.
COLLECTION  COMPANY:
The commander of the TECHINT Collection Company works directly for the
JCMEC commander.  This company is augmented by a Joint EOD
detachment and forward deploys three TECHINT collection teams.  The
collection teams assist in recovering, processing, tagging, and shipping 
materiel to the JCMEC.  They also perform screening and make field
assessments of "first seen" materiel encountered by US personnel.
The EOD detachment consists of personnel from the Services who are
familiar with weapons systems, ammunition, and ordnance related to theirFM 34-54
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respective areas.  This detachment works for the TECHINT Collection
Company commander but provides EOD support to all JCMEC elements.
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES: 
There will be times and places where other US, allied, or host nation
government agencies, organizations, or elements may be required to
support the foreign materiel efforts of the JCMEC.
COMMUNICATIONS
The supported commander provides communications for the JCMEC.  The
J2/G2 validates all requirements and coordinates with the J6 to ensure that
the required bandwidth and types of circuits are provided.
Normal JCMEC operations will require the following minimum intelligence
processors and connective communications capabilities:
JDISS and/or a compatible file server and workstations.  This system is
essential for access to databases, collection and production
requirements processing, and dissemination.  Since there will be a
requirement for a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF),
and split-based operations to and from Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD,
both DSNET 1 and DSNET 3 connectivity with a minimum of 32 Kb
bandwith will be essential.
Disk operating system (DOS) stand-alone terminals for report writing
and records administration. 
Automated message access.
Dial-up STU-III secure telephone.
Classified and unclassified facsimile.
Other specialized communications as required to support the forward
teams (such as tactical high frequency, ultra high frequency, super high
frequency, and satellite communications [SATCOM]).
OTHER REQUIREMENTS
See DIAMs 58-4, 58-13, and 75-1 and references herein for procedures
and requirements for identifying, safeguarding, controlling, and disposing of
CEM.FM 34-54
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Appendix C
HANDLING AND EVACUATION
INTRODUCTION
This appendix covers the procedures for handling and evacuating routine
CEM, as well as TECHINT CEM.  Some basic guidelines and procedures
on how to handle TECHINT interest items follow:
CEM evacuation channels and handling procedures are usually the
same as similar US end items.  A captured tank generally will go to the
same location as a US tank at the Class VII point.  (Definitions for
classes of supply are in the glossary.)
The element requiring a specific type item is responsible for
coordinating and tasking evacuation and handling.
As time permits, as much CEM should be collected from the battlefield
and taken to the echelon's CEM points for disposition.
The capturing unit always notifies higher command of capture and then
safeguards the known or possible TECHINT item, if possible, until
higher command provides disposition instructions.
All echelons will establish CEM points and keep logistical and
intelligence channels informed of their status.
Special handling and evacuation procedures are often situation
dependent and cannot always be included in SOPs and OPORDs.
The plans, policies, and procedures for evacuating foreign materiel are 
prescribed by joint, unified, and theater headquarters.  These plans are
based on DA and DOD policies and guidance.  Each command echelon in
theater must ensure that its plans comply with theater directives and the
Joint TECHINT plan.  The final disposition of CEM and associated technical
documents rests with the theater commander.
As stated before, the CMEC is responsible for coordinating the handling
and evacuation of CEM of TECHINT value.  Routine CEM evacuation
guidance, such as raw material found in railroad yards, is best established
in advance in the command's various OPORDs and SOPs.  CEM should be
policed off the battlefield to the prescribed collection points as soon as
possible.  Special situations, as in the case of high priority TECHINTFM 34-54
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interest items, require active coordination among the JCMEC and the
command's different assets to move the item quickly.
Coordinating and tasking is the job of the echelon commander's staff for
normal CEM movement.  Their ability to coordinate between the logistic
units that move the item and the specialist elements such as TECHINT, 
EOD, and NBC is the key to the reuse, intelligence exploitation, and
removal of CEM.
LOGISTIC CHAIN OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS 
Logistic assets will evacuate CEM to the collection points, Corps CMEC
(Forward), theater CMEC, or CONUS.  They do this according to available
assets and the priorities set by the commander and staff.   The J4/G4 is the
principal staff element charged with coordinating this task.   The
command surgeon,  responsible for medical items, coordinates disposition
of Class VIII not of TECHINT value.
The J4/G4 provides staff guidance to the MMC and the movement control
office (MCO) or the movement control center (MCC).  The MMC controls
combat service support  (CSS) and maintenance inventories and is the
management arm that ensures proper accountability of CEM during transit.
The support commands are the Division Support Command (DISCOM),
COSCOM, and Theater Army Area Command  (TAACOM).    They 
exercise  command  and  control  over supporting units in carrying out the
directives issued by the J4/G4.  The division medical supply officer (DMSO)
or the medical, supply, optical, and maintenance (MEDSOM) are the first
elements that manage the command's collection, inventory, and evacuation
procedures and functions for captured medical materiel.
The MMC manages the command's collection,  inventory,  and evacuation
functions.  This includes the operation of the CEM point.  The MMC
operations staff is organized by function and commodity, Class I through
Class VII, and Class IX materiels.  CEM will normally be managed by the
Class VII operations staff.  The MMC keeps the records of the CEM at the
CEM point.  TECHINT elements, such as the Corps CMEC (Forward) or
TECHINT teams, would provide support to logistical personnel operating
the CEM point for identification of CEM.FM 34-54
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TRANSPORTATION PLANNING AND ALLOCATION
The J4/G4 coordinates logistic support for evacuation of CEM operations
by developing a command transportation plan. The command
transportation officer and the movement control element use the
transportation plan to task individual transportation units.  Transportation
elements can be effectively used to backhaul CEM to the CEM points on
their return trips from forward units.  Transportation elements are tasked to
support critical TECHINT missions when required.
EVACUATION CHANNELS
As stated in the introduction, US forces will usually evacuate CEM along
the same channels as like US items.  The system must, however, have the
flexibility to evacuate high priority intelligence items directly from division
collection points to the Theater CMEC and CONUS when required.  This
evacuation will be described in the logistical and intelligence appendixes to
OPLANs.  The routine evacuation channels are described below.  Figures
C-1 to C-4 provide examples of evacuation channels for CEM.
Abandoned or unserviceable US and captured foreign materiel are
evacuated to each echelon's collection points for classification,
segregation, and disposition.  Collection points operate wherever needed
throughout the theater of operations and should always be planned for
ahead of time.  In stability and support operations (SASO), it may take more
time to evacuate larger items due to limited resources and environment.
In the Corps area, at least one materiel collection point is established.   
Other points are established in the TAACOM.  Collection points in the
communications zone (COMMZ) are generally operated by the collection
and classification element of the general support maintenance battalion
near the Class VII point.
In the division areas, DISCOM maintenance companies operate CEM
points.  During offensive operations, these points will be temporary until the
Corps elements take control.  CEM is handled and processed the same
way as similar US items.
Salvage points, including Class VII, established by related supply units are
located near unit maintenance collection points.  These two points handle
the collection, classification, inventory, and disposition of Classes II, VII,
and IX materiel.  The heavy division and Corps have the mostFM 34-54
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suitable assets for evacuation of large amounts of foreign materiel, such
as tanks.  The process is much the same in the light divisions.  However,
evacuation of the heavier items will be normally handled by COSCOM
assets since the division lacks heavy transportation elements.
Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) units establish their own collection
sites to handle captured POL materiel.   Supply units can also establish
POL collection sites.  Commanders will test and use captured POL at the
lowest echelon possible.  Samples will always be taken and sent to the
Corps CMEC or TECHINT collection teams.
Class V ordnance, including missiles, is evacuated through conventional
ammunition supply points (ASPs).  Ammunition supply units will establish
their own collection sites to handle captured Class V.  It is critical that the
CEM ASPs provide a detailed inventory of ammunition to logistical and
intelligence channels.  TECHINT elements must move assets to the CEM
ASP to assist in identifying ammunition of intelligence value.
Class VIII medical items are evacuated through established medical supply
points, the DMSO, and the MEDSOM elements.  TECHINT elements must
have full access to the medical materiel to identify items of medical value.
Captured aviation items, especially airframes, are evacuated to either the
Class VIII CEM collection points, or the nearest aviation units airfield.
All CEM, except NBC hazardous materiel and war trophies, that require
evacuation to CONUS are eventually shipped to the Transportation Officer,
Military Operations Division, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
RESPONSIBILITIES
The personnel, activities, and elements responsible for the recovery and
evacuation of CEM are usually the same as those responsible for
handling like US items.  A good example is the military police
responsibilities.
  Since military police are responsible for controlling prisoners, they have
similar evacuation responsibilities for EPW and CEM.  MI interrogators and
TECHINT analysts exploit these sources of intelligence along the
evacuation chain.
THE CAPTURING UNITFM 34-54
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The capturing unit always is responsible for reporting, safeguarding, and
initiating accountability of CEM.  The capturing unit reports the capture with
a SALUTE report (see Figure E-1).  It safeguards the materiel, within its
mission parameters,  until relieved or as long as possible.  It initiates
accountability by marking and tagging the item according to established
procedures.
The capturing unit may be tasked to move CEM wanted for intelligence
exploitation to a collection point.  If the capturing unit is tasked with
evacuation,  it coordinates any assistance with the command responsible
for direct support maintenance at their echelon.
The capturing unit may be tasked with the destruction of the item.  This may
require coordination with either EOD or NBC assets to do it safely.  It is
illegal to destroy captured enemy medical materiel.  According to the Laws
of Land Warfare, if friendly forces cannot use it for EPWs, refugees,
and indigenous population, the medical materiel will remain in place and
unharmed.
The capturing unit must report the discovery of unusual mechanisms used
as booby traps through intelligence channels to the nearest TECHINT
element and EOD by SALUTE report.  Countermeasures must be
coordinated with EOD personnel.  EOD personnel are responsible for the
final disposition of explosive components or hazardous materials
associated with such devices and recovered ammunition.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
As discussed, TECHINT units have a profound interest in foreign explosive
ordnance.  The assistance of EOD personnel in the examination,
movement, and evacuation of explosive ordnance cannot be
overemphasized.  All items of foreign ordnance should first be rendered
safe by EOD personnel.  If this is not feasible, the item should be rendered
safe in place by any destructive method that minimizes damage  to the
item.
  
Collection of TECHINT data may require dismantling of ordnance and 
stripping fuses and other dangerous components.  These operations  will 
be performed only by experienced personnel.  Dismantling and stripping
are conducted only in response to a specific requirement for such action. 
The request must be placed through TECHINT and EOD staffs.  Only
trained weapons and munitions specialists should analyze or test 
captured mines and booby traps. FM 34-54
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DANGER
Exercise extreme caution when encountering taut
wire, pull releases, or similar devices due to the
possibility of immediate death or permanent injury.
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL
All CB hazardous items are handled and shipped in accordance with
command SOPs, national policy, and theater TECHINT plan.  Evacuation is
best handled after coordination with either an NBC reconnaissance team,
NBC qualified TECHINT team, or a task-organized medical element.  NBC
samples, after theater tactical exploitation, will be shipped to CONUS
laboratories. 
TECHINT ELEMENTS ECB, EAC, AND THE CMEC
When evacuation is either unknown or is delayed, TECHINT personnel will
be tasked to perform onsite analysis.  This can provide immediate tactical
information and countermeasures vital to the combat force commander.  
Onsite analysis also ensures the recovery of intact components which
become useless once wires are clipped and subcomponents have been
disturbed.   This type of analysis is limited by the battlefield situation and
available assets.
During onsite analysis, TECHINT teams look for—
Equipment  operational  characteristics,  performance, capabilities, and
vulnerabilities.
New weapons and devices.
Modifications.
Possible countermeasures.
Identification and proper handling of radioactive materiel.
Specific orientation and siting of equipment.
Recovery and evacuation of explosive ordnance and NBC munitions.
At times, a large number of like items will be acquired.  The TECHINT
teams or elements must have the opportunity to examine the materielFM 34-54
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thoroughly.  They will be especially interested in any modifications done to
the equipment.
TECHINT teams may also be tasked to supervise the materiel handling and
evacuation onsite.  The Corps TECHINT LNE or theater TECHINT
elements will coordinate with appropriate staffs to evaluate the need to use
TECHINT personnel to—
Supervise the evacuation.
Arrange necessary technical escorts to the Corps CMEC (Forward),
CMEC, or CONUS.
TECHINT elements are capable of coordinating the handling and shipping
with necessary medical, intelligence, NBC, and strategic level elements for
captured CB materiel.
MARKING AND TAGGING
Labeling CEM properly is vital to the timely exploitation of the item.  It
speeds up the often slow process of producing effective countermeasures
for the soldier in combat.  Proper labeling provides the analyst information
necessary for the item's timely exploitation.  It also allows interrogators and
TECHINT elements to match up knowledgeable prisoners with the CEM
from which they became separated in the evacuation process.
RESPONSIBILITIES:
The capturing unit is responsible for properly marking and tagging CEM. 
The responsibilities must be clearly established by command SOP.  The
equipment and document tags accompany the materiel to its final
destination.  Article 103 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is printed on
the reverse side of the tag to prevent indiscriminate tampering.
As part of core training, all personnel should be instructed on how to tag
CEM.  They should know the consequences when personnel and
equipment are not properly tagged.  Training should stress protecting and
preserving the original markings on materiel at the time of capture.
Weather-resistant capture tags are used.  They are normally produced
within the theater.  They are securely attached to the item itself and to the
shipping container.  If weather-resistant tags are not available, use any
material (for example, rations packing) on which pertinent capture data
can be recorded.
There are two procedures for marking and tagging CEM.  The procedure
used depends on whether or not the captured item is associated with aFM 34-54
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captured person.
CEM WITH EPWs:
For CEM with personnel, tag the captured person and any associated CEM
with the three-part tag (Form PE 96C-18).  An example of this tag is at
Figure C-5.  
CEM BY ITSELF:
For CEM by itself, tag the piece of equipment and associated document
with the tag shown at Figure C-6.  Be careful to use this tag to label ONLY
items captured with or known to be associated with a particular EPW.  In
addition, label all documents believed to be of a technical nature (such as
operator manuals) with the flag word “TECHDOC."  An example is shown in
Figure C-7.FM 34-54
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SECURITY AND ESCORT
Many items of foreign materiel acquired by US forces and determined to be
of TECHINT value require safeguarding in storage as well as during
evacuation.  Such items may be sensitive due to their criticality or because
of  the US classification assigned.  At all stages during the
exploitation process, CEM will be placed under guard to prevent looting,
misuse, or destruction.
  
Initially, the capturing unit is responsible for safeguarding materiel, based
on instruction from the next higher headquarters.  When foreign materiel is
sensitive or of special value, military police elements normally provide
physical security during its evacuation.
RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS
Technical publications and manuscripts of concern to TECHINT relate to
the technical design or operation of the materiel.  Such documents may be
acquired from the materiel to which they refer.  Therefore, it is essential that
TECHINT personnel coordinate with interrogation elements to exchange
information about related documents.
CEM BY ITSELF:
All enemy documents captured on the battlefield are sent immediately to
the first intelligence staff officer in the chain.  The S2/G2 routes all CEDs
to the nearest interrogation element for tactical exploitation.  Interrogators
screen the documents for immediate information and forward them to
higher command, as required.
In any case, all known or suspected technical documents are marked
“TECHDOC” and treated with highest priority and forwarded through
intelligence channels to the higher command until their value has been
determined.
CEM ASSOCIATED WITH EPWs:
Documents obtained through liaison with interrogation elements should be
accompanied by pertinent interrogation reports.  These reports can be in—
SALUTE reports.
Tactical interrogation reports.FM 34-54
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Special interrogation reports.
Intelligence information reports.
Biographic reports in accordance with DIAM 58-13.
Knowledgeability briefs.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND OTHER ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AND
DOCUMENTS
TECHINT units use special procedures for handling captured C-E
equipment and documents.  These items are tagged and evacuated to the
nearest target exploitation (TAREX) element as soon as possible after the
initial tactical exploitation.
WAR TROPHIES
Foreign equipment is frequently a target of souvenir hunters.  An effective
war trophy policy must be established to ensure that these items are not
retained by the capturing unit.
FOREIGN MATERIEL NUMBERING SYSTEM
It is the responsibility of the COSCOM and Theater support command to
tag all CEE that is sent to them in accordance with the foreign materiel
numbering system.  All inventories of CEE will use this system to keep
track of materiel.FM 34-54
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THIS APPENDIX COMPLIES WITH STANAG 2044 
 AND IMPLEMENTS STANAG 2084.
Appendix D
INTELLIGENCE ANNEX WITH TECHINT INPUT
INTRODUCTION
This appendix provides examples of TECHINT input to an intelligence
annex and TECHINT-related tabs to that annex.  The TECHINT appendix is
used—
As the primary example for the J4/G4 appendix on captured weapons.
As the example for the J1/G1 appendix on equipment taken from
EPWs.  (See Figures C-1 through C-3  for CEE and EPW tags.)
THEATER ARMY INTELLIGENCE ANNEX:
Figure D-1 shows input for TECHINT operations.  This example is tailored
for a Theater Army headquarters.  All headquarters, however, should
include TECHINT operations input.
1.  SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.
2.  INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.
a.  PIR:
(1)  Does the enemy have significant quantities of night vision devices?
(2)  Is there unusual or unexplained damage to US equipment and materiel?
(3)  Has there been unexpected defensive and/or offensive capabilities of enemy
equipment?
      b.  IR:
(1)   What are the capabilities and/or limitations of the AT-5 ATGM?
3.  INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.
Figure D-1.  Example of an extract from a Theater Army Intelligence Annex.FM 34-54
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a.  General:   Capture of any enemy materiel will be immediately reported through
intelligence channels in accordance with priorities described below.
(1)  15th Corps.  Priority of collection on foreign equipment is T-64B,  AT-5, and SA-13.
(2)  25th Corps.  Priority of collection on foreign equipment is BTR-70, BMP-l, and
individual protective vest (body armor).
(3)  23d MI Brigade (EAC).
(a)  1st Battalion.
  (b)  2d Battalion.
 
(c)  3d Battalion.
1   One TECHINT collection team and TECHINT LNE to operate within each
corps area, attached to each corps MI brigade (command less OPCON).
2   Screening and exploitation of captured IEW priorities described in           FM
34-54, Appendix B.
3   Fully integrate TECHINT operations and teams with IEW and EPW
operations.
4.  MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL.
a.  Personnel.
b.  Documents.
c.  Materiel.
(1)  All materiel will be reported in accordance with procedures and priorities described in
Appendix   , TECHINT.
(2)  All materiel will be evacuated to the nearest collection point and held for TECHINT
screening in accordance with Appendix   , TECHINT.  
          (3)  Items designated by TECHINT personnel as possessing intelligence value will be
evacuated to destinations designated by TECHINT personnel in accordance with priorities
described in Appendix   , TECHINT.        
     
Figure D-1.  Example of an extract from a Theater Army Intelligence Annex  (continued).FM 34-54
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          (4)  No materiel will be diverted for other uses until screened and released by TECHINT
personnel.
5.  REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.   All equipment-related intelligence, SALUTE, and
EPW reports will include the J2/G2 and CMEC as an addressee.
Figure D-1.  Example of an extract from a Theater Army Intelligence Annex  (continued).FM 34-54
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(TAB B) JOINT THEATER TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE APPENDIX:
Figure D-2 is an example of a Joint Theater TECHINT appendix.  It shows
how CEM must be handled, reported, and disposed of.
Appendix      , TECHINT, to Annex      , Intelligence, to OPLAN/OPORD     .
REFERENCES:
          a.  OPLAN _____
          b.  FM 34-54.
          c.  FM 3-19-1.
          d.  Chemical and Biological Sampling, Transport, and Evaluation Management
Procedures, dated February 1986.
1.  PURPOSE:  This appendix establishes policy and prescribes responsibilities and
procedures for the proper handling, reporting, intelligence assessment, and disposition of CEM. 
Additionally, it establishes the procedures for the safe and expedient collection of suspected CB
agents to the laboratory for processing, analysis, and identification.
2.  POLICY:
          a.  The J2 controls and directs the theater captured materiel exploitation program.  The
CMEC OPCON to the J2 carries out exploitation activities.
          b.  The CMEC will be formed from elements of the 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT),  _____
MI Brigade.
          c.  The __________ J2 exercises staff responsibility over the intelligence exploitation of
CEM throughout the area of operations and establishes requirements for evacuation of specific
items to CONUS for further exploitation.  An LNE from the JCMEC will be located in the J2.
          d.  Commander, 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT)—
  (1)  Establishes the CMEC and attaches a TECHINT team to each Corps; positions
an LNE with the J2, each Corps G2, the theater MI Brigade, and theater interrogation.
                (2)   In coordination with the Theater/Army Surgeon General, advises the J2/G2 on all
matters of CB sampling.
Figure D-2.  Example of a Joint Theater TECHINT Appendix.FM 34-54
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             (3)  Recommends a theater souvenir and war trophy policy in accordance with 
FM 34-54, Appendix C.
e. The J3—
(1)  In coordination with the J2, approves requests and assigns priorities for issue
of CEM to US units engaged in special missions or training based on the following prioritized
uses of captured materiel:
                           (a)  Intelligence.
      (b) Special warfare.
(c) Special Operation Forces.
(d)  Issue to friendly forces.
(e)  Internal defense.
(f)  Substitutes or supplements to US equipment.
(g)  Distribution to friendly foreign units or groups.
     (2)  Coordinates provisions of EOD support as required in the exploitation of CEM
in accordance with AR 75-15 and to fill requirements stated by the J2.
f.  The J4 exercises staff supervision over the evacuation and movement of CEM of
intelligence value in the theater to the JCMEC, and coordinates evacuation of high priority items
back to CONUS.
g.  The Staff Judge Advocate provides legal guidance concerning the disposition of
certain categories of enemy materiel, structures, and facilities.
h.  See Tab D of this appendix for CB sampling responsibilities.
3.   RESPONSIBILITIES:
a.  The CMEC is charged with the conduct and coordination of assessment of CEM
within the command.  Support in the assessment of enemy naval and aerodynamic systems
and materiel will be provided by intelligence personnel from the Navy and Air Force
components attached to the CMEC.  The scope of responsibilities include:
                    (1)  Assign an LNE to the J2, G2, and the theater interrogation facility.
Figure D-2.  Example of a Joint Theater TECHINT Appendix (continued).FM 34-54
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(2)  Deploy TECHINT collection teams forward to each deployed Corps to  conduct
preliminary screening of evacuated materiel and to respond to targets of opportunity which
cannot be processed in a normal manner.       
(3)  Receive and process validated intelligence requirements for items of enemy
materiel.
(4)  Participate in the technical interrogation of EPWs and assist in screening 
CEDs.
 (5)  Examine and evaluate TECHINT reporting and classification of CEM.
 (6)  Participate with TAREX elements to fully integrate the exploitation of specified
C-E items.
 (7)  Participate with medical, NBC, and Special Operations units for coordinating
the delivery of CB samples through MI channels to the TAML.
b.  Subordinate Commands:
(1)  Each Corps will—
                                (a)  Designate and operate collection points.   Report locations of collection
points where CEM will be stored and amounts and types stored at each location.  Forward
reports to Cdr, CMEC, with an information copy to the J2/G2 and J4/G4s.  The collection point
will receive, store and, only upon direction, dispose or issue CEM.
                           (b)  Designate and operate ammunition storage areas for the storage of
captured ammunition and explosive items, as required.  Store captured chemical munitions
similarly to like US chemical munitions.  Report locations of ammunition storage areas and
amounts and types stored to Cdr, CMEC, with an information copy to J2/G2 and J4/G4.
                           (c)   Provide necessary logistics support, as required, to evacuate CEM and CB
samples needed for intelligence operations, or other purposes, from collection points to the
CMEC.
                           (d)  Ensure all CEM is promptly tagged.
                           (e)  Provide logistics and administrative support for all TECHINT assets
operating within their areas.
                    (2)  NBC reconnaissance units, Special Operations units, and medical units are
responsible for the transfer of CB samples to TEUs or TECHINT collection teams  at Corps, or
directly to the TAML.
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4.  PROCEDURES:
           a.  Procedures for handling and processing CEM.
(1)  The recovery and evacuation of CEM is a command responsibility at all levels. 
The prescribed method of evacuation is through normal logistics channels and in accordance
with priorities established in Tab A and Tab B to this Appendix.
(2)   Enemy materiel captured by US military personnel is the property of the United
States and must be protected from pilferage, cannibalizing, and souvenir hunters. 
Commanders at all levels will provide adequate security for CEM until it has been screened by
TECHINT personnel.
(3)   Specific intelligence collection requirements and Top Ten End Item
requirements items of enemy materiel for which the tactical commander and intelligence
agencies have a need are listed at Tab A and Tab B to this Appendix.  These Tabs will be
published upon execution of the OPLAN.
              (a)  When items listed in Tab A and Tab B or any of their updates are captured
or otherwise obtained, commanders will ensure that the acquisition is reported through
intelligence channels to the Corps TECHINT LNE to Cdr, CMEC, with an information copy to
J2/G2.
              (b)  Report as in (a) above (at a PRIORITY precedence) the  capture of
standard types of foreign materiel that have been apparently modified in a major way or are
having a greater impact on combat operations than expected.  These items will be evacuated to
COSCOM collection points by available backhaul capabilities on a PRIORITY basis. 
Equipment will be held pending further disposition instructions from the J2 through the Corps
TECHINT LNE.
             (c)  The capture of items listed in Tab A and Tab B will be reported by
IMMEDIATE precedence through intelligence channels and expeditiously evacuated to at least
the supporting collection point to await further disposition instructions from J2.
                         (d)  Report as in (a) above (at a ROUTINE precedence) all CEM.  These items
will be evacuated to collection points by available backhaul capabilities on a space-available
basis.  They will be held at the collection point until screened by TECHINT personnel. 
Disposition will be per paragraph 4d below.
 
                       (e)  The J2, in coordination with the J4, is the focal point for evacuation of key
items of intelligence interest to CONUS for national exploitation.
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                (4)  The assessment of CEM below division and separate brigade levels will be
limited.  Their primary responsibility is the recovery, reporting the capture, and initial evacuation
of enemy materiel from the capture location to the nearest collection point.  Exception is for
medical supplies which will be handled through medical supply channels.  Significant items of
CEM which cannot be evacuated, either because of the tactical situation or due to their size, will
be left in place and reported immediately.
(5)  Assessment of CEM at division and separate brigade level is performed by
intelligence and operations personnel to the extent necessary to determine the immediate
tactical significance of the materiel.  Assessment at this level does not replace the need for
detailed evaluation and analysis of CEM by technical specialists from the JCMEC.  For this
reason, the prompt evacuation of significant items of CEM must not be delayed.
     (6)  Screening and preliminary field assessment of CEM is performed by JCMEC
TECHINT collection teams.  These teams will operate in the Corps areas and are attached
(command less OPCON) to the Corps MI Brigade.  When required, these teams can also
provide assistance to capturing units.  Assessment functions are normally carried out at the
Corps support area collection points.  Items of intelligence interest or items needed to fill other
requirements by the JCMEC are selected for evacuation.  Selected items will be evacuated to
the JCMEC, or a designated location, by collection point personnel through logistics channels.
(7)  Selected CEM evacuated to the CMEC is subjected to detailed examination
and evaluation to—
                         (a)  Determine enemy materiel threats, performance capabilities, and limitations.
            (b)  Produce information from which military countermeasures may be
developed.
            (c)  Provide inputs continuously to the national and integrated S&TI Program in
accordance with DIA and Theater policies.
                         (d)  Provide intelligence that can be of timely use to the tactical commander.
b.  Materiel Requiring Special Handling.
(1)  C-E Equipment.  All CEM in this category must be evacuated immediately with
their dial settings, frequencies, and so forth, and recorded and sent to the supporting EW unit by
the quickest and most secure means possible.  All such materiel will be evacuated to Corps
support area collection points for screening by TECHINT and other specialized personnel.
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(2)  Ammunition and Explosives.  The complete recovery and expeditious
evacuation of enemy ammunition and components is essential to the identification of known or
new enemy weapons systems and the threat posed by each.  EOD teams are responsible for
preparing PRETECHREPs on first-time-seen enemy ammunition or explosives.  If there are no
TECHINT personnel to assist in the area, EOD teams will also be responsible for preparing
COMTECHREPs.
(3)  Medical Materiel.  Medical materiel normally will not be destroyed.  It will be left
in place if it cannot be evacuated.  It will be handled in accordance with normal Class VIII
procedures.
(4)  Significant Items:  All intelligence requirements specified in Tab A and Tab B
will be afforded special handling as described in paragraph 4a above.
(5)  Technical Documents:  Captured or recovered technical documents consist of
firing tables, logbooks, packing slips, and other documentation.  If the tactical situation does not
permit the equipment to be evacuated, the documents will be forwarded to the JCMEC and will
include a description of the equipment.
(6)  CB Samples.  See Tab D to this appendix.
c.  Requirements.
  (1) DIA provides national intelligence requirements for CEM to the Theater.  In-
theater intelligence requirements for enemy materiel are submitted through J2 and G2.
  (2)  In-theater operational and training requirements for other than Army
subordinate units are submitted through J3 to the J2 for review, approval, and assignment of
priority.
          (3)  The intelligence requirements are published in Tab A and Tab B.
d.  Disposition.
 (1)  Items required in support of operational requirements or for distribution to host-
country forces will be separately designated by the J3.  Tab C to this Appendix contains such
equipment.
 (2)  Items determined by the J2 to have no intelligence significance and by the J3 to
have no operational need will then be identified and reported through logistics channels to the
J4.  Items will be retained within designated collection points for further disposition by the J4. 
No items will be released for war trophies until released by J2.
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e.  Destruction.   The destruction of CEM, excluding medical items, will be accomplished
only in the event that recapture is imminent, due to its location, or in those cases where materiel
is declared by EOD or TECHINT personnel to be hazardous to the safety of troops.   In the
event destruction of materiel is necessary, all factory markings should be carefully recorded
and photographs taken, if possible, before the materiel is destroyed.  Medical items  normally
will not be destroyed, but left in place.
OFFICIAL:
TABS:
A = Top Ten Priority Items (TBP)
B = General Collection Requirements (TBP)
C = Equipment Releasable to Allies (TBP)
D = Chemical, Biological, and Biomedical Sampling
Figure D-2.  Example of a Joint Theater TECHINT Appendix (continued).FM 34-54
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      (TAB D)  CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL SAMPLING PROCEDURES: 
Figure D-3 is an example of a Tab D to a TECHINT Appendix of a Theater
Army Intelligence Annex.  It shows disposition instructions for CB samples.
 
1.  PURPOSE:  To establish the procedures for the safe and expedient collection and
evacuation of suspected CB agents to the laboratory for processing, analysis, and identification.
2.  RESPONSIBILITY:
     a.  The Cdr, JCMEC, with the Army and Theater Surgeon General, are responsible for
advising the J2/G2 and J3/G3 on all matters of CB samplings.
     b.  Corps G2, SOCCENT J2, MARCENT G2, Navy intelligence, and Air Force intelligence
will be responsible for transferring samples to MI channels via TEU teams or TECHINT
collection teams.
     c.  Medical personnel will coordinate with combat units and Graves Registration Service
units through local medical units and hospitals for obtaining biomedical samples, for the
expedient transfer of personnel deceased as a result of a CB attack.   
     d.  The Cdr, JCMEC, will be responsible for coordinating shipment of suspected biological
samples to the TAML for preliminary analysis, and suspected chemical or biological-chemical
mixed to CONUS-based laboratories.
     e.  The TEU is responsible for coordinating shipment to the US Army Chemical Research
Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC) at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, if it is a
chemical sample; or to the US Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USARlID) at
Fort Detrick, MD, if it is a combination CB sample or if it is a suspected biological sample only.
3.  SAMPLING RESPONSIBILITY:  Samples suspected of containing CB agents are divided
into environmental and biomedical samples on the basis of their origin.  Both medical and
nonmedical teams are responsible for collecting samples suspected of containing CB agents.
     a.   ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES.  Environmental CB agent samples are collected in the
field.  They include samples like aerosols or vapors; liquids other than water, soil, vegetation;
water; used chemical equipment; and ordnance.  The acquisition of these samples is the
responsibility of—
           (1)  NBC reconnaissance teams.
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  (2)  Technical escort field teams.
(3)  TECHINT collection teams.
(4)  Preventative medicine units (potable water sources only).
  (5)  Special operation teams.
b.  BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES.  Biomedical samples are derived primarily from acutely ill
soldiers who exhibit symptoms of CB agent intoxication or from personnel who were killed in an
attack.  Collection of the biomedical samples will be the responsibility of personnel in—
(1)  Battalion-level medical units.
(2)  Division-level medical treatment facilities.
(3)  Combat support hospitals.
(4)  Evacuation hospitals.
(5)  Theater medical hospitals.
(6)  NBC reconnaissance teams (small animals only).
(7)  Technical escort field teams.
(8)  TECHINT collection teams.
4.  SAMPLING:  Sampling will be initiated if the following are observed:
a.  Significant numbers of unexplained sickness or death of personnel or animals occur.
b.  Ordnance (munitions) are found which contain known or suspected CB agents.
c.  An attack is suspected or is known to have occurred but the causative agent cannot be
identified.
d.  The widespread outbreak of unusual mission-degrading behavior occurs.
e.  Sampling of known identified agents to verify first use is required.
Figure D-3.  Example of a TAB D to a TECHINT Appendix of 
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5.  PROCEDURES:
a.  Procedures for the collection, packaging, documentation, and transporting of CB samples
to laboratories must be precise to ensure the credibility of the analysis conducted on the
samples.  Ensuring the credible analysis of suspected CB samples is critical for both battlefield
commanders concerned with possible retaliation and contamination avoidance, and medical
personnel concerned with prophylactic or post-contamination treatments.
b.  When possible, a background sample from "clean" areas beyond the perimeter of the
attack site should be obtained as baseline data for comparison; collection should be identified to
sample collected data from contaminated areas and packaged separately.
c.  The best biomedical sample is an acutely ill soldier or a cadaver which is sent back to
CONUS immediately.  A copy of the physical examination or an extract of significant findings
will be enclosed with biomedical samples.  Samples will be collected in triplicate, distributing
two to CONUS and one to the TAML.
d.  All samples will be forwarded from the TAML to either ERDEC or USAMRIID laboratories
12 to 24 hours after collection; delay beyond 24 hours rapidly degrades the  intelligence value
of the samples.
6.  NOTIFICATION MESSAGE:  A notification message will be sent from the TAML or
TECHINT unit by PRIORITY precedence upon receipt and screening of samples to the Theater
Surgeon General, J2, J3, and CDR, ERDEC APG MD//CBATEB//:  The notification message
will contain the following information:
a.  The sample identification number and details which relate to the acquisition of the
sample.  This message will be confirmed to provide the following information:
     (1) Background information.
     (2)  Physical description.
     (3)  Results of preliminary tests after sample collection.
     (4)  Where, when, and under what conditions the sample was acquired.
     (5)  Description of incident.
     (6)  Casualty symptoms (if applicable).
     (7)  Shipment information, such as—
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(a)  Date of shipment.
(b)  Mode of transportation.
          (c)  Flight number and destination.
(d)  Estimated time of arrival CONUS.
(e)  Description of shipment (for example, size and weight).
 
(f)  Names of escort personnel.  
                
Figure D-3.  Example of a TAB D to a TECHINT Appendix of 
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Appendix E
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
INTRODUCTION
This appendix describes the nine basic reports, which are listed below, that
battlefield TECHINT analysts use.
SALUTE report (Figure E-1).
Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP) (Figure E-2).
Complementary Technical Intelligence Report (COMTECHREP)
(Figures E-3, E-4, and E-5).
Detailed Technical Report (DETECHREP).
Technical Intelligence Update Report.
Technical Intelligence Summary (TECHSUM).
Technical  Intelligence Report (TIR).
Special technical reports.  These reports are generated in response to
requests for information.  The formats vary by request and usually
address a specific question or requirement from a TECHINT consumer.
Other equipment information reports.  These reports focus on aspects
of equipment that do not necessarily relate to intelligence needs
per se.  For example, the Theater commander may have a war trophy     
   policy that permits units to evacuate certain equipment to their home      
stations for static displays.  These reports may include driver's                    
instructions, handling considerations, render-safe procedures, and         
demilitarization standards for equipment.
The SALUTE report is an oral or written report prepared by the acquiring
units or intermediate command echelons.  It is used to report rapidly, by
electrical or other means, the capture of foreign materiel.  These reports are
forwarded to either the TECHINT LNEs at Corps, other TECHINT LNEs, or
directly to the JCMEC.  As a result of this information, a TECHINT team
could be dispatched or the CEM could be moved to the
Corps CMEC or the theater JCMEC.  Figure E-1 gives an example of a
completed  SALUTE report.FM 34-54
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SALUTE REPORT
      TO:  G2  V Corps                                   DTG:  230900Z Aug 98
FROM:  G2  24th Inf Div (Mech)   REPORT NO:  07-0623
1. SIZE:  NA.
2. ACTIVITY:  Capture of shoulder-fired laser target designator by 1/64th Armor Bn 2d Bde 
24th Inf Div (Mech)  (include capturing unit).
3. LOCATION:  Town of Al-Dahran (UTM EH556937) (as a minimum always give grid
coordinates).
4. UNIT:  3d Republican Guards Regiment (include enemy unit if known).
5. TIME:  Item captured on 230230Z AUG 98 (always use ZULU time).
6. EQUIPMENT:  One laser target designator and sighting device (give best possible
description).
Figure E-1. Example of a SALUTE report.
PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL REPORT
The PRETECHREP contains a general description of the CEE.  It alerts the
CMEC, other technical elements, and the tactical units to significant
technical information of immediate tactical importance.  It can also be used
for reporting inventories at collection points through intelligence  channels
so that location, quantities, and type of equipment can be monitored. 
Figure E-2 shows an example of a PRETECHREP.
Corps TECHINT teams and possibly CMEC teams will prepare a
PRETECHREP on all CEM after preliminary screening.  This report is first
transmitted by radio directly to the Corps TECHINT LNE, from the captured
equipment site.  It is then forwarded to the CMEC.  The report will normally
be treated as unclassified during this transmission.
The CMEC's technical analysts determine what is of importance from the
report, and give the team instructions through the LNE on what items need
more detailed reporting or evacuation.  During this time the team will collect
all documents off the CEE and will record— FM 34-54
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(Classification)
PRETECHREP
A. Type of equipment and quantity.
B. Date and time of capture.
C. Location (map reference).
D. Capturing unit and circumstances of capture.
E. Enemy formation from which captured and origin.
F. Brief description with serial numbers and,  if possible, manufacturer.
G. Technical characteristics with an immediate value, including information or any
photographs available.
H. Time and origin of message.
I. Present location of CEE.
(Classification)
Figure E-2. Format for a PRETECHREP.
All radio frequencies of communication equipment.
All serial markings of important equipment.
The battle damage done to the CEE.  
These  information requirements and actions will be taken at all CEE sites. 
The radio frequencies will be sent only by secured means. 
COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The COMTECHREP is categorized by Types A, B, or C, depending on
what type of CEE is being reported.  The COMTECHREP contains a more
detailed description of the CEE than the PRETECHREP.   It alerts the
JCMEC, other technical elements, and the tactical units to significant
detailed technical information of immediate tactical and technical
importance.FM 34-54
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Corps TECHINT teams, and possibly JCMEC teams, will prepare a
COMTECHREP on all CEM that the JCMEC tells it to do.  If the TECHINT
collection team is out of contact with the JCMEC, it will follow the TECHINT
collection plan and use its best judgment on reporting.
  
This report is first transmitted normally by secure computer data
transmission over landline to the Corps TECHINT LNE from the team's
base.  If possible, it is transmitted from the CEE site over secure computer
or radio data transmission via satellite.  It is then transmitted to the JCMEC. 
The report normally will be treated as classified during this transmission.
   
All electronic images of the CEE and computer scanning of critical CED will
be transmitted with the COMTECHREP.  If data transmission is not on
hand, the report will be transmitted by the nearest message center at no
less than PRIORITY precedence.
COMPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE TECHNICAL 
REPORT - TYPE A
The COMTECHREP - Type  A is provided to Air Force TECHINT
personnel.  Air Force teams usually are not on the scene of captured or
downed enemy aircraft before destruction, recapture, or loss.  Army
TECHINT personnel usually are the first elements on the scene and will
examine the CEM and submit a COMTECHREP - Type A.  This report often
constitutes the only information that can be provided to Air Force TECHINT. 
If naval CEM is acquired, the Type A report format can be modified for
reporting such acquisition.  Figure E-3 shows an example of a
COMTECHREP - Type A.
                                                               (Classification)
COMTECHREP - TYPE A
The COMTECHREP - Type A is used to report information about aircraft.  The JCMEC normally
will require this report to be done right after the PRETECHREP on the aircraft.
A.  Type of Aircraft, fixed wing (examples):
 (1)   Air-superiority (F-15C, SU-27B)
 (2)   Multi-role fighter (F-l6, MiG-29C)
(Classification)
Figure E-3.  Format for a COMTECHREP - Type A.FM 34-54
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(Classification)
(3)   Fighter-bomber (F-111, YAK-141)
(4)   Close Air Support/Ground Attack (A-10, SU-25, SU-22)
(5)   Bomber (B-2, TU-160)
(6)   Observation (OV-10)
  (7)   Transport (C-130, IL-76)
(8)   Airborne Early Warning (AWACS, Israeli PHZ)
(9)   Electronic Warfare/Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (EA-63, F-4G)
(10)  Special Mission (for example, Intelligence Collection)
B.   General Aircraft Configuration:
(1)    Overall length
(2)    Wingspan
(3)    Wing sweep angle
(4)    Variable geometry wings
(5)    Number of vertical stabilizers and orientation
(6)    Number of seats and orientation
(7)    Number of engines
(8)    Intake type and location
(9)    Landing gear type and orientation
(10)  Distinct control surfaces present (flaperons, elevons)
(11)  Other distinguishing features (wing fences, wingtip winglets, antennas, canards)
C.  Identifying Marks:
(1)   Fin flashes
(2)   Paint scheme
(3)   Individual or squadron markings
D.  Overall Condition:
(1)   Describe extent of damage and salvageable parts
(2)   Assess cause of crash, if possible
(3)   Did Aircrew survive
E.  Cockpit Avionics (not all equipment is present in every aircraft):
(1)   Type (brand and model) of airborne intercept, bombing and navigation, weather radars
(2)   Type of communications gear, frequency settings if possible 
(3)   IFF or Transponder type, settings
(4)   Type EA equipment
(5)   Type of RWR gear
(6)   Type of weapon guidance gear (laser designation equipment, TV guidance
equipment)
(Classification)
Figure E-3.  Format for a COMTECHREP-Type A (continued).FM 34-54
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(Classification)
(7)   Type of IRSTS if present 
(8)   Are the following flight controls present:  HUD, fly-by-wire controls, MFD, HOTAS  (9)  
Type of chaff or flare dispenser system
F.  Armament:
(1)   Number of cannons present, caliber, and location
(2)   Bombs or rockets present
(3)   Air-to-air missiles present
(4)   Air-to-surface missiles present
(5)   Number of launch rails or weapon mounts present and location
G.  General remarks and special points or unusual features not mentioned.
H.  Photos of at least:
(1)  Airframe
(2)  Engine
(3)  All other items that could be of importance
I.  Designation of TECHINT collection team conducting exploitation:
J.  Time and origin of message:
(Classification)
Figure E-3. Format for a COMTECHREP - Type A (continued).
COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
REPORT - TYPE B
The COMTECHREP - Type B is used to report information about explosive
ordnance.  TECHINT teams prepare these reports, normally done by the
EOD member of the team.  EOD companies will also prepare them in
absence of TECHINT personnel or when required by higher headquarters. 
This report must be as complete and detailed as possible.  EOD personnel
prepare and send this report by the fastest means through an EOD control
unit.  The JCMEC coordinates with EOD battalions to receive copies of
these reports as soon as possible.FM 34-54
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NOTE:  Initial overall classification of EOD Reports.  Non-nuclear (COMTECHREP B) will be in
accordance with OPNAVINST S5513.3B-24.1.
The initial classification of the COMTECHREP B with RSP is Confidential and will not be released
to non-US personnel without the written consent of Commanding Officer, NAVEODTECHDIV. 
The release of RSP to non-EOD qualified personnel is forbidden.
A complete and accurate report is essential; lives of other EOD personnel rely on this report, strive
for the most complete report possible.  However, when a detailed report might result in serious
delay and the items are of extreme significance, complete as much of the report as possible. 
Items of EOD interest will at a minimum be photographed (with electronic imaging systems if
available), X-rays (digital) and have detailed drawings with measurements (metric).
Figure E-4 shows an example of a COMTECHREP - TYPE B.
The unit completing the report will distribute copies of the COMTECHREP - TYPE B (EOD Report)
to all deployed US EOD units and provide copies to:
Commander                                          Commander
USATECHDET                                     USAARDEC
2008 Stump Neck Road                       ATTN:  AMSTA-AR-FSX   
Indian Head, MD  20640                      Picatinny Arsenal, NJ  07806-5000
Commanding Officer                            Commander
NAVEODTECHDIV                              NGIC
2008 Stump Neck Road                       ATTN:  IANGIC-RMS
Indian Head, MD  20640                      220 7th Street, NE
                                                             Charlottesville, VA  22901-5396
(Confidential when filled in)
COMTECHREP-TYPE B (EOD Report)
Section I.  (U)  DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION
1.  (U)  IDENTIFICATION.  See Figure     for physical appearance and dimensions.
NOTE:  This will be an external view (when possible) and not show internal components.
    a.  (U)  Designation.  Ordnance designation (if known) with transliteration of foreign alphabet. 
Example:  M45.
    b.  (U)  Type.  Used to summarize the key functional aspects of the items.
Example:  This is a High Explosive Rocket Assist (HERA) projectile.
      
Figure E-4.  Format for a COMTECHREP - TYPE B.FM 34-54
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    c.  (U)  Painting and Markings.  Record all paintings, surface treatments, and markings.
    d.  (U)  Features.  Point out unique or distinguishing external features of the item that are not
obvious in the drawings.
2.  (U)  DESCRIPTION.
    a.  (U)  Material.  Include information pertaining to the major external components; for
example, "plastic," "aluminum."
    b.  (U)  Weight.  Give the approximate weight if known.
3.  (U)  HAZARDOUS COMPONENTS.
ITEM               QTY               LOCATION            EXPLOSIVE              HE WEIGHT
List Hazardous components (if known).
4.  (U)  FUNCTIONING.  Explain the operation of the ordnance, particularly the components of
the ordnance involved with initiating the explosive train.
5.  (U)  APPEARANCE.  It must be known for certain that the item is unarmed if the item is to be
treated as such.
    a.  (U)  Unarmed Condition.  Example:  The item is unarmed if not fired.
    b.  (U)  Armed Condition.  Example:  Consider the item armed if it has been fired.
Section II.  (C)  EOD PROCEDURES.  (EOD USE ONLY)
6.  (U)  RENDER SAFE PROCEDURE FOR THE UNARMED CONDITION.
    a.  (C)  PROPOSED:  (Develop and record prior to completing RSP).
    b.  (U)  Proceed to disposal.
7.  (U)  RENDER SAFE PROCEDURE FOR THE ARMED CONDITION WARNINGS.
    a.  (C)  PROPOSED:  (Develop and record prior to completing RSP).
    b.  (U)  Proceed to Disposal.
continued:
8.  (U)  DISPOSAL PROCEDURE.
Figure E-4.  Format for a COMTECHREP - Type B (continued). FM 34-54
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    a.  (U)  Unarmed.  Transport hazardous components to safe disposal area and dispose of by
detonation.
    b.  (C)  Armed.
         (1)  (Include quantity of explosives used to dispose of item).
         (2)  Detonate remotely.
(Confidential when filled in)
Figure E-4.  Format for a COMTECHREP - Type B (continued).
COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
REPORT - TYPE C 
The COMTECHREP - Type C is used to report items not reported under
COMTECHREP (Types A and B).  COMTECHREP - Type C is submitted
as soon as possible.  Figure E-5 shows an example of a COMTECHREP -
Type C.
(Classification)
COMTECHREP - TYPE C
A.  Date found and location (map reference).
B.  Type of equipment and quantity.
C.  Origin.
D.  Description with distinguishing marks (additional details).
E.  Condition of equipment.
F.  Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (additional details).
G.  Recommended disposal.
H.  Name plates photographed.
I.   Photographs taken.
(Classification)
Figure E-5.  Format for a COMTECHREP - Type C.FM 34-54
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(Classification)
J.  Other information.
K. Designation of TECHINT collection team doing this initial exploitation.
L.  Time and origin of message.
(Classification)
 Figure E-5.  Format for a COMTECHREP - Type C (continued).
DETAILED TECHNICAL REPORT
The DETECHREP normally is prepared at the JCMEC by the Exploitation
Company, with the assistance of the national S&TI analysis personnel at
the JCMEC.  The DECTECHREP normally is classified.  The CM&D
section of the Exploitation Company sends the DETECHREP through the
JTIB to the national S&TI community.  They also send a summary of the
report to Theater units.
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT
The TECHINT Update Report is a one- to two-paragraph report on an item
of equipment that has an impact on tactical operations.  The report comes
from information provided in PRETECHREPs and COMTECHREPs, and is
unclassified.  The goal of the report is to reach the lowest level—the
soldier—with information of value to the soldier.  The CM&D section of the
Operations Company sends the report by electronic message and
computer data transmission.
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
The TECHINT Summary is a collection of information on more than one
item of equipment that has an impact on theater tactical operations.  The
information comes from PRETECHREPs and COMTECHREPs from over a
period of time or from a large CEE location.  The report normally is
unclassified, but if put into an overall intelligence summary, it can be
classified.  The CM&D section of the Exploitation Company sends the
report by electronic message and computer data transmission to the JTIB. 
The JTIB then makes dissemination to the lowest possible level with JTF
C I assets.
3FM 34-54
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TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The TIR is a critical report which goes to the highest levels of the
intelligence hierarchy.  The report comes from information from
PRETECHREPs, COMTECHREPs, and DETECHREPs.  This report is
always classified and follows the format in DIAM 58-13.  The CM&D section
sends TIRs by electronic message to the JTIB.  The JTIB  disseminates
them to the highest and lowest intelligence units and agencies possible.FM 34-54
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Appendix F
COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION REQUIREMENTS
INTRODUCTION
This appendix includes guidance on how to develop a TECHINT collection
plan, and a listing of general exploitation categories regarding items of
interest to battlefield TECHINT.  It is included only as a field guide, and is
not an all-inclusive exploitation plan.
TECHINT COLLECTION PLAN GUIDANCE
TECHINT elements are a very limited resource requiring specific collection
planning to be effective.  The most critical TECHINT items for collection are
found in the TECHINT Appendix to the OPLAN or OPORD.  The following
steps help determine pertinent items in the collection plan before it is
accepted.
STEP 1.  Identify the equipment OB for the threat; for example, items such
as individual soldier's equipment, maps, small arms, heavy weapons, and
explosives.  Also include every type of equipment the threat could have on
the battlefield.  This is an ongoing effort, with the OB always being updated. 
In addition to the collection plan, include overlays of locations of ASPs,
maintenance points, SAMs, communications centers, and other locations
that contain quantities of equipment for collection.
STEP 2.  In coordination with DIA, national S&TI requirements, and Theater
and Corps PIR and IR, the TECHINT unit prioritizes collection of items from
the OB.  If coordination is not possible, the equipment that is the greatest
threat to the conduct of tactical operations is prioritized.
STEP 3.  The DOD Foreign Acquisition List is used to guide TECHINT
priorities.  These collection priorities are published in the Intelligence Annex
to the OPORD in the form of a collection plan.  As collection takes place,
the updated collection plan is then sent to TECHINT and theater units in
message format.
STEP 4.  The TECHINT collection requirements are then cross-referenced
to the known threat OB.  TECHINT elements are then tasked, if possible,
with specific collection of items from the threat units that they are facing.  In
addition, the Corps TECHINT LNE coordinates with the Corps G2 to give
specific collection requirements to the Corps units.  The JTIB coordinatesFM 34-54
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with the Theater J2 to give collection requirements to theater units such as
Special Operations units.
STEP 5.  In addition to the TECHINT collection priority list for equipment,
TECHINT elements are tasked to collect, inspect, or develop the following
items:
Threat equipment manuals or documents.
Threat installations.
Listing of TECHINT questions for the interrogation of EPWs.
CB laboratories and samples.
STEP 6.  The 203d MI Battalion, in coordination with national S&TI
agencies, maintains contingency TECHINT collection plans for possible
threat forces.  When a TECHINT element deploys, it is given the TECHINT
collection plan in order to prepare and train for operations.
EXPLOITATION PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS
GENERAL EXPLOITATION PLAN:
The JCMEC is expected to conduct this level of exploitation on all
equipment in theater.  The Corps RC TECHINT sections at the CMEC
conduct this level on equipment that matched the MOSs in their elements. 
The TECHINT collection teams are prepared to do this, but normally would
not do it on a large scale.
Preliminary requirements for exploitation include—
Preliminary photographs of CEM outside and inside (to shows status of
equipment before assessment).
An inventory.
— Examine system for any written information (documents, operator
manuals, maps), markings, data plates, or operating instructions.
— Identify all individual equipment components requiring separate
analysis.
If equipment requires further analysis beyond initial exploitation, begin
planning for further detailed exploitation with national S&TI personnel.FM 34-54
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The exploitation, with finished report, is accomplished within 48 hours.
The JCMEC normally is the primary center for all detailed exploitations in
theater.
Once the general exploitation is accomplished, a more detailed exploitation
begins. This is in coordination with the national S&TI SME at the JCMEC. 
The plan is provided by the national S&TI community.
The JCMEC maintains in the Exploitation Company detailed exploitation
plans for collection priority equipment.  These plans are part of the
contingency database for the threat equipment.  The time limit for a detailed
exploitation is determined by the tactical needs of the theater and national
requirements.FM 34-54
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Appendix G
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEXT RECOGNITION 
INTRODUCTION
When TECHINT personnel are able to correctly identify foreign languages
used in documents or equipment, it has two immediate benefits.   First,  it
helps identify the equipment or type of document and where or who is using
it.  Second, it ensures that TECHINT personnel request the correct
linguistic support.
This appendix contains language identification hints that will enable
TECHINT personnel to quickly identify some of the many languages used
in documents, on equipment plates, and on other materiel.  TECHINT
personnel can speed up the entire battlefield TECHINT process by
following the guidance herein.
 
The language identification hints were compiled by NGIC.  There are
thousands of languages and dialects in use in the world today; therefore,
this material is not complete.  The following include examples of the use of
language identification during TECHINT operations.
A TECHINT team discovers an ADA system that looks like a Russian
ZPU-4 ADA gun.  But on closer examination, the technical analysis
identifies Chinese characters on a data plate and on the tires.  This
      could mean that this ADA gun is from China, and this observation            
   needs to be reported to TECHINT elements and to the CMEC.
TECHINT personnel find a document in Arabic, but the country they are
in speak and write only Spanish.  This document could be of
intelligence value and would require being reported to TECHINT
elements and to document exploitation (DOCEX) personnel.
LANGUAGE SYSTEMS
The world's written languages can be divided into alphabet languages and
character languages.  The only present-day character system is the
Chinese system, which has been borrowed by other languages.   But there
are many alphabets.   The most important alphabets currently in use are—
The Roman alphabet  (used by English and many other languages).FM 34-54
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The Cyrillic alphabet (used by Russian, some other Slavic languages,
and most of the minority languages of Russia).
The Arabic alphabet (used in the Middle East and other areas
influenced by Islam).
Other alphabets exist, but their use is more restricted.  (Figure G-1 shows
some of these spoken languages and some of the locations where they are
spoken.)
The Hebrew alphabet for Hebrew and Yiddish; the Greek alphabet for
Greek.
The Devanagari alphabet for Sanskrit and other languages of India.
In addition, there are special alphabets for languages like Georgian,
Telugu, the other Dravidian languages in southern India, Laos, and other
languages in southeast Asia, and Amharic in Ethiopia.
Illustrations of the main alphabets are normally available in standard 
desktop dictionaries.  Many unusual scripts are illustrated in Romanization
Guides, revised and enlarged edition, put out by the Office of the
Geographer, Directorate for Functional Research, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, US Department of State, and the US Board on Geographic
Names, dated 1 April 1972.
Reliable detailed information about foreign languages for people who
cannot actually read them is available in manuals compiled for professional
librarians.  These manuals can be found at your local library.
ROMAN ALPHABET LANGUAGES
The most complex language recognition problem is to distinguish between
the numerous languages that use the Roman alphabet.  The 26-letter
alphabet is used here as the basic alphabet.  The other Roman alphabet
languages use these same letters, but many use fewer than 26 and a few
use more.
Unfortunately, just because a letter is not used is not a very useful
language recognition criterion.  This is because it is difficult to know
whether a letter is absent because it is never used or because it simply was
not needed to write the text in question.FM 34-54
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Language                                 Location 
Chinese  People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand
English   United States, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand 
Spanish  Spain, South America, Central America, Mexico    
Hindi   North Central India     
Russian  Soviet Union, Europe 
Arabic   Saudi Arabia, Yemen, South Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Oman,        
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt,         
Sudan, Libya, Tunisia,  Algeria, Morocco
Portuguese  Portugal, Brazil, Africa, Asia  
Japanese  Japan    
German Germany, Austria, Switzerland 
Urdu                              Pakistan, India  
French France, Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria,       
Lebanon, Syria, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam  
Korean             Korea, China, Japan 
Italian                            Italy, Switzerland 
Vietnamese                   Vietnam 
Turkish             Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus  
Persian (Farsi, Dari)   Iran, Afghanistan (Tadzhik, USSR)  
Polish                             Poland, United States, Soviet Union 
Ukrainian                  Ukrainian SSR  
Rumanian                   Romania, Moldavian SSR   
Serbian (Croatian)         Yugoslavia
Pashto                     Afghanistan, Northwest Pakistan 
Czech (Slovak)             Czechoslovakia 
Dutch                        Netherlands, Suriname, Belgium
Hungarian                  Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia 
Danish (Norwegian)     Denmark, Norway    
Bulgarian Bulgaria      
Swedish                    Sweden      
Belorussian                Belorussian SSR
Finnish                     Finland    
Albanian                   Albania, Yugoslavia
Lithuanian                 Lithuanian SSR  
Latvian                     Latvian SSR 
Slovenian                  Slovenia (Northwest Yugoslavia)
Estonian                   Estonian SSR  
Macedonian                 Macedonia (Yugoslavia)  
Figure G-1.  A partial list of spoken languages and locations where they are spoken.FM 34-54
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Five of the letters <a, e, i, o, u> are referred to collectively as "vowels,"
while the rest are called collectively "consonants."  The rules designating
letters as vowels or consonants vary from language to language.  Some
languages, for instance, consider <l>, <r>, or <y> to be vowels.  Most of the
Roman alphabet languages modify letters by putting extra marks above, in,
or below them.  These marks are called diacritics.  They are among the
best criteria for language recognition.
DIACRITICS
Figure G-2 shows the principal diacritics used by various languages to
modify the Roman alphabet.  Figure G-3 shows the languages that use
these diacritics.  It also summarizes the occurrence of various diacritics in
selected Roman alphabet languages and gives examples of letters with
diacritics on them.  The diacritics are divided into three groups, depending
on whether they are written above, in, or below the letter.  They are given
standard names for convenience; their actual names vary from language to
language.
DIACRITICS ABOVE THE LETTER
Grave           <  >                   Acute < >              Circumflex  <^>  
Hacek          < >       Breve <  >               Macron  < > 
V -
Tilde  <~>                   Krouzek < >            Dot  <>  
O .
Dieresis  <u>              Double Acute <_>              Apostrophe  <'> 
Question  <?>               Umlaut  <ä>         Back Apostrophe  <ë> 
DIACRITICS IN THE LETTER 
Bar  <->                     Slash     </>                  Horn  < > 
DIACRITICS UNDER THE LETTER
Cedilla  <î>                    Ogonek  < >                 Comma  <,>
    Low Dot  <.>       
Figure G-2.  Table of diacritics.
WESTERN EUROPEAN LANGUAGES
Western European languages include those commonly called Romance
and Germanic languages.
 FM 34-54
G-5
           DIACRITICS WRITTEN ABOVE THE LETTER  
<`> grave:   French, Italian, Portuguese, Vietnamese, e.g., <à>
< >acute:   Croatian, Czech, French, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Polish <N, O, S,
    C, Z>, Slovak, Spanish, Portuguese,  Vietnamese; e.g., <á, ó> 
<^> circumflex:   French, Italian, Portuguese, Rumanian, Vietnamese, Turkish, e.g.,<â, 
    ô>
<v> hacek:                    Croatian, Czech, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian <S, Z, C>,Slovak,
                                          Slovenian, e.g., < ,  >   
< > breve:   Rumanian, Turkish, Vietnamese; e.g., < ,  >  
<  > macron:   Latvian, Lithuanian; e.g., < ,  >  
<~> tilde:   Estonian, Portuguese, Spanish, Vietnamese; e.g., <ã, ñ> 
< > krouzek:   Czech, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish; e.g., <å, e>  
O
<.> dot:   Lithuanian <e>, Polish, Turkish, e.g., < ,  >   
<u> dieresis:   Albanian, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Hungarian, Slovak,
   Portuguese <ü>, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish;  e.g., <ä, ë>    
<"> double acute:   Hungarian; e.g., < ,  > 
<'> apostrophe:   Czech, French, Slovak; e.g., < ,  >     
<?> question:   Vietnamese; e.g., <a, e>
<{> back apostrophe:  Latvian; e.g., <g>     
                              DIACRITICS WRITTEN IN (OR TOUCHING) THE LETTER  
<-> bar:   Croatian, Polish, Vietnamese; e.g., <d,1, a>    
</> slash:   Danish, Norwegian, Polish; e.g., <1, 0>  
<»> horn:   Vietnamese; e.g., < , õ>   
        DIACRITICS WRITTEN UNDER THE SEAT     
< > cedilla:   Albanian, French, Portuguese, Turkish, e.g., <ç,  >  
<O> ogonek:   Lithuanian 
<,> comma:   Latvian, Rumanian; e.g., <k,  > 
<.> low dot:   Vietnamese; e.g., <a, e> 
Figure G-3.  The occurrence of diacritics in various languages.
DISTINGUISHING FRENCH, GERMAN, AND DUTCH
FRENCH:
French is generally easiest to recognize because it is so familiar and has
so many words in common with English.  French uses acute < > and
grave <`> on <e>.  Acute is not used on any other letters, but grave is used
occasionally on <a> and <u>.  Circumflex <^> is used on <a, e, i, o, u> and
cedilla < > is used under <c>.  The French commonly omit
diacritics over capital letters and in typescript.  Definite article forms:  le, la,
les.  French also uses a trëma <oe, ï, ë>.FM 34-54
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GERMAN:
German uses the umlaut <u u> on <a, o, u>.  This is the language's only
diacritic.  German also uses a special letter, the Eszett < >, which does not
begin a word.  In regular prose, capitalization is rather frequent since all
nouns are capitalized.  Definite article forms:  der, die, das, des, dem, den.
DUTCH:
Dutch can be mistaken for German; however, Dutch does not capitalize its
nouns in regular prose.  Dutch adopted a few diacritical forms from the
French language.  These include:  acute <een>; grave <crepe>;
apostrophe <'t, z'n, d'r, etc.>; dieresis <België>; and sometimes the cedilla
< >.  Definite article forms:  de and het.
DISTINGUISHING SPANISH, PORTUGUESE, AND ITALIAN
For Spanish, look for acutes occasionally over vowels, tilde <~> over <n>
but not over vowels, no grave accents, and words that end in <n>.  For
Portuguese look for the tilde over <a> and <o> but not over <n>, the cedilla
under <c>, and some words that end in <m>.  For Italian look for occasional
graves over vowels, no tildes or cedillas, and numerous doubled
consonants; for example, <tt>, <gg>, <pp>, <vv>, and so forth.  Of course,
look for the definite articles; they are frequently used and mostly different in
the three languages.
SPANISH:
Spanish uses acute < > on vowels <a, e, i, o, u> and tilde <~> on <n>.
Since the acute marks irregular word accent, there will normally be no more
than one acute per word and it will appear on the last vowel or third from
last vowel.  Dieresis <u> is used occasionally over <u>.  Grave <`> and
circumflex <^> are not used.  Definite article forms:  el, la, los, las.
PORTUGUESE:
Portuguese uses acute <'>, grave <'>, and circumflex <^> occasionally over
vowels, and tilde <~> frequently over <a> and <o>.  Cedilla < > is used
under <c>.  Dieresis <u> is used over vowels occasionally.  Definite article
forms: o, os, a, as.FM 34-54
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ITALIAN:
Italian uses acute < > on <e> and grave <`> on vowels <a, e, i, o, u> to
indicate unusual accent.  Some type fonts may substitute circumflex <^> for
grave.  Normally there will be no more than one grave per word, and it will
appear on the last vowel or third from last vowel.  Definite article forms:  il,
lo, i, gli, la, le.
NORTHERN EUROPEAN LANGUAGES
Northern European languages include North Germanic and Slavic, as well
as unique languages of the Finno-Ugric family.  The distinguishing features
of each are described below.
SWEDISH:
Swedish uses dieresis <u> on <a> and <o> and krouzek < > on <a>.  A
O
frequent word is och; meaning "and."
DANISH AND NORWEGIAN:
Danish and Norwegian use the same alphabet as Swedan.  They use
krouzek < > on <a> and slash </> on <o>, and a special letter, the ae
O
digraph <E, æ>.  Written Danish and Norwegian are difficult to tell apart,
but anyone who can read one can make sense out of the other.  A frequent
word in both languages is og; meaning "and."
FINNISH:
Finnish is very different from the other northern European languages, but it
is similar to Estonian.  Finnish uses dieresis <u> on <a> and <o>.  About 60
percent of the average text consists of vowels (including <y>).  Look for
frequent double vowels; <aa>, <ee>, <ii>, etc.
ESTONIAN:
Estonian uses tilde <~> on <o>, dieresis <u> on <a, o, u>, and hacek < > 
V
on <s, z> infrequently in foreign words.  At first glance Estonian looks very
much like Finnish, and both are of the Finno-Ugric family.  To tell the two
languages apart, look for <y> (Finnish) or <u> with dieresis (Estonian).
HUNGARIAN:
Hungarian uses acute < > on <a, e, i, o, u>, dieresis <u> on <o, u>,  and
double acute < > on <o, u>.  These three diacritics are very frequent and
should all appear in an average paragraph.  Definite article forms:  a, az. 
Although not Northern European, Hungarian is listed here because it is in
the Finno-Ugric family.FM 34-54
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ROMAN ALPHABET SLAVIC LANGUAGES
It is often difficult to distinguish between the Roman alphabet Slavic
languages.  Of these languages, Polish is easiest to distinguish from the
rest because it does not use hacek < >, whereas the others do; and
V
because it uses <w> frequently and <v> almost never, whereas the
opposite situation occurs in the other languages.
The languages of Czechoslovakia—Czech and Slovak—can be
distinguished from the Roman alphabet languages of the former
Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Serbia because Czech and Slovak use acute <'>
on vowels  (including <y>) and Croatian and Slovenian do not.  Acutes are
so frequent in Czech and Slovak that the absence of acutes in an average-
length sentence can be taken as a valid negative test.  
The presence of the diacritics listed above for Croatian indicate that it may
be Croatian; but there is no convenient way to test for Slovenian against
Croatian.  If in doubt between Croatian and Slovenian, assume Croatian
unless it can be established that the text was published in Ljubljana.
POLISH:
Polish uses acute < > on <c, n, o, s, z>; ogonek < > on <a, e>; bar <->
(occasionally depending on font as a substitute for slash) on <L,1, Z>, such
as <L, 1, Z>; and < > dot on <z>.  Letters <w> and <z> are very frequent in
Polish, and the <v> almost never occurs.
CZECH:
Czech uses acute < > on <a, e, i, o, u, y>, hacek < > on <c, d, e, n, r, s, t,
V
z>, krouzek < > on <u>.  The letter <r> with hacek is frequent in Czech and
O
lacking in Slovak.
SLOVAK:
Slovak uses acute < > on <a, e, i, l, r, o, u, y>; dieresis <u> on <a>;
circumflex <^> on <o>; hacek < > on <c, d, l, n, s, t, z>; and apostrophe <'>
V
on <d, l, t>.  The digraph <ie> is fairly frequent in Slovak and very
infrequent in Czech.  Slovak is used in eastern Czechoslovakia.  Suspect
Slovak if Bratislava is the origin.
    CROATIAN:
Croatian uses acute < > on <c>, hacek < > on <c, s, z>, and bar <-> on
V
<d>.  Croatian is used in northern and coastal Yugoslavia around the city of
Zargreb.FM 34-54
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SLOVENIAN:
Slovenian uses hacek < > on <c, s, z> and no other diacritics.  Slovenian is
V
used in extreme northwest Yugoslavia around the city of Ljubljana.
RUMANIAN:
Rumanian uses breve < > on <a>, circumflex <^> on <a, i>, and comma
V
<,> under <s, t>.
ALBANIAN:
Albanian uses dieresis <u> on <e> and cedilla < > under <c>.  The <e>
with dieresis is very common.  Another recognition mark of Albanian is the
use of <q> without <u>.
LITHUANIAN:
Lithuanian uses hacek < > on <c, s, z>, macron < > on <u>, dot < > on <e>,
V -
and ogonek < > under <a, e, i, u>.  The frequent occurrence of ogonek is a
good recognition sign for Lithuanian.
LATVIAN:
Latvian uses hacek < > on <c, s, z>, macron < > on <a, e, i, o, u>, and
V -
comma <,> under <k, l, n>.  Comma is also used under <G> (upper case
letter only), while back apostrophe <`> is used on <g> (lower case letter
only).  In this case the two marks are variant forms of the same diacritic. 
The macrons and commas are a good recognition sign for Latvian.
OTHER ROMAN ALPHABET LANGUAGES
Turkish and Vietnamese use the Roman alphabet with unusual diacritics.
TURKISH:
Turkish uses breve < > on <g>, dieresis <u> on <o, u>, and cedilla < > on
V
<c>.  Turkish has two forms of the letter <i>.  One has the upper case < >
and a corresponding lower < > that looks like an "i" without the dot.  
The other letter has the lower case form <i> (the same as English) and a
corresponding upper case form that looks like English " " with a dot < >. 
Turkish also uses circumflex <^ > <latif> <lugat>.FM 34-54
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VIETNAMESE:
Vietnamese uses a very complex system of diacritics.  It uses breve < > on
V
<a>, circumflex <^> on <a, e, o>, horn <´> on <o, u>, and bar <-> on <d>. 
In addition to these, the following five diacritics are used with vowels to
indicate tone:  grave <`>, acute < >, low dot <.>, question <?>, and tilde
<~>.  Vowels with breve, circumflex, and horn can, and often do, have a
tone diacritic.  So, in Vietnamese, one letter can have two diacritics on it.
CYRILLIC ALPHABET LANGUAGES
The Cyrillic alphabet is used to write Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and
many minority languages from the former Soviet Union.  It is also used to
write Bulgarian and Serbian.  The Cyrillic alphabet and the Roman alphabet
are both derived from forms of the Greek alphabet so there is a general
resemblance.  Some Cyrillic letters seem to Americans to be backwards or
oddly shaped.  Figure G-4 shows the characters and diacritics not found in
Russian.  With the exception of one letter,    , which is only used sometimes
in Russian, none of these letters appear in the normal Russian text.
SLAVIC LANGUAGES:
Figure G-4 gives the simplest recognition guide for identifying documents
that look like Russian but are actually other Slavic languages or minority
languages.FM 34-54
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TRANSLITERATION:
Figure G-5 shows the different forms of the Cyrillic alphabet for five
principal Cyrillic alphabet languages and the recommended transliterations
for each letter.  Pay particular attention to the transliteration of Russian. 
These equivalents must be used when reporting on materiel bearing
Russian nameplates.  DO NOT REPORT ON FOREIGN EQUIPMENT
AND DOCUMENTS USING THE ORIGINAL CYRILLIC CHARACTER. 
The Figure classifies each letter as "C" for consonant or "N" for
nonconsonant.
RUSSIAN:
Russian is the most frequently encountered Cyrillic alphabet language and
should always be the prime suspect.  The key to recognizing Russian is the
fact that it uses both letter 12 and letter 39 and does not use letter 13 at all. 
(See Figure G-5.)
BULGARIAN:
Bulgarian is perhaps the second most frequently encountered Cyrillic 
alphabet language and the most difficult for the nonspecialists to
differentiate from Russian.  Bulgarian uses fewer letters than Russian.
NOTE:  In the following discussion, the letters are referred to by their
numbers on the chart in Figure G-5.
For example, a letter used often in Russian and never in Bulgarian is the
letter 39; however, the way to be sure that it is not Bulgarian is to see if the
letter 38 comes before a consonant or "C" letter.  Note that letter 38 is
frequent in Bulgarian and rare in Russian; moreover, when letter 38 occurs
in Russian, it always occurs before an "N" letter.
Proper transliteration is very important.  When an analyst reads a Russian
nameplate and writes down P-105A, but it is actually an R-105D (P is not P,
rather "R," and <  > is wrongly symbolized by A); then it results in incorrect
reporting.
The column in Figure G-5 marked "Other" is not supplied with any
transliteration equivalents.  This column contains similar letters that are
encountered in the written languages of various minority nationalities in the
former USSR.  These languages belong mainly to the Uralic family or the
Altaic family, and a Russian linguist will be unable to make any sense out of
them.  Recognition of any documents in these languages as non-Slavic is a
helpful first step in DOCEX.  FM 34-54
G-12FM 34-54
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 NOTES:
                                                            
1.  The letters are numbered sequentially for ease of reference.  The alphabetic order given is
the convenient one, which is not necessarily the traditional one.
2.  The letters marked "N" are nonconsonants; and the letters marked "C" are consonants.
3.  Letters 7 and 8 have alternate transliterations for Russian and Belorussian.  In all cases, the
first transliteration is used when the letter occurs after a "C" letter; the second transliteration is
used in all other cases, including when the letter begins the word.
4.  Letter 8 is not considered a separate letter and its dieresis is often omitted. 
5.  Letter 4 is pronounced something like "h" in Ukrainian and Belorussian and "h" is often the
recommended transliteration.   However, transliteration "g" is recommended here to eliminate  
confusion with the letters transliterated "sh" and "zh." 
    
6.  The "Other" category refers to various minority languages in the Soviet Union, many of
which are Uralic or Altaic languages. 
Figure G-5.  Cyrillic alphabet and transliteration chart (continued).
UKRAINIAN:
Ukrainian is distinguished by the use of letters 12 and 13 and the non-use
of  letter 39.  Letters 9 and 14 also are unique to Ukrainian, but their
frequency is low and their absence may be accidental.  When Ukrainian is
identified, pay particular attention to the transliteration of letter 12.  The
recommended transliteration for letter 4 is "g" even though its pronunciation
is closer to English "h."
BELORUSSIAN:
Belorussian is distinguished by the use of letters 13 and 39 and the
non-use of letter 12.  Letter 30 is unique to Belorussian, but its frequency is
not high enough to use it as an identification sign.  As in Ukrainian, letter 4
in Belorussian is transliterated "g" and pronounced like "h."
SERBIAN:
Serbian is spotted easily by the several unique letters it uses:  letters 6, 16,
19, 22, 28, and 35.  Serbian is conventionally transliterated into Croatian,
and this is what the chart gives.  The diacritics of the Croatian script are
discussed in the "ROMAN ALPHABET LANGUAGES" section above.FM 34-54
G-14
MACEDONIAN:
Macedonian is spoken by perhaps two million people in southeastern
Yugoslavia.  The Macedonian alphabet is similar to the Serbian, except that
letters 6 and 28 are not used and three other letters are added.  The added
letters are letter 4 with an acute < >, letter 17 with an acute < >, and <S, s>. 
Macedonian language documents are rare.
ARABIC ALPHABET LANGUAGES
The Arabic alphabet has generally followed the spread of Islam and has
been used to write numerous languages, some of which (notably Turkish)
no longer use it.  This alphabet, appropriately modified, currently is used for
all the dialects of Arabic and for Persian, Urdu, and other Indo-Iranian
languages, such as Dari, Pashto, and Kurdish.  The Russian and Cyrillic
alphabets seem even more related to one another when compared to
Arabic.
ARABIC AND PERSIAN:
The best distinction a nonlinguist can make is to separate Persian
documents from Arabic documents.  Persian linguists cannot read Arabic,
and vice versa, unless they know both languages.
ARABIC:
Arabic is spoken over a large area extending from Morocco on the west to
borders of ancient Persia (modern Iran) on the east.  The spoken language
varies widely in this area, but the written language is fairly standard.  Only a
specialist could hope to distinguish the varieties of Arabic, but a sharp-eyed
nonlinguist can learn to recognize Arabic and distinguish it from Persian. 
The best indication is perhaps the presence of letter 32, which is not used
in Persian.  The next best indication is perhaps the frequent occurrence of
the definite article <   >, which is spelled with letter 1 (initial) and letter 27
(initial).  A final characteristic is the absence of the special Persian letters: 
letters 3, 7, 14 , and 26.  Since this is a negative indication, however, it
cannot be used by itself to prove that a text is Arabic.
PERSIAN:
Persian is used in Iran.  It is indicated by the presence of the special
Persian letters 3, 7, 14, and 26, and by the absence of letter 32.  Other
indications are a paucity of letter 1 and 27 combinations (the Arabic definite
article) and a slightly different preference in numeral usage.FM 34-54
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ARABIC NUMERALS:
In school, the numerals used in the United States and most of the rest of
the world are often called "Arabic numerals," but these are not the same
forms used in Arabic alphabet languages.  The real Arabic numerals are
illustrated in Figure G-6.  This figure also shows Arabic and Persian
variants of the numerals along with their international equivalents.  Unlike
the Arabic alphabet (which is, of course, read from right to left), ARABIC
NUMERALS ARE READ FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, THE SAME WAY AS
OUR OWN NUMERALS ARE READ.
Document collectors should familiarize themselves with the Arabic
numerals so they can read page numbers in collected documents and
properly reassemble documents that have come apart.  Collectors should
remember that one of the results of the right-to-left orientation of the Arabic
alphabet is that the apparent "back" of a document is actually the front.
Figure G-7 illustrates the Arabic alphabet in its Arabic and Persian variants. 
Notice that each letter has four forms, labeled "alone," "final," "medial," and
"initial."   Notice that "initial" is to the right of "final."  These column labels
indicate two of the main differences between Arabic script and Roman
script:  First, the letters change in order to connect to other letters, and
second, THE SCRIPT IS WRITTEN FROM RIGHT TO LEFT.
The letters with asterisks by their numbers cannot connect to a following
letter.  The initial form is used to begin a word or when the letter follows a
nonconnectable letter.  The medial form is used after a connectable letter or
when it is used by itself; for example, to letter paragraphs in a document.
DIACRITICS:
Another feature of the Arabic alphabet is the use of diacritics to differentiate
many of the letters.  Figure G-8 illustrates the diacritics used in Arabic and
Persian.
Using Figures G-7 and G-8, note that letters 2, 3, 4, 5, 29, and (partially) 33
have the same base form with the following diacritics:  high dot < >, letter
29; low dot <$ $>, letter 2; high double dot <¨>, letter 4; low double dot <..>,
letter 33, initial and medial only; high triple dot < >, letter 5; and low triple
ˆ ˆ
dot < >, letter 3. ‡ ‡
Letter 8 is the base form for another diacritic set:  High dot < >, letter 9; low
dot <$ $>, letter 6; low triple dot < >, letter 7.  Letter 10 is the base form, and ‡ ‡
letter 11 adds high dot < >.  Letter 12 is the base form.  A Letter 13 adds
high dot < >, and letter 14 adds high triple dot < >.  Letter 15 is the base
ˆ ˆ
form and letter 16 adds high triple dot < >.
ˆ ˆFM 34-54
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Letters 17, 19, and 21 are the base forms for letters 18, 20, and 22
respectively; the added diacritic for all three is high dot < >.  Letters 23
and 24 have approximately the same base form with high dot < > on letter
23 and high double dot <¨> on letter 24.  Letters 25 and 26 have the same
base form.  Letter 25 uses flag <´> on its initial and medial forms and
hamza sign <À> on its final and alone forms.
Letter 26 uses double flag < > on all its forms and hamza sign <¸> on its
final and alone forms.  Letter 31 is the base form, and letter 32 uses high
double dot <¨>.  For grammatical reasons, letter 32 is not used initially or
medially.
SAMPLES OF ARABIC AND PERSIAN
Figure G-9 gives a sample of printed Arabic.  Note the frequent
occurrences of letter 1 and letter 27: the definite article at word beginnings. 
Remember, words begin on the right.  The seventh line from the top, for
instance, has four obvious occurrences and two other occurrences in
modified forms that have not been discussed here.  There are 18
occurrences of letter 32, at least one occurrence in every line except lines 9
and 11 and four occurrences in lines 3 and 8.FM 34-54
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Figure G-10 illustrates typewritten Arabic.  Note that lines 1, 2  5, and 10
begin (on the right) with the definite article (letter 1 and letter 27).  There are
20 other obvious occurrences of these letters at the beginning of words and
several others that are less obvious.  Lines 1, 2, and 9 end (on the left) with
letter 32.  Letter 32 occurs five other times in the sample.  Arabic script
permits some letters to be stretched in order to even out text on the left. 
The long lines at the left of the sample are instances of this. FM 34-54
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Figure G-11 illustrates printed Persian.  Note the double flags < >, two in
the first line and eight more in the rest of the sample.  Note the low triple
dots < >, one in the first line and eight more in the rest of the sample.  ‡
Neither of these diacritics occurs in Arabic.
  FM 34-54
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OTHER ARABIC ALPHABET LANGUAGES
DARI:
Dari is used in Afghanistan and favored by the government.  Since its
written form is heavily influenced by Persian models, there is no easy way
for the nonspecialist to distinguish it from Persian.
KURDISH, PASHTO, AND URDU:
The other notable Arabic alphabet languages are Kurdish, Pashto, and
Urdu.  Kurdish is spoken by the Kurdish tribes of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. 
Pashto is used widely in Afghanistan, and Urdu is the predominant
language of Pakistan.  These languages contain letters and diacritics not
listed for Arabic or Persian.  If one of these languages is suspected, refer
the problem to a linguist.
CHARACTER LANGUAGES
Character languages use writing systems with symbols that stand for words
or meaningful elements of words rather than for sounds.  Character
languages, such as hieroglyphic Egyptian, existed in earlier times; but
today, the only character languages are Chinese and languages that have
wholly or partially borrowed the Chinese system, such as Japanese and
Korean.
DISTINGUISHING CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND KOREAN:
The easy way to distinguish the three languages is to look for the distinctive
phonetic symbols of Japanese and Korean.  If these symbols are not
present, conclude that the language is Chinese.  Chinese is the model for
the other two, and these languages borrow freely from Chinese.  Figures
G-12, G-13, and G-14 give sample texts of Chinese, Japanese, and
Korean.
Figure G-12 shows Chinese characters.  They are more detailed, complex,
and square or precise than Japanese or Korean.
Korean and Japanese language texts use Chinese characters whenever it
might be unclear to use one of their own symbols.  This means that the
higher or more academic a text is the more Chinese characters it will have.FM 34-54
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NOTE:  North Korean text seldom has any Chinese characters as a matter
of official policy.
CHINESE:
Chinese is written with several thousand symbols called characters. 
International numerals are widely used and scientific and technical Chinese
will contain quoted European words in Roman letters.  The characters are
constructed according to a complex system based on the use of only a few
different stroke types (less than 10) and a large set of elements called
"radicals" (about 200).  Radicals are made up of one or more elements
associated with them.  These radicals and strokes are used to construct the
characters.  The characters are thought of as occupying a rectangular
space and good calligraphy allots about the same area to each character,
regardless of complexity.
Figure G-15 shows the 50 most common radicals in Chinese.  Some will
occur by themselves as characters.  Most will more frequently occur as
constituents of more complex characters.  The People's Republic of China
has recently changed the form of  some of these elements, but most are
unchanged and the traditional forms still occur even there.
Except for numerical zeroes and the small circles that are used as
punctuation marks to indicate the end of a sentence, printed Chinese does
not have any circles.  If the text has a lot of circles and curves, suspect
some language other than Chinese.FM 34-54
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JAPANESE:
Japanese has a mixed writing system.  Like the Chinese, the Japanese
normally use international numerals in their S&T literature; but this is not the
real reason their writing system is mixed.  Japanese writing is mixed
because, in general, it uses Chinese characters to write the lexical stem of
nouns and verbs (the part of the word that conveys the basic meaning); and
a set of phonetic symbols invented in Japan called hiragana to write the
grammatical affixes of the nouns and verbs as well as entire auxiliary
words.
Japanese also use another set of phonetic symbols, also invented in
Japan, called katakana to write words borrowed from European languages. 
The presence of these katakana symbols distinguishes Japanese.  Normal
prose will contain perhaps 60 to 70 percent hiragana symbols.  Unlike
Chinese characters, hiragana are written with curved strokes.  Katakana
are less frequent.
The hiragana are illustrated in Figure G-16 and the katakana are illustrated
in Figure G-17.  Pay particular attention to the fifth symbol from the left in
the bottom row of the hiragana (Figure G-16), the one labeled "no."  This
symbol is used to write a very common grammatical affix.  It will almost
always occur frequently in any Japanese text.FM 34-54
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KOREAN:
Korean can be written entirely in its native alphabet.  Therefore, symbols
from this script will overwhelmingly predominate in any normal Korean text. 
Chinese characters, however, are considered learned and prestigious, so a
certain number of them will be encountered in quantities that vary with the
pretensions of the author.
The Korean alphabet was developed under the influence of Chinese writing
models, so to the untrained eye Korean alphabetic writing looks like Chinese
characters.  The letters of European alphabets form words, but the symbols
of the Korean alphabet are grouped together to form a syllable.  This means
that a Korean word may extend over several groupings.
Also, while the letters of European words are read horizontally, KoreanFM 34-54
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alphabetic symbols are read vertically—from the top to the bottom of each
group—with the left preceding the right when the symbols are side-by-side.
Figure G-18 illustrates the symbols of the Korean alphabet.  Pay close
attention to the second symbol from the left in the third row, the one that
looks like a circle with a stem at the 12 o'clock position.  It is a very frequent
symbol and does not look like anything that occurs in Chinese or Japanese.
               
                              FM 34-54
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Appendix H
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE SAMPLING PROCEDURES
INTRODUCTION
This appendix provides procedures for the safe and expeditious collection,
transportation, and receipt of suspected CB agent samples from the
integrated battlefield to approved CONUS and OCONUS laboratories for
processing, analysis, and identification.
BACKGROUND
During the 1980's, at the time of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and
the Iran-Iraq War, the ability of US forces to collect and analyze toxic
agents was questionable.
In response to this concern, an examination was conducted on the
mechanisms in place to preserve the integrity of the suspected CB samples
collected on the battlefield.
Procedures for collecting, packaging, documenting, and transporting CB
samples to laboratories must be precise to ensure the credibility of the
analysis conducted on the samples.
The credible analysis of suspected CB samples is critical for both battlefield
commanders concerned with chemical retaliation and contamination
avoidance, and medical personnel concerned with prophylactic or post-
contamination treatment.
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
SITUATION:
Current battle doctrine describes a nonlinear battlefield where the Threat
NBC weapons are tactically integrated. The principles of NBC
reconnaissance and detection and TECHINT teams apply equally across
the battlefield.
SAMPLING:FM 34-54
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   Sampling will be initiated when the following are observed:
Significant numbers of unexplained sickness or death of personnel or
animals occur.
Ordnance (munitions) are found which contain known or suspected CB
agents.
An attack is suspected or is known to have occurred but the causative
agent cannot be identified.
The widespread outbreak of unusual mission-degrading behavior
occurs.
Sampling of known or identified agents to verify first use is required.
SAMPLING RESPONSIBILITY:
Samples suspected of containing CB agents are divided into environmental
and biomedical samples on the basis of their origin.  Both medical and
nonmedical units and teams have the responsibility for  collecting samples
suspected of containing CB agents.
Environmental Samples.  Environmental CB agent samples are
collected in the field.  They include samples of aerosols or vapors,
liquids other than water, soil, vegetation, water, used equipment, and
ordnance.  The acquisition of these samples is the responsibility of—
— NBC reconnaissance teams.
— TEU field teams.
— Preventive medicine units (potable water sources only).
— TECHINT collection teams.
— Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) team.
Biomedical Samples.  Biomedical samples are derived primarily from
acutely ill soldiers who exhibit symptoms of CB agent intoxication or
from personnel who were killed in an attack.  Collection of the
biomedical samples will be the responsibility of personnel in—
— Battalion-level medical units.
— Division-level medical treatment facilities.FM 34-54
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— Combat support hospitals.
— Evacuation hospitals.
— NBC reconnaissance teams (small animals only).
— TECHINT collection teams.
— BIDS teams.
 SAMPLE ACQUlSITION
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES:
Responsible personnel for collection:
Commander, NBC reconnaissance teams.
Commander, TEU.
— Commander, CMEC.
— Commander, preventive medicine units.
NOTE:  When possible, background samples from "clean" areas beyond
the perimeter of the attack site should be obtained as baseline data for
comparisons.   Collect these identically to samples from contaminated
areas and package them separately.
The methodology for collecting environmental  samples in order to analyze
them for CB-agent presence will be specific for the type of sample (for
example, liquid aerosols or vapors, soil, vegetation, water, other liquids,
ordnance, equipment).  Complete DA Form 1971-6-R for all environmental
samples.  A sample form is at Figure H-1.
In conjunction with collection of environmental samples, any positive results
using the chemical agent detector kits should be recorded on 
DA Form 1971-6-R.  Sampling will be accomplished as instructed.   
Figure  H-2 is an example of an equipment list containing components of
a suggested environmental sampling kit.  (See FM 3-3.)FM 34-54
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Description:
labels, paper, pressure sensitive 7530-00-577-4376
Edmont Wilson gloves 8-9 8415-00-J02-2802
Edmont Wilson goves 9-9 8415-00-634-4639
tape, pressure, sensitive, adhesive 1" 7510-00-582-4772
pliers #47 8" 8820-00-543-5350
screwdriver, flat tip 1/4 inch 5120-00-596-5653
tongs, Teflon tips AF 15-202-5
micro spatula with Teflon ends AF 21-401-50A
scissors, universal type AF 08-951-30
sterile sampler scoops 2 oz AF 14-241-10A
spoon spatula with Teflon AF 14-356-10
knife, pocket                                              5110-00-526-8740
PFA sample bottles, 6 oz CP J-6103-50
pipet, jumbo transfer type AF 13-711-7
pipet, graduated transfer type AF 13-711-9A
insulated bag, type 1 AF 01-814-8
insulated bag, type 2 AF 01-814-10
whirl/pak bag, 6 oz AF 01-812-6B
ph paper; non-bleeding plastic strip SW 8-65271
SEP-PAK C18
syringe, hyp 50 or 60 mL 6515-00-168-8913
R3602 clear laboratory tubing AF 14-169-3B
marking pen, waterproof AF 13-381
Tenax tubes EC ST-023
blade surgical knife detach no. 21 6515-00-860-0007
blade surgical os 21 1508 6515-01-009-5297
igloo type container
ice pack CP TR-6345-20
pad, non-adherent 3 x 4 100s 6510-00-111-0708
pad, cooling chemical 49 6530-00-133-4299
piglette
tape, antiseizing 8030-00-889-3535
personal air sampler LSS G4980 +
methanol GJ4981
distilled water
matches, waterproof
myler bags
Field Expedient Packing Materials
tin foil
Saran wrap polyethylene without plasticizers
Thermos bottles
pressure sensitive tape
Cool Paks
butcher paper
newspaper
igloo cooler
canteens
Mess kits
glass bottles
packing material
Teflon plumbers tape
medical supplies
Figure H-2.  Example of an equipment list.
Contaminated sampling equipment not transported with the sample will be
decontaminated and double wrapped in plastic and undergo a sampling
protocol to certify the items as "XXX."  The XXX refers to decontamination
to the point that equipment can be reused, but is not releasable from DOD.FM 34-54
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Liquid Aerosol and Vapor Samples:
Use an electric or hand pump (record the run time for electric pump or
number of aspirations for hand pump to determine volume), collect the 
liquid aerosol remove (LAR) in two Tenax GC-Type Sorbent Tubes.
Return the sampling tube to the piglette, mark on the outside with a
sample identification code and close the ends tightly.  Attach a
DA Form 1971-6-R.  Pack the sample.
Vegetation Samples:
Collect vegetation which appears in any way to be different from
normal, nearby vegetation (for example, discolored or withered
vegetation, or vegetation having powder or droplets present).
Collect vegetation samples at several locations within suspected
contaminated areas.
Cut several affected leaves and/or a handful of grass.  Do not crush the
sample.   Instead, place it in a mylar bag and seal.  Collect similar
reference vegetation from an unaffected area and place it in a separate
mylar bag and seal it.  The minimum sample size of value is three
leaves or three handfuls of grass.  One leaf is of little value (but it is
better than nothing).  Bark is acceptable but not preferred.
Mark the bag with a sample identification number.
Soil Samples:  Collect samples from areas stained with oils or powders,
from areas that are discolored, or from areas that are otherwise different in
appearance from the surrounding soil.  A similar soil sample from an
unaffected area is required for reference (soil of the same type and texture
is preferred).  The minimum sample volume is approximately that of a
cigarette pack laying on its side.
Use a knife, spoon, spatula, or piece of metal to collect the sample.
Place the sample in a mylar bag.
Mark the bag with a sample identification number.
Water Samples:  Use the M272 water test kit or other appropriate test kit to
determine the presence of chemical agents, record the test
results on a DA Form 1971-6-R.  Take samples at standing pools or along
streams where dead animals are observed.FM 34-54
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Collect bulk water samples (preferred when oily globules or suspended
solids are present) as follows:
— Skim surface water into Teflon bottle.
— Fill the bottle, screw on the top, and ensure that the seal is leak
proof with parrafin wax or plumber's antiseize tape.
— Mark a sample identification number on the bottle.
When using the SepPak Cartridge for liquid sampling, consider the
following:
— The C-18 SepPak cartridge extracts and concentrates contaminants
from a water source.
— Methanol and distilled water are used to prime the SepPak.
— 200 milliliter (mL) of sample water is drawn slowly through cartridge
with a 50 mL syringe.  Discard liquid and syringe.
— The cartridge is placed in a Teflon bottle marked with a sample
identification number.
When obtaining a sample of sludge on the shore or in a shallow bottom,
scoop the top of solids with an open bottle; close the bottle and seal it
with parrafin wax.  Mark the bottle with an identification number.
Packaging Samples:  Place several sample bags in one mylar bag. Place
the reference samples in a separate mylar bag.  Do not overfill.  Press
excess air from the bag and seal the adhesive end.  Seal the package with
tape, and mark sample identification numbers.  Include the DA Form 1971-
6-R.
Packaging Small Animals (Mammals Preferred):  Place the animal in a
mylar bag, press excess air from the bag, and seal it.  Mark the bag with
the sample identification number and place the marked bag into a second
mylar bag.  Press excess air from the bag, seal the adhesive flap, and seal
the bag with tape.  Mark with sample identification numbers and attach the
DA Form 1971-6-R.
Packaging Ordnance or Protective Equipment or Clothing:  Prior to
approaching or handling any ordnance, exploded or unexploded, contact
the EOD unit in the area for assistance.  The EOD unit will attempt to
identify the ordnance by physical characteristics or markings and render it
safe.  If the ordnance is CB in origin, EOD will perform initial packing in theFM 34-54
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field and transfer the sample to an MI unit for transfer to CONUS.  The
sample must be marked with a sample identification number and
documented with the DA Form 1971-6-R and DD Form 1911.
Protective equipment and clothing from casualties can be an important
source of a CB agent for identification purposes.  To do this, place the
equipment or clothing in a large mylar bag, fold, expel excess air from the
bag, and seal it.  Mark the bag with a sample identification number.  Place
the bag in a second mylar bag, seal, and mark with a sample identification
number.  Then complete and attach the DA Form 1971-6-R.   Finally, 
forward the sample to Technical Intelligence for transfer to Corps G2. 
Document the transfer on DA Form 3147.
BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES:
Responsible personnel for collecting samples are located in—
Battalion-level medical units.
Division-level medical treatment facilities.
Combat support hospitals.
Evacuation hospitals.
TECHINT collection teams.  In the theater of operations, the TECHINT
teams will have the capability to obtain biomedical samples from
patients and cadavers.
The best biomedical sample is an acutely ill soldier sent back to CONUS
immediately.  DA Form 1971-6-R is to be completed on all biomedical
samples.  In addition, a copy of the physical examination or an extract of
significant findings are to be enclosed with the biomedical samples. 
Additionally, the following samples should be collected whenever
casualties occur and should be collected in triplicate, distributing two within
CONUS and one to the TAML.  Once collected, the samples should be
refrigerated or chilled immediately.  DO NOT FREEZE.  
DA Form 1971-6-R will be completed on all biomedical samples.  Medical 
personnel should perform biomedical sample collection to obtain a valid
sample.  
Use the following guidance to collect samples:
Collect samples from patients during acute phase and at day 7.FM 34-54
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Collect urine samples (20 to 50 mL per sample x 3) in urine specimen
cups, the top secured with wide tape, and placed in individual sealable
bags.
Collect whole blood or serum samples (5 mL per sample x 3) in red-top
blood tubes and placed in individual, sealable bags.
Collect sputum only from acutely ill patients (x 3). They should be
collected in urine cups.  Secure the cup with wide tape and place in
individual sealable mylar bags.
Collect cerebral spinal fluid (2 mL per sample x 3) in red-top blood
tubes and placed in individual, sealable bags.
Take at least 30 grams of organs and tissues (human, post-mortem 
      x 3), place in a sterile container in individual, sealable bags, and
refrigerate immediately:  liver, spleen, lung, subcutaneous fat, cerebral
spinal fluid, kidney, heart, and brain.
Collect at least two mediastinal lymph nodes.
Take animal tissue samples as a lower priority to human samples. 
Animals should be mammalian (no birds).
Once critical and significant biomedical samples are identified in
OCONUS, these samples should be turned over to the tactical 
intelligence channel for disposition to appropriate laboratories (CONUS
or OCONUS).
Sample and corroborative information is provided for on
DA Form 1971-6-R.
Packaging Biomedical Samples:  Place the mylar bags or sample
containers in a plastic bag.  Remove excess air and seal tightly.  Mark the
container with a sample identification number.  Place 1 to 2 inches of
packing material (for example vermiculate or foam) around the sample bag
in a rigid container.  Wrap jars, tubes, or specimen cups in bubble wrap or
other suitable material so they do not move in the container.  Place a lid on
the container and seal with wide tape.  Place a warning on the outside of
the container as follows: 
DANGER
   Do not open.  Contains hazardous material or      
 suspected CB agents which may cause                 
immediate death or personal injury. 
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DISPOSITION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES: 
Place the environmental and biomedical samples in an insulated chest;
ensure that the sample is packed tightly and an adequate supply of
refrigerant is available.  Seal the chest and label accordingly prior to its
departure from the OCONUS theater of operation to CONUS. 
The procedure should further meet the specifications contained in
TM 38-250, paragraph 10-51, for etiologic agents.  Document all samples
with DA Form 1971-6-R.  Number the samples.  Units are responsible for
forwarding samples through intelligence channels to Corps G2.  Document
the sample transfer with DA Form 3147.  Figures H-3 through H-5 are
examples of responsibilities, collection guidelines, and identification and
control for a sample evacuation.
SAMPLE EVACUATION
A.  RESPONSIBILITY:
1.  Field units are responsible for the transfer of samples to MI channels for forwarding to
Corps G2.  Additional packaging and consolidation of double-contained samples, if required,
will be accomplished prior to shipping to CONUS.  Complete the sample identification. 
Document sample transfers on DA Form 3147.
2.  Corps or Division surgeons are responsible for coordinating the delivery of samples from
MI channels to Corps G2. The Corps and/or Division Surgeon will coordinate with combat units
and graves registration units for expedient transfer of personnel deceased as a result of a CB
attack to battalion, division, or corps level medical units and hospitals for obtaining biomedical
samples.  Document the sample transfers on DA Form 3147.
3.   Corps G2 is responsible for coordinating shipment of samples to approved CONUS and
OCONUS laboratories and the TAML, as well as dispatching the required notification
messages.  Notification to the US Army Chemical and Biological Agent Technical Evaluation 
Board (CBATEB) of the acquisition of a sample suspected of containing CB agents is requested
within 1 hour of receipt by Corps G2.
Figure H-3.  Description of responsibilities for a sample evacuation.FM 34-54
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*IMPORTANT NOTES*
   (a)  Properly packaged samples do not constitute a hazard to personnel.
(b)  All outer packaging is to be inspected visually for physical evidence of leakage or
loss of envelope integrity.
(c)  DO NOT UNWRAP.  Overwrap if any irregularities exist.
(d)  If overwrapping is required, provide the time, date, place, and the reason.
(e)  Refrigerate or chill (DO NOT FREEZE) all samples.
(f)  Delay must be minimized.
(g)  All samples will be forwarded from the theater to approved CONUS and OCONUS
laboratories and TAML 12 to 24 hours after collection.  Delay beyond 24 hours rapidly 
degrades the operational and intelligence value of the samples.  The most efficient means of
shipment will be used; address all samples to CBATEB, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and
TAML.
B.  DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED ON ALL SAMPLES:
1.  DA Form 1971-6-R.
2.  DA Form 3147.
C.  NOTIFICATION MESSAGE:  The notification message sent by Corps G2 should be sent as
an IMMEDIATE precedence and with appropriate security classification.  The action addressee
is Technical Director, ERDEC APG MD//CBATEB//.  The notification message will contain the
sample identification number and details which relate to the acquisition of the sample.  The
message will be configured to provide the following information: 
1.  Background information.
2.  Physical description.
3.  Results of preliminary tests after sample collection.
4.  Where, when, and under what conditions the sample was acquired.
       Figure H-3.  Description of responsibilities for a sample evacuation (continued).FM 34-54
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5.  Description of incident.
6.  Casualty symptoms (if applicable).
7.  Shipment information, such as—
(a)  Date of shipment.
(b)  Mode of transportation.
(c)  Flight number and destination.
(d)  Estimated time of arrival CONUS.
(e)  Description of shipment (size, weight, and so forth).
D.  NOTIFICATION:  Upon receipt of the notification message, the Chairman, CBATEB, is
responsible for notifying the appropriate agencies.
REFERENCES:
1.  FM 3-3 Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance, 16 Nov 92.
2.  FM 3-5 NBC Decontamination, 17 Nov 93.
3.  FM 3-101-2 NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon Operations Tactics, Techniques,         
                             and Procedures, 10 Aug 94.
4.  AR 59-8       Department of Defense (DOD) Common User Airlift, 20 Aug 82. 
5.  TM 38-250         Preparing of Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments, 25 Nov 94.
        Figure H-3.  Description of responsibilities for a sample evacuation (continued).FM 34-54
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SAMPLE COLLECTION GUIDELINES
 
1.  PROTECT YOURSELF:
Do not handle contaminated samples with your bare hands.  If neoprene gloves are not
available, use a stick or other object to move a sample into a container.  Respiratory and/or
skin protective equipment may also be required.
2.  TAKE THE SAMPLE:
If an area appears to have been contaminated, use whatever field expediency is necessary
to get a sample.
3.  LABEL THE SAMPLE:
Once a sample is collected, the container should be labeled immediately so that it is not
confused with another sample.
4.  PROTECT THE SAMPLE:
Most environmental and biomedical samples should be sealed and chilled to avoid cross-
contamination and decomposition.  Samples should not be frozen if possible.  Above all,
avoid freeze-and-thaw situations.
5.  DOCUMENT THE SAMPLE:
Record the circumstances surrounding the collection of the sample.  Data such as how, 
where, when, why, and by whom is required.  Diagrams and maps of areas are useful.
6.  FORWARD THE SAMPLE:
CB samples are time sensitive.  They should be reported and forwarded for analysis as
quickly as possible (within 12 to 24 hours).
7.  PROTECT YOUR SOURCE:
All transactions involving CBW samples are highly sensitive.  All knowledge and information
(written and verbal) pertaining to the source are automatically considered SECRET.  All
samples and associated papers and diagrams, for example, will be released only to
individuals known to be cleared and having a need to know; and they will be SIGNED FOR. 
All samples and associated papers must remain in the physical custody of authorized US
persons only.
Figure H-4.  Sample collection guidelines.FM 34-54
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SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL
1.  Samples acquired by a governmental source or provided by another source must be
carefully controlled to be of the greatest value.  To accomplish this, physical custody of the
sample is maintained by a government representative.  A sample identification number is also
assigned and affixed to the sample or its container.
2.  To prevent confusion, the sample number must be used when referring to the sample or to 
information concerning its acquisition.  A sample number consists of the following elements:
(a)  Country of Acquisition.  This is a 2-digit alphabetic code for the country in which the
sample was collected.  The codes are found in DIAM 58-13, Volume II, Section E, dated        28
March 1988.
(b)  Date Acquired.  DTG sample acquired (local or Zulu time, as directed by higher       
headquarters).
(c)  Sample Sequence Number.  This is a 3-digit numerical code which is assigned per
collector, and begins each collection day.  The first sample collected is 001, the second is  002,
and so forth.
(d)  Unit Identification Code.  UIC of the unit that the collector is assigned to.
     (e)  Collector Identification.   The initials of the collector.
EXAMPLE
LA-12l300Z FEB 90-002-WH60AA-JD
LA =  Sample was acquired in Laos
121300Z FEB 9 =  DTG sample was collected
002 =  This is the second sample obtained on the date above by the collector
WH60AA =  Unit of assignment of collector
JD =  The sample was collected by John Doe
Figure H-5.  Sample identification and control.FM 34-54
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Appendix I
FACILITY EXPLOITATION CHECKLISTS
The following sample checklists can be used to guide the actual eyes-on or
hands-on exploitation of facilities or to guide the interrogation of EPWs with
knowledge of facilities.
COLLECTION CHECKLIST-AIRFIELDS
  1.  IDENTIFICATION.  Local name (both romanized and ideograph) and military designation.
  2.  LOCATION.
a.  Map reference.  Include series and sheet number(s) of both tactical and air-ground         
series.
b.  Political unit, area, nearest town, and specified reference point (both UTM and                 
geographic coordinates).
  3.  AIRFIELD CATEGORY.  Liaison, surveillance, light lift, medium lift, tactical, or heavy lift.
  4.  STATUS.
  5.  TYPE.  Civilian, military, or joint.  
  6.  PRINCIPAL USE. 
  7.  LAYOUT.
  8.  ELEVATION (feet and meters).
  9.  NUMBER OF RUNWAYS.
10.  EACH RUNWAY.
a.  Identification.
b.  Azimuth.
c.  Length and width.
d.  Surface, base, subbase course (material, thickness, and condition).
e.  Longitudinal grade (minimum and maximum change per 100 feet).
f.   Transverse grade (maximum).
Figure I-1.  Collection Checklist-Airfields.FM 34-54
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g.  Shoulders, clear area, and overrun (width, transverse grade, and surface material).
h.  Lateral safety zone (width, transverse slope, and obstacles).
i.   End clear zones (length, width, and maximum slope).
j.   Approach zones (length, width, glide slope, and obstacles).
k.  Condition.
11.  EACH TAXIWAY.
a.  Identification.
b.  Azimuth.
c.  Length and width.
d.  Grade (maximum longitudinal and transverse).
e.  Surface, base, subbase material (thickness).
f.   Bearing capacity (pounds per square inch).
g.  Shoulders and clear area (width, transverse grade, surface, and obstacles).
h.  Turn radii.
i.   Condition.
12.  PARKING AND WARM-UP APRONS.
a.  Number.
b.  Total area and individual area.
c.  Description of each apron.
d.  Total capacity (specify aircraft type).
13.  HARDSTANDS.  
a.  Total number.
b.  Aircraft capacity (specify).
c.  Description of each hardstand.
14.  PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANTS.  Describe facilities and storage.
a.  Jet fuel by type (J rating).
b.  Aviation gasoline.
c.  Jet oil.
d.  Aviation oil.
e.  Lubricants.
f.   Pipelines (cross-reference to pipeline collection file).
15.  NAVIGATION FACILITIES.  Describe the type of facility.
16.  LIGHTING FACILITIES.  Describe all lighting at airfield.
Figure I-1.  Collection Checklist-Airfields (continued).FM 34-54
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17.  COMMUNICATION FACILITIES.  Cross-reference to communication collection file.
18.  MAINTENANCE FACILITIES (aircraft).
19.  OXYGEN AVAILABILITY. 
20.  SPECIAL EQUIPMENT.
a.  Crash and fire.
b.  Construction and ground maintenance.
21.  COVERED STORAGE.
22.  SANITATION.
23.  HANGARS. 
a.  Number and locations.
b.  Type and material.
c.  Condition.
24.  HOUSING FACILITIES.
a.  Type, location, and number.
b.  Capacity and condition.
25.  MUNITIONS STORAGE.
a.  Type and location.
b.  Cubage, normal use, and condition.
26.  ADMINISTRATION BUILDINGS (identify).
27.  ELECTRICITY.  Cross-reference to electric power collection file.
a.  Sources.
b.  Current characteristics.
28.  JET STARTING UNITS.
29.  AUXILIARY POWER UNITS.
Figure I-1.  Collection Checklist-Airfields (continued).FM 34-54
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30.  ANTI-DETONATION FLUID OR WATER-ALCOHOL.
a.  Type and location.
b.  Quantities.
31.  DEFENSES.
32.  ADJACENT TERRAIN.  Cross-reference to appropriate collection files.
33.  MEDICAL FACILITIES.
a.  Type and location.
b.  Capacity and characteristics.
34.  WEATHER FACILITIES.  Cross-reference to weather collection file.
a.  Type and location.
b.  Characteristics and condition.
Figure I-1.  Collection Checklist-Airfields (continued).FM 34-54
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COLLECTION CHECKLIST-ELECTRIC POWER
POWERPLANTS
  1.  IDENTIFICATION.  Local name and military designation.
a.  Map reference.  Include series and sheet numbers of both tactical and air-ground            
series.
b.  Political unit, area, nearest town, UTM coordinates, and geographical coordinates.
  2.  TYPE.  Conventional-steam thermal, nuclear-steam thermal, internal combustion-thermal,   
hydro-turbine storage, hydro-turbine run-of-river, solar, wind, tidal, and so forth.
  3.  OWNERSHIP.  Government or private.
  4.  FUNCTION.  Public utility, industrial, or both.
  5.  AREA SERVED.
  6.  PURPOSE.  Base load, peak load, or stand-by.
  7.  STATISTICS.
a.  Total capacity (kW or kVA) and annual production (kWh).
b.  Generators (numbers, type, and rating of each).
  8.  CURRENT CHARACTERISTICS.
a.  Type (direct current; alternating current).
b.  Generating voltage.
c.  Phase and hertz.
  9.  OVERALL CONDITION AND AGE.
10.  POWERHOUSE CONSTRUCTION.  Material, number of stories, windows, and so forth.
11.  TRANSMISSION LINE CONNECTIONS.  Number and voltage.
12.  FUEL DATA (thermal plants only).
a.  Type (by grades).
b.  Quantity used per annum (tons, gallons, cubic feet, pounds, and so forth).
c.  Sources.
Figure I-2.  Collection Checklist-Electric Power.FM 34-54
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d.  Calorific content (conventional-steam).
e.  Waste disposal (nuclear-steam).
13.  BOILER, REACTOR OR ENGINE DATA (thermal powerplants only).
a.  Number, manufacturer, and rating (kW; hp).
b.  Cooling facilities (type and source).
c.  Steam pressure in psi (conventional-steam only).
d.  Efficiency (calories; Btu/kWh) (conventional-steam only).
e.  Operating temperature (conventional-steam only).
f.   Neutron flux (nuclear-steam only).
g.  Shielding and control mechanism (nuclear-steam only).
14.  WATER SOURCE, HYDRO-TURBINE POWERPLANTS.
a.  Identification.
b.  Flow, cubic feet per second (average, minimum, and maximum).
c.  Reservoirs (location, volume, area, head, and so forth).
d.  Dams (name, location, dimensions, diversion canal).
15.  HYDRO-TURBINES (HYDRO-TURBINE POWERPLANTS ONLY).
a.  Type, number, and rating (hp).
b.  Heat (feet; meters) and Flow (cubic meters per second).
SUBSTATION
  1.  IDENTIFICATION.  Local name and military designation.
  2.  LOCATION.
a.  Map reference.  Include series and map sheet numbers of both tactical and air-ground
series.
b.  Political unit, area, UTM coordinates, and geographic coordinates.
  3.  TYPE.  Transmission, distribution, or industrial.
  4.  FUNCTION.  Switching, transforming, converting, or inverting.
  5.  OWNERSHIP.  Government or private.
  6.  TRANSFORMERS.  Number, capacity (kVA), and voltage ratio (220/110, and so forth).
  7.  CONVERTERS OR INVERTERS.  Number and capacity (kW; kVA).
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I-7
  8.  LINES.  Number and voltage (kV).
  9.  AREA SERVED.
TRANSMISSION LINES
  1.  LOCATION.  (Same as 2 above.)
  2.  NUMBER OF LINES.
  3.  OWNERSHIP.  Government or private.
  4.  PLACEMENT.  Overhead, underground, submarine cable, and so forth.
  5.  WIRE CHARACTERISTICS.
  6.  TYPE OF TOWER.  Metal, wood, or concrete.
  7.  ALIGNMENT AND LENGTH.
  8.  VOLTAGE (kV).
  9.  PHASE.
10.  MAINTENANCE.  Failure causes, effects, and frequency.
Figure I-2.  Collection Checklist-Electric Power (continued).FM 34-54
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CHECKLIST-PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS FIELDS
  1.  IDENTIFICATION.  Local name and military designation.
  2.  LOCATION.
a.  Map reference.  Include series and sheet numbers of both tactical and air-ground           
series.
b.  Political unit, area, nearest town, UTM coordinates, and geographic coordinates.
  3.  OWNERSHIP.  Government or private.
  4.  TYPE.  Wet or dry.
  5.  AREA EXTENT.
  6.  STATUS.  Exploited or unexploited.
  7.  PRODUCTION.  Barrels, tons, cubic feet, per time unit.
  8.  NUMBER OF PRODUCING WELLS.
  9.  PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL PRODUCTION.
10.  PRODUCT.  Type and characteristics.
11.  RESERVES.  Proven and unproven.
12.  PLANNED EXPANSION.  Expected increase, date, and method.
13.  TRANSPORTATION.
a.  Method (pipeline, railroad, road, water).
b.  Identification and destination.
PROCESSING PLANTS
  1.  IDENTIFICATION.  (Same as 1 above.)
  2.  LOCATION.  (Same as 2 above.)
  3.  TYPE OF PLANT.  Complete, skimming, cracking, distilling, synthetic, and so forth (oil or
gas).
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  4.  OWNERSHIP.  Government or private.
  5.  PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL REFINING OR CRACKING CAPACITY.
  6.  YEAR COMPLETED.
  7.  GENERAL CONDITION.
  8.  RATED PRODUCTION CAPACITY.  Barrels, tons, cubic feet, per time unit.
  9.  EQUIPMENT.
a.  Number and type.
b.  Rated capacity and condition.
10.  OUTPUT.  Product, quantity, and quality.
11.  POWER SOURCE.
12.  WATER SOURCE.
13.  TRANSPORTATION.
a.  Raw materials in (identification, method, and origin).
b.  Finished products out (identification, method, and destination).
14.  PLANNED EXPANSION.
15.  BUILDINGS.  Type, number, and characteristics.
STORAGE FACILITIES
  1.  IDENTIFICATION.  (Same as 1 above.)
  2.  LOCATION.  (Same as 2 above.)
  3.  TYPE.  Gas or petroleum.
  4.  OWNERSHIP.  Government or private.
  5.  TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY.  Barrels, tons, or cubic meters.
  6.  PERCENTAGES OF NATIONAL TOTAL.
Figure I-3.  Checklist-Petroleum and Natural Fields (continued).FM 34-54
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  7.  GENERAL CONDITION.
  8.  STORAGE TANKS.
  9.  STORAGE DRUMS.
a.  Manufacturing (location and capacity).
b.  Cleaning and reclamation (location and capacity).
c.  Filling facilities (location, equipment, and capacity).
10.  TRANSPORTATION. 
 
a.  In (method and origin).
b.  Out (method and destination).
11.  BUILDINGS.  Number, type, and characteristic.
Figure I-3.  Checklist-Petroleum and Natural Fields (continued).FM 34-54
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FACILITY PHYSICAL SECURITY CHECKLIST
  1.  IDENTIFICATION.
a.  Local and official name.
b.  Functional description.
c.  Local address.
d.  Map reference.
       e.  Geographic coordinates.
f.   Additional information.
  2.  BUILDING DESCRIPTION.
a.  Identification.
b.  Type of construction material.
c.  Type of roof.
d.  Blueprints.
e.  Floor plans.
f.   Description of roof.
(1)  Entrances to building.
(2)  Skylights.
(3)  Air-conditioning ducts.
(4)  Maintenance accesses.
(5)  Elevator shafts.
(6)  Emergency exits and fire escapes.
(7)  Ventilation systems.
(8)  Ladders.
(9)  Additional information.
g.  Entrances to building.
(1)  Main entrance.
(2)  Other entrances or exits.
(3)  Non-standard access points.
h.  Sewage and drainage systems.
i.   Water system.
 j.   Interior description of building.
(1)  Floors.
(2)  Corridors.
(3)  Doors.
(4)  Windows.
Figure I-4.  Facility Physical Security Checklist.FM 34-54
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(5)  Locks.
(6)  Stairways.
(7)  Elevators.
(8)  Physical barriers.
(9)  Lighting
     k.  Active security.
          (1)  Security guards.
   (a) Posts.
(b) Arms
(c) Ammunition.
(d) Riot control devices.
(e) Additional information.
(2)  Contract watchmen.
(3)  National police agents.
(4)  Additional information.
l.  Communications equipment available.
MODEL    TYPE NUMBER LOCATION FREQUENCY/CHANNELS ANTENNAS 
m.  Telephone system.
n.  Emergency lighting and power system.
o.  Additional information.
3.  DESCRIPTION OF GROUNDS.
a.  Structures.
b.  Entrances to grounds.
c.  Perimeter fence.
d.  Terrain.
e.  Vegetation.
f.  Lighting-external.
g.  Map or sketch.
 4.  DESCRIPTION OF SURROUNDING AREA (24 Block Area).
a.  Possible observation points.
b.  Relative distances of key terrain.
c.  Additional information.
Figure I-4.  Facility Physical Security Checklist (continued).FM 34-54
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5.  KEY TERRAIN.
    a.  Predominant terrain.
b.  Drop zones.
c.  Landing and Pickup Zones.
d.  Airfields.
e.  Critical lines of communications.
f.  Additional information.
6.  MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
a.  Medical staff and facilities.
b.  Civilian hospitals.
c.  Additional information.
Figure I-4.  Facility Physical Security Checklist (continued).FM 34-54
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  CHECKLIST-RAILWAYS
  1.  IDENTIFICATION.  Route designation (native, military, or other) and segment being
studied.
  2.  LOCATION.
a.  Map reference.  Include series and sheet numbers on both tactical and air-ground
series.
b.  End points of segment.  Political unit, area, UTM coordinates, and geographical
coordinates.
  3.  OWNERSHIP.
  4.  TOTAL TRACK LENGTH.  Double and single tracks in kilometers.
  5.  END POINTS OF DOUBLE TRACK SECTIONS.  Location (UTM) and area name.
  6.  TRACK. 
 
a.  Gage (millimeters).
b.  Rails.
c.  Roadway (total width and double or single track).
     d.  Ditches (depth, width, side slope, lining, condition, cross-section, and structures).
  7.  ROADBED.  Material, total width, and width of shoulders.
  8.  SUBBALLAST.  Material and thickness.
  9.  BALLAST.  Material, size, thickness, and condition.
10.  TIES.  Material, length, width, depth, and spacing.
11.  SPACING OF TRACKS.  Centerline-to-centerline.
12.  RADIUS OF TIGHTEST CURVE.  Location (UTM) and radius.
13.  MAXIMUM GRADE.  Direction of travel and location.
14.  BRIDGES.  Cross-reference to bridge collection file.
a.  Total number of bridges in segment.
b.  Total length of bridging in segment.
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15.  FERRIES.  Cross-reference to ferry collection file.
16.  TUNNELS, GALLERIES, AND SNOW SHEDS (TGSS).  Cross-reference to TGSS
collection file.
17.  UNDERPASSES.  Cross-reference to bridge collection file.
18.  MINIMUM CLEARANCES.  Horizontal and vertical.
19.  AXLE LOAD LIMIT.  Metric tons.
20.  CULVERTS.  Location (UTM) and total number, type, construction material, and bypasses.
21.  ELECTRIFICATION. 
 
a.  End points of electrified sections (UTM).
b.  Power feed (overhead or third rail).
c.  Current characteristics (direct current; alternating current).
d.  Source of power.
22.  MAINLINE JUNCTIONS.  Location (UTM), identification of connecting line, and type switch.
23.  CROSSOVERS.  Location (UTM) and type of switch.
24.  PASSING SIDINGS.  Locations (UTM), number, double-end or single-end, length, and type
of turn.
25.  STATIONS.
a.  Location (local name and UTM coordinates).
b.  Function (passenger, freight, or both).
c.  Facilities.
26.  FREIGHT-HANDLING FACILITIES.
  
a.  Location (local name and UTM coordinates).
b.  Side-loading platforms (number and length).
c.  End-loading bays.
d.  Sidings with access roads.
e.  Freight sheds.
Figure I-5.  Checklist-Railways (continued).FM 34-54
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f.   Turntables (number and diameter).
g.  Cranes (type, number, and capacity).
27.  YARDS.
a.  Location (local name and UTM coordinates).
b.  Function (receiving, classification, departure, storage, and so forth).
c.  Hump or flat.
d.  Number of tracks.
e.  Fuel facilities (type of fuel, quantity normally on hand, and maximum storage capacity).
f.   Other facilities (water, sand, compressed air, and so forth).
g.  Electrification (overhead or third rail).
28.  FUEL FACILITIES.
a.  Location (local name and UTM coordinates).
b.  Type of fuel.
c.  Type of storage and capacity.
d.  Quantity of fuel normally on hand.
e.  Method of loading.
29.  REPAIR SHOPS AND LOCOMOTIVE TERMINALS.
a.  Location (local name and UTM coordinates).
b.  Engine house or turntable.
c.  Service facilities.
30.  WATERING FACILITIES.
a.  Location (local name and UTM coordinates).
b.  Source and type of storage.
31.  SIGNALS AND TRAIN CONTROL.  Location (UTM) and type.
32.  CRITICAL POINTS.
a.  Type (points subject to rock slides, snow slides, flooding, or subject to interdiction and
ambush).
b.  Location (local name and UTM coordinates).
33.  USE.  Average number of trains per day (both passenger and freight).
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34.  SECTIONS IN NEED OF REPAIR.  Location and nature of repair, and effort required to
repair.
35.  CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIR EQUIPMENT.
a.  Type and characteristics of equipment.
b.  Location of park where kept (UTM coordinates).
36.  MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE.
37.  PLANNED EXTENSIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS.
38.  MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS.
39.  SAFETY AND SECURITY STANDARDS.
40.  ROLLING STOCK.
Figure I-5.  Checklist-Railways (continued).FM 34-54
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CHECKLIST-UNDERGROUND FACILITIES
  1.  IDENTIFICATION.  Native name, military designation, and tunnel number.
  2.  LOCATION OF PORTALS.
a.  Map reference.  Include series and sheet numbers of both tactical and air-ground          
series.
b.  Political unit, kilometer points, UTM coordinates, and geographic coordinates.
c.  Landmark reference.  Description and location of landmark, and azimuth and distance    
from landmark to nearest portal.
  3.  LENGTH (portal to portal).
  4.  TYPE.  TGSS.
  5.  CROSS-SECTION.
a.  Shape (semicircular, elliptical, horseshoe, square with arched ceiling).
b.  Width of traveled way.
c.  Width at widest part.
d.  Height of widest part.
e.  Height of ceiling at center.
f.   Height of ceiling at edge of traveled way.
g.  Rise of arch.
  6.  CONSTRUCTIONS (HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL).  Type, least clearance, and   
location (meters from nearest portal).
  7.  RAILROAD TRACKS.
a.  Number for which tunnel was designed.
b.  Number in use.
c.  Gage.
d.  Center-to-center spacing.
e.  Cross-reference to railway collection file.
  8.  HIGHWAY.
  
a.  Wearing surface (material, thickness, and condition).
b.  Base course.
c.  Subgrade.
d.  Cross-reference to highway collection file.
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  9.  CHANNEL (water tunnels).
a.  Cross-section dimensioned.
b.  Sides (material and thickness).
c.  Bottom (material and thickness).
d.  Normal depth.
e.  Normal current velocity.
10.  ALIGNMENT.
a.  Horizontal (position, curve radius, and curve location).
b.  Vertical (grade percent, length, and location).
11.  NUMBER OF MANWAYS.  Dimensions and spacing.
12.  OBSTACLE TUNNELED.
13.  PORTAL.  Design and material.
14.  LINING MATERIAL.  Type, thickness, condition, and points of change.
15.  SHORING AND BRACING.
a.  Location and spacing.
b.  Design.
c.  Materials.
d.  Dimensions of members.
e.  Arrangement and spacing of members.
16.  STRUCTURAL DESIGN, MATERIALS, AND DIMENSIONS OF GALLERIES AND
SNOWSHEDS.
17.  GEOLOGICAL DATA.
a.  Material through which tunnel passes.
b.  Geology of adjacent areas.
18.  OVERHEAD COVER.  Material and depth.
19.  DEMOLITION CHAMBERS.  Location and dimensions.
20.  VENTILATION.  Description and adequacy.
Figure I-6.  Checklist-Underground Facilities (continued).FM 34-54
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21.  DRAINAGE.  Description, location, and adequacy.
22.  LIGHTING FACILITIES.  Type, location, and power source.
23.  YEAR COMPLETED.  
24.  BYPASSES.  Location, condition, effort required to establish.
25.  ALTERNATE ROUTES.  (Cross-reference to highway collection file).
26.  TRAFFIC CONTROL MARKINGS.  
 
27.  APPROACHES.  Characteristics, grade, surface, curves, turnouts, and parking areas.
28.  SURFACE FEATURES OVER TUNNELS.  Vegetation, structures, and surface
configuration.
29.  EFFECTS OF CLIMATE AND WEATHER.
a.  Snow blockage (probable occurrence, effects, and duration).
b.  Flooding (periods of occurrence, effects, and duration).
30.  SPECIAL GEOPHYSICAL PHENOMENA.
31.  SUSCEPTIBILITY TO ABOVE-GROUND DEMOLITIONS.
32.  CAMOUFLAGE AND DEFENSES.
33.  PRESENT USE.
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GLOSSARY
ACRONYMS
AC Active Component
ACE analysis and control element
ACOM US Atlantic Command
ADA air defense artillery
ADP automated data processing
AFACSI Air Force Assistant Chief of
   Staff for Intelligence
AFMIC Armed Forces Medical
Intelligence Center
AL Alabama
AMB aviation maintenance battalion
AMC US Army Materiel Command
ammo ammunition
APG Aberdeen Proving Ground
ARAT Army Reprogramming
  Analysis Team
ARCENT US Army Central Command
ASP ammunition supply point
ATGM antitank guided missile
ATP ammunition transfer point
Aug August
AVIM aviation intermediate 
maintenance
AWACS Airborne Early Warning
AZ Arizona
BDA battle damage assessment
BIDS Biological Integrated 
Detection System
bn battalion
BOS battlefield operating system
Btu British thermal unit
C I command, control, 
3
communications, and
intelligence
CA Civil Affairs
CB chemical and biological
CBATEB US Army Chemical and
Biological Agent Technical
Evaluation Board
CBDCOM Chemical and Biological
Defense Command
CCIR commander's critical 
information requirements
C-E communications-electronics
CED captured enemy document
CEE captured enemy equipment
CEM captured enemy materiel
CENTCOM US Central Command
CHATS CI/HUMINT Automation Tool
Set
CI counterintelligence
CINCLANT Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CJCMEC Combined Joint Captured
Materiel Exploitation Center
CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force
CM&D collection management and
dissemination
CMEC Captured Materiel Exploitation
Center
COMTECHREP   Complementary Technical  
 Intelligence Report
COMMZ communication zone
CONUS continental United States
COSCOM Corps Support Command
CSA corps storage area
CSD contingency support 
detachment
CSS combat service support
CWCC Centralized Weapons 
Collection Center
DA Department of the Army
DARPA Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency
DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Intelligence
DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations
DETECHREP Detailed Technical Report
DHS Defense HUMINT Service
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAM Defense Intelligence Agency
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DISCOM Division Support Command
DISE Deployable Intelligence
Support Element
div division
DMSO division medical supply officer
DOD Department of Defense
DOCEX document exploitation
DOS disk operating system
DSNET Defense Secure Network
DTG date-time group
DTO district transportation officer
EA electronic attack
EAC echelons above corps
EACIC echelons above corps 
intelligence center
ECB echelons corps and below
ELECTRO-OPTINT electro-optical intelligence
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EODTIC Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Technical Information
Center
EP electronic protection
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ERDEC US Army Chemical Research
Development and 
Engineering Center
EW electronic warfare
EXCEN exploitation center
FSAC Fire Support Armaments
Center
FMA foreign materiel acquisition
FME foreign materiel exploitation
FMEP Foreign Materiel Exploitation
Program
FMMEP Foreign Medical Materiel
Exploitation Program
FMIB Foreign Materiel Intelligence
Branch
FMP Foreign Materiel Program
FMT Foreign Materiel for Training
FPB Force Projection Brigade
G1 Assistant Chief of Staff, G1,
Personnel
G2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G2,
Intelligence
G3 Assistant Chief of Staff, G3,
Operations
G4 Assistant Chief of Staff, G4,
Logistics
G5 Assistant Chief of Staff, G5,
Civil Affairs
HERA High Explosive Rocket Assist
HHC headquarters and 
headquarters company
HOTAS hands on throttle and stick
HQDA Headquarters, Department of
the Army
hp horsepower
HUD heads-up display
HUMINT human intelligence
I&W indications and warnings
IEW intelligence and electronic
warfare
IFF identification, friend or foe
IIR intelligence information report
IMEP International Materiel 
Evaluation Program
IMINT imagery intelligence
inf infantry
INSCOM US Army Intelligence and
Security Command
IPB intelligence preparation of the
battlefield
IPC intermediate processing
center
IR information requirements
IRSTS infrared search and track set
J1 Assistant Chief of Staff, J1,
Personnel
J2 Assistant Chief of Staff, J2,
Intelligence
J3 Operations Directorate
J4 Logistics Directorate
J5 Joint staff plans and policy
J6 Communications-Electronic
Directorate
JCMEC Joint Captured Materiel      FM 34-54
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Exploitation Center
JDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence
Support System
JIC Joint Intelligence Center
JTF Joint Task Force
JTIB Joint Technical Intelligence
Branch
Kb kilobyte
kV kilovolt
kVA kilovoltampere
kW kilowatt
kWh kilowatthour
LAR liquid aerosol remove
LIDAR laser detection and ranging
LNE liaison element
LNO liaison officer
LOS line-of-sight
MACOM major Army command
MASINT measurement and signature
intelligence
MCC movement control center
MCO movement control office
MD Maryland
MDR MASINT data requirements
mech mechanized
med medical
MEDLOG medical logistic battalion
MEDSOM medical, supply, optical, and
maintenance
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
MFD multifunctional display
MI military intelligence
mL milliliter
MMC materiel management center
MOS military occupational specialty
MRC mission requirements center
MSB maintenance support battalion
MSE mobile subscriber equipment
MSIC US Missile and Space 
Intelligence Center
MSR main supply route
NA not applicable
NAIC National Air Intelligence
Center
NATO North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization
NAVEODTECHDIV Naval EOD Technical Division
NBC nuclear, biological, and
chemical
NETC see NAVEODTECHCEN
NGIC National Ground Intelligence
Center
NO number
NRT near-real time
NSA National Security Agency
NTC Naval Technical Center
NUCINT nuclear intelligence
NVA North Vietnamese Army
OB order of battle
OCONUS outside continental United
States
ODCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff, Intelligence
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
OPCON operational control
OPCEN operations center
OPLAN operations plan
OPORD operations order
OPSEC operations security
PACOM US Pacific Command
PIR priority intelligence 
requirements
POC point of contact
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PM provost marshal
PRETECHREP Preliminary Technical 
Intelligence Report
PSYOP psychological operations
psi pounds per square inch
RADINT radar intelligenceFM 34-54
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RC Reserve Components
RDTE research, development, test,
and evaluation
R&D research and development
R&S reconnaissance and 
surveillance
RDEC research, development, and
engineering center
RF/EMPINT radiofrequency/ 
electromagnetic pulse
intelligence
RINT radiation intelligence
RSP render safe procedure
RWR radar warning receiver
S2 Intelligence Officer (US Army)
S3 Operations and Training
Officer (US Army)
S4 Supply Officer (US Army)
S&T scientific and technical
S&TI scientific and technical
intelligence 
SALUTE  size, activity, location, unit,
time, equipment (spot report
format)
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SASO stability and support
operations
SATCOM satellite communications
SCIF Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility
SIGCEN signal center
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIR specific information requests
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SME subject matter expert
SOP standing operating procedure
SOR specific orders and requests
SRBM short-range ballistic missile
SSC software support center
STANAG Standardization Agreement
STICEUR Scientific Intelligence Center
Europe
STICFE Scientific Intelligence Center
Far East
STU-III Secure Telephone Unit-Third
Generation
sup supply
SUPCEN support center
TA Theater Army
TAACOM Theater Army Area Command
TAMCA Theater Army Movement
Control Agency
TAML Theater Army Medical 
Laboratory
TAREX target exploitation
TBP to be published
TECHSUM Technical Intelligence 
Summary
TECHINT technical intelligence
TECOM US Army Test and Evaluation
Command
TECRAS technical reconnaissance and
surveillance
TEU US Army Technical Escort
  Unit
TGSS tunnels, galleries, and snow
sheds
TIARA tactical intelligence and
related activities
TIR Technical Intelligence Report
TRADOC US Army Training and 
Doctrine Command
trans transportation
TSS target sensing system
TTF TECHINT target folder
TTP tactics, techniques, and
procedures
TV television
UAV unmanned aerial 
vehicle
UIC unit identification code
US United States
USAARDEC US Army Armament 
Research, Development,
and Engineering Center
USAF US Air Force
USAIC&FH US Army Intelligence Center
and Fort Huachuca      FM 34-54
Glossary-5
USAMRIID US Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious
Diseases
USATECHDET US Army Technical 
Detachment
USMC US Marine Corps
UTM universal transverse mercator
XO Executive OfficerFM 34-54
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TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
acoustic intelligence Intelligence derived from the collection and
processing of acoustic phenomena.
captured enemy document Documents captured from the enemy.
captured enemy equipment Equipment captured from the enemy.
captured enemy materiel The combination of documents, equipment, and
material captured from the enemy.
Class I Subsistence items and gratuitous health and
welfare items (B-rations; meals, ready to eat;
fresh fruits; and vegetables).
Class II Equipment, other than principal items, prescribed
in authorization and allowance tables (individual
equipment, clothing items, tentage, tool sets,
administrative supplies, housekeeping supplies).
Class III POL, which are petroleum fuels, hydraulic and
insulating oils, chemical products, antifreeze
compounds, compressed gases, and coal. 
Class III (bulk) is normally fuel; for example,
diesel, motor gasoline, and aviation fuel.  Class
III (package) is other elements such as
lubricants, antifreeze, and fog oil.
Class IV Construction and barrier materials (lumber,
sandbags, and barbed wire).
Class V Ammunition (small-arms ammunition, artillery
rounds, hand grenades, explosives, mines,
fuzes, detonators, missiles, and bombs,
including special ammunition—chemical and
nuclear rounds).
Class VI Personal demand items; the items that are
normally sold through the exchange system      FM 34-54
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(cigarettes, candy, soap, and so forth, contained
in ration supplemental sundries packs).
Class VII Major end items (final combinations of items that
are assembled for their intended use:  vehicles,
self-propelled artillery pieces, missile launchers,
and major weapon systems—the weapons
themselves, not the crews).
Class VIII Medical material (medicines, stretchers, surgical
instruments, and medical equipment repair
parts).
Class IX Repair parts and components, including kits and
assemblies, and items required for maintenance
support of all equipment (batteries, spark plugs,
and axles).
Class X Material required to support nonmilitary
programs; the items used to support CA
operations (commercial design tractor for use by
local civilians, farms tools, and so forth).
combined operations Operations conducted by forces of two or more
allied nations acting together for the
accomplishment of a single mission.
communications intelligence Technical and intelligence information
derived from foreign communications by other
than the intended recipients.  Also called
COMINT.
etiologic agent The cause of a disorder or disease as
determined by medical diagnosis.
electro-optical intelligence Intelligence other than signal intelligence derived
from the optical monitoring of the
electromagnetic spectrum from ultraviolet (0.01
micrometers) through far infrared (1,000
micrometers).  Also called ELECTRO-OPTINT. 
The collection, processing, exploitation, and
analysis of emitted or reflected energy across
the optical portion (infrared, visible, and
ultraviolet) of the electromagnetic spectrum.
foreign materiel The all-encompassing term for the weaponsFM 34-54
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systems, equipment, apparatus, documents, and
supplies of a foreign military force or nonmilitary
organization.
Foreign Material Program The Army program for exploiting, developing, or
providing foreign military materiel, commercial
representations of foreign materiel with potential
miliary application, related foreign documents in
the Army inventory, and exploitation reports on
this materiel of value to US intelligence, RDTE,
and military planning, operations, and training.
This includes planning concerning intelligence
and non-intelligence acquisition requirements,
management of signature and simulator
programs, participation in evacuation efforts, and
support to the Opposing Forces Program.
joint operations The integrated military activities of two or more
service components—Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps—of the US military.
measurement and signature intelligence S&TI  information obtained by quantitative and
qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial,
wavelength, time dependence, modulation,
plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from
specific technical sensors for the purpose of
identifying any distinctive features associated
with the source, emitter, or sender and to
facilitate subsequent identification and/or
measurement of the same.  Also called MASINT.
materials Raw substances, scrap, semifinished and
finished; supplies.
materiel  All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled
weapons, aircraft, and so forth, and related
spares, repair parts and support equipment, but
excluding real property, installations, and
utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain,
and support military activities without distinction
as to its application for administrative or combat
purposes.      FM 34-54
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medical intelligence That category of intelligence resulting from
collection, evaluation, analysis, and
interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific,
and environmental information which is of
interest to strategic planning and to military
medical planning and operations for the
conservation of the fighting strength of friendly
forces and the formation of assessments of
foreign medical capabilities in both military and
civilian sectors.
nuclear intelligence  Intelligence information derived from the
collection and analysis of radiation and other
effects resulting from radioactive sources.  Also
called NUCINT.
radar intelligence Intelligence derived from data collected by radar. 
Also called RADINT.
scientific and technical intelligence The product resulting from the collection,
evaluation, intelligence analysis, and
interpretation of foreign scientific and technical
information which covers:  a.  foreign
developments in basic applied research and in
applied engineering techniques; and b.  scientific
and techical characteristics, capabilities, and
limitations of all foreign military systems, and
materiel, the research and development related
thereto, and the production methods employed
for their manufacture.  Also called S&TI.
technical intelligence Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign
material, produced for strategic, operational, and
tactical level commanders.  Technical
intelligence begins when an individual service
member finds something new on the battlefield
and takes the proper steps to report it.  The item
is then exploited at succeedingly higher levels
until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize
the adversary's technological advantage.  Also
called TECHINT.
unintentional radiation intelligence Intelligence derived from the collection and
  analysis of noninformation-bearing elements
extracted from the electromagnetic energy
unintentionally emanated by foreign devices,
equipment, and systems, excluding thoseFM 34-54
Glossary-10
generated by the detonation of nuclear weapons. 
Also called RINT.         FM 34-54
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IPC, A-5
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TSS, A-5
areas of exploitation, 3-8
Army, 2-2, 2-5
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Army Materiel Command
CBDCOM, 2-2, 2-5
STICEUR, 2-2, 2-5, A-3
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automation systems, 3-9
aviation officer, 5-5
battlefield TECHINT, 3-1
203d MI Battalion role, 3-1, 3-3
ammunition officer role, 5-7
analysis, 4-8
aviation officer role, 5-5
channels, 3-5
chemical officer role, 5-5
CMEC role, 3-2, 3-6
Collection Company, 3-3
command surgeon role, 5-6
definition, 3-1
elements, 5-1
engineer officer role, 5-5
EOD role, 5-6
exploitation, 4-7
Exploitation Company, 3-3
JCMEC role, 5-7
MASINT Detachment, 3-3
NTC Detachment, 3-3
provost marshal role, 5-6
reporting sequence, 4-7
reports, E-1 
responsibilities, 5-1
Staff Judge Advocate role, 5-7
 
BDA, A-2.  See also MASINT
biomedical samples, Appendix H
CA elements, 5-10
CB sampling
enviornmental, H-2
liquid and vapor, H-7
packaging, H-8
procedures, H-1
soil, H-7
vegetation, H-7
water, H-7
CBDCOM, 2-5
CCIR, 4-1
C-E and IEW Exploitation Element, B-4,
B-6, See also JCMEC
C-E TECHINT, 3-10
CED.  See CEM
CEE.  See CEMFM 34-54
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CEM, 1-6, 1-7, 3-1 
aviation officer role, 5-5
battlefield TECHINT responsibilities for, 
3-1, 4-3, 5-1, 
CMEC responsibilities, 3-3 through 3-9,
   D-5
command responsibilities, D-6
disposition and destruction, D-9, D-10
exploitation of,  3-4, 3-5
exploitation requirements, F-2
handling and evacuation of, Appendix C,
D-4
handling and processing, B-2 through D-8, 
information flow, 4-4
JCMEC responsibilities, 5-7, Appendix B
marking and tagging, B-2, C-9 through
C-13, D-6
policy, D-4 
provost marshal role, 5-6
recovery, C-14
reporting, D-3, D-4, Appendix E
reporting procedures, Appendix E
requirements, D-9
S4 responsibilities, 3-4
SJA role, 5-7
staff responsibilities, 5-1 through 5-4
checklists, Appendix I
chemical officer, 5-5
CJCMEC, 3-3, 3-4, 3-8, 5-7.  See also
CMEC and JCMEC
CM&D element, B-4, B-6.  See also JCMEC
CMEC, 1-5, 3-2, C-1, C-2, C-6, C-8, F-2 
See also CJCMEC; JCMEC; JTIB
functions, 3-3 through 3-10, D-6
S4 responsibilities, 3-4
CMEC (Forward)
functions, 3-7
handling CEM, 4-3, 4-5, C-9
J4/G4 responsibilities, 5-4
logistic functions, C-2
responsibilities, 4-2, 4-6
collection.  See TECHINT collection
collection company, B-4, B-6.  See Also
JCMEC
collection managers, 3-3
collection plan, F-1
command surgeon, 5-6
COMTECHREP, E-1, E-3
Type A, E-4 
Type B, E-6 
Type C, E-9 
conflict.  See military environments 
DARPA, 2-2, 2-4
Defense Intelligence Agency
AFMIC, 2-2, 2-3
DHS, 2-2, 2-4
MSIC, 2-2, 2-3
DETECHREP, E-1, E-10
DHS, 2-2, 2-4
dissemination, See also
TECHINT
definition, 4-6
of CEM, 5-8
of EOD information, 5-6
of TECHINT products, 3-1, 4-6
of TIRs, E-1, E-11
staff section duties, 5-1
DOD S&TI community, 2-2
EAC, 2-6
at force projection brigades, A-1
TECHINT support, 3-6, D-2FM 34-54
Index-3
ELECTRO-OPTINT, A-3
engineer officer, 5-6
engineer topographic and terrain units,
5-11
EPW
evacuation and processing, 5-1, C-6
tags, C-9 through C-13
EXCEN, B-4, B-5.  See also JCMEC
Air and Missile Exploitation Element, B-5
C-E and IEW Exploitation Element, B-6
CM&D Element, B-6
Ground Exploitation Element, B-5
Maritime Exploitation Element, B-5
Medical and NBC Exploitation Element,
   B-5
force projection brigades, 2-2, 2-6, A-3
foreign materiel exploitation, 2-5, 2-7, 
B-3
Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program,
   2-3, 2-6
Foreign Materiel for Training Program,
   2-6, 3-5
Foreign Materiel Intelligence Branch,
   1-6
Foreign Medical Materiel Exploitation       
Program, 2-3
foreign technological developments, 2-1
geophysical intelligence, A-4
Ground Exploitation Element, B-4, B-5.
See also JCMEC
historical perspectives
Grenada, 1-6
Gulf War, 1-6
Haiti, 1-8
Korean War, 1-5
Raid on Bruneval, 1-3
Somalia, 1-7
Vietnam, 1-5
World War II, 1-2
information requirements, 5-6, D-1, F-1
developed by JTIB, 4-1
JCMEC role, 5-7
INSCOM functions, 2-6
FPB, 2-2, 2-6
FMEP 2-3, 2-6
FMT Program, 2-5
MASINT responsibilities, A-2
NGIC, 2-2, 2-6
S&TI exchange, 2-3
TECHINT operations responsibilities, 2-5
intelligence collection
management, B-3
MASINT mission, A-1
intelligence cycle, 4-1, 4-6
intelligence production center
AFMIC, 2-3
MSIC, 2-3
intermediate processing centers, A-5
J1/G1
responsibilities, 5-1, D-1
J2/G2, 3-2
compliance with Geneva Convention, 5-3
relationship with capturing units, 5-8
relationship with Command Surgeon,
5-6, D-4
responsibilities, 4-1, 5-2
  
J3/G3 responsibilities, 5-1 through 5-6
J4/G4 responsibilities, 5-4, C-3
J5/G5 responsibilities, 5-5 FM 34-54
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JCMEC, 1-6, 3-4, 3-8.  See also JTIB;
CMEC; CJCMEC
exploitation requirements, 3-7, F-2, 
in joint or combined operations, 3-4
LNE, 4-8, D-4
organization, 3-3, B-4
purpose, B-1
responsibilities, 3-8, 4-2, 5-7, B-1,
D-11
role in intelligence cycle, 4-1 through 4-8
required reports, 4-7, Appendix E
JTIB, 4-1, B-1, B-2.  See also JCMEC;
CMEC; CJCMEC
in joint operations, 3-6
missions, 3-6, 4-7
TECHINT reports, 4-6, E-1
lessons learned, 1-8
liaison elements.  See also TECHINT
composition, 3-2, 3-8, B-1, B-3
responsibilities, 3-4, 3-5, 4-3, 4-8, B-3, E-1
Maritime Exploitation Element, B-4, B-5. 
See also JCMEC
MASINT, 2-4, 2-6, A-1
agency responsibilities, A-2
BDA, A-2
data requirements, 2-6
in support of
collection teams, 3-4, 3-8
  force modernization, A-6
  S&TI, 2-6
TECRAS, 2-6
mission, 3-3, A-1
RINT integration, A-4
TIARA systems, A-1
training, 2-7
materials intelligence, A-4
Medical and NBC Exploitation
Element, B-4, B-5.  See also JCMEC
medical TECHINT, 3-10
medical units, 5-11, D-12
collection of samples, H-2, H-9, H-11
MEF intelligence element, 3-9
military environments
conflict, 1-2, 3-3, B-3
peacetime, 1-2, 2-5, A-1
war, 1-2, 1-5, 1-8, 3-3, 3-6, A-1 
military police, 5-6, C-6
CEM role, 5-6, 5-8, 5-11, C-6, C-14
duties on the battlefield, 5-11
in support of JCMEC, B-2
responsibilities of, 5-6, 5-11, C-6, C-14
mobility TECHINT, 3-10
MSIC, 2-2, 2-3
munitions TECHINT, 3-10
NAIC, 2-2, 2-4
National Ground Intelligence Center, 2-2,
2-6, A-3, G-1
Navy, 2-2, 2-4
MCIA, 2-2
ONI, 2-2, 2-4
EOD training, 2-4
NBC, B-5, C-2, C-6, C-8, H-1, H-3, H-13
capturing unit role, 5-8
chemical officer role, 5-5
command surgeon role, 5-6
equipment, 4-9
functional area of TECHINT, 3-10,
4-3, 4-9, C-7
J2/G2 responsibilities, 5-2 
materials intelligence, A-4 
NBC (continued)
role of TEU, 2-2,2-5
samples, 5-11, D-11, H-3FM 34-54
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NBC reconnaissance teams
responsibilities, 5-11, H-2, H-3, D-6, D-11,
D-12 
NBC TECHINT, 3-10
NSA, 2-2, 2-4
NTC mission, 3-5
NUCINT, A-5
ODCSINT, 2-2
responsibilities, 2-3, 2-5, A-3
OPCEN, B-4.  See also JCMEC
operational support, H-1, 3-4 through 3-10
role of commanders, 1-2, B-3
TECHINT requirements, 2-1, 3-4, 3-5
peacetime engagement.  See military
environments
PIR, D-1, F-1 
capturing units, 5-8
command surgeon, 5-6
JCMEC, 5-8
POL, C-4, C-6, I-2
PRETECHREP, E-1, E-2, E-3
processing.  See TECHINT
production.  See TECHINT
provost marshal, 5-6
PSYOP teams, 5-9, 5-10
radar intelligence, A-4
radio frequency intelligence, A-4
RC TECHINT, 3-6, 3-9
RDEC, 2-5 
responsibilities of
capturing units, 5-8
engineer topographic and terrain
     units, 5-10
EOD, 5-6, 5-12
J1/G1, 5-1
J2/G2, 5-2
J3/G3, 5-3
J4/G4, 5-4
J5/G5, 5-5
JCMEC, 3-8, 4-2, 5-7, B-1, D-11
military police, 5-6, 5-11, C-6, C-14
MI units, 5-9
NBC reconnaissance teams, 5-11
SOF, 5-9
staff officers, 5-5
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203d MI Bn, 2-6, 2-7
AFMIC role, 2-3
Air Force role, 2-4
Army role, 2-5
characteristics, 1-1
CMEC role, 3-7
community structure, 2-1, 2-2, F-3
definition of, 1-1
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directorate responsibilities, 2-3
exploitation of, 4-8
fulfilling TECHINT requirements, 2-3
historical perspective, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8
JCMEC role, 5-8, F-3
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S&TI directorate, 2-3
SALUTE
example of, E-1, E-2
reporting, 4-7, 5-8, C-7, C-14, D-3
scientific and technical information.
See S&TI
SIGCEN, B-4, B-6.  See also JCMEC
signatures analysis, 3-10
SIR, 4-1, 4-3
SJA, 5-3.  See also J2/G2
SOF
   aviation units, 5-10
CA elements, 5-10
  PSYOP teams, 5-10
   ranger units, 5-9
Special Forces and Ranger Units, 5-9
Special Operations Aviation Units, 5-10
special technical reports, E-1
SUPCEN, B-4
STICEUR, 2-5
 
203d MI Battalion, 2-6
CMEC function, 3-3, 3-4
collection company, 3-3, 3-4
exploitation company, 3-3, 3-4
HHC, 3-3
JCMEC and CJCMEC, 3-3, 3-8
MASINT Detachment, 3-3, 3-5
mission, 2-6, 3-3, F-2
NGIC, 3-3
NTC Detachment, 3-3, 3-5
organization, 3-3
TAML, B-5, D-6, D-13, H-9, H-11, H-12
target folder, 4-2
target sensing systems, A-5
TECHINT
at operational level, 1-2
at strategic level, 1-1, 2-1
at tactical level, 1-2
battlefield operations, 3-1, 3-2
CEM, C-1
collection, 3-1 through 3-10  4-3, F-1 
definition, 2-1 
dissemination, 4-6
goals, 2-1
historical perspective, 1-1 through 1-9
in force protection, 1-9
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intelligence cycle, 4-1, 4-7
lessons learned, 1-8
liaison elements, 3-5, 3-9, 4-3, 4-8, D-2,
F-1
mission, 1-1
objectives, 2-1
processing, 4-6
production, 4-6
reports, E-1
responsibilities, 5-1
support to the warfighter, 1-1
target folder, 4-2
templating, 4-2
TECHINT analysts, 3-7
CEM responsibilities, 3-1, 5-12
exploitation function, 3-4, 3-8, 4-8, 4-9, 
C-6
reports, E-1
TECHINT collection, 3-1 through 3-10, 
5-11
chemical officer role, 5-5
CM&D, B-6
definition, 4-3
historical perspective, 1-8 
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JCMEC role, B-1 through B-6
JTIB role, B-2
  NBC reconnaissance role, 5-11
of CB samples, D-11 through D-14
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